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'Getting Asia' Right[1]

Siddharth Mallavarapu

Abstract

What does it take to interpret Asia accurately? In this think piece, I distill nine arguments concerning Asia, mapping a set of possibilities for students of International Relations (IR) embarking on the study of Asia. I argue that there is much to be gleaned from these distinctive claims surrounding Asia both theoretically and empirically and further that these are exciting times for those focused on this slice of international reality. If the 21st century lives up to its promise of being the Asian century, it is indeed worthwhile to get some analytical traction of what drives this populous and increasingly influential theatre of the world. If Asian realities for any reason belie that promise, it would still be analytically worthwhile to ask what holds Asia back. Either way, I argue that turning to serious intellectual investments in the study of Asia is a win-win situation for students of IR.

Keywords: Asia, international relations theory, eurocentrism, realism, liberalism, foreign policy analysis, practice, civilizations.

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[1]The title is a play on David Kang's 2003, 'Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks', *International Security*, (27)4:57-85.

Introduction

In 2003, David Kang published a piece in the pages of the journal *International Security* titled 'Getting Asia Wrong'. It advanced an argument as to how mainstream realism made inaccurate predictions about power transitions and balancing in Asia and especially misread China's motivations in a changing world (Kang, 2003: 57-85). Kang's argument is one in a litany of claims that attempt to theorize Asia afresh. I shall confine myself to nine such arguments here (including Kang's own) to give readers a flavor of the distinct positions emerging on a wider continuum of evolving analytical moves with regard to the study of Asia. These arguments carry potential implications for researchers embarking on the study of Asia, which I shall flesh along as we proceed.

In terms of a broad road map, beginning with Kang's claims of Asian exceptionalism, I examine Alastair Iain Johnston's position on the significance of 'local knowledge' in the context of East Asia (Kang, 2012,: 53-78). Another valuable innovation is a conscious acknowledgment of hitherto neglected intellectual histories and opening up of critical archives in Asia arguably best represented in the works of Amitav Acharya and Prasenjit Duara (Duara, 2010; 2010). In addition to these contributions, I would also like to contend with Muthiah Alagappa's notion of 'conceptual traveling' advanced in a substantive edited volume on '*Asian Security Practices*' (Alagappa, 1998).

An alternative register of claims with regard to contemporary Asia, premised on the centrality of the state, has been offered by Saadia M. Pekannen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot in their recently co-edited handbook on Asia (Pekannen et. al.,2014). They also engage through their contributors, strands of realist and liberal International Relations theory with a special focus on Asia in particular, which merits further commentary. In the same volume, as an advocate of foreign policy analysis (FPA), Yeun Foong Khong advances a persuasive case for restoring political agency to Asian actors through a rigorous application of FPA as a conscious methodological choice with regard to the study of Asia

(Khong, 2014: 81-99). Similarly, Peter Katzenstein's prior suggestion to take 'civilizations' as a category more seriously while retaining a fair amount of 'analytical eclecticism' in the study of Asia provokes further thoughts in this context on how Asia may be best approached given the current state of play within the discipline of International Relations (Katzenstein, 2010; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 411-431).

There are three explicit and fairly straightforward objectives that I seek to accomplish in this study. First, the intent is to attract researchers embarking on a study of International Relations to take Asia more seriously. Asia is exciting – in terms of its evolving political, social and economic configurations. While it may appear a cliché to suggest that the 21st century is likely to be an 'Asian Century', there is more than an iota of truth in that formulation. Further, there is a pressing intellectual rationale to invest in the study of Asia (just as there is a case to be made to bring Africa, South America and the Arab world in particular much more centrally in terms of the main sinews of International Relations thinking), especially given the general Anglo-American ethnocentrism that has characterized the discipline. There remains much that still remains unexplored in terms of our study of Asia. Researchers need not worry about the limited shelf life of their work on Asia. If it is rigorously done, it is both likely to attract considerable intellectual attention both within and outside Asia and second, it could end up making a significant contribution to an otherwise under-researched part of the world.

Second, there are competing accounts of what constitutes Asia. As we proceed, I intend gesturing to these frames that emerge in various studies of Asia. While clearly there is no single definition of Asia, it is also important not to treat all of Asia as similar. As Acharya asserts unequivocally in the title of one of his articles 'Asia is not one' (Acharya, 2010). The existing scholarship reminds us of both the 'dynamic' nature of regional self-definitions as well as the more complicated connotations particular conceptions of a region tend to attract. Researchers embarking on the study of Asia will

need to at the outset spell out their working definitions of Asia and come clean on their theoretical and empirical slants of emphases that characterize their particular studies of Asia.

Third, equally compelling and worth reiterating in my view is a conscious effort to theorize Asia anew. The challenge this time is for researchers within the region to particularly contribute to the task of theory production based on sound empirical research. Asia needs to be engaged on its own terms. Asymmetries between the metropolitan and peripheral sites of theory production need to be redressed by a new generation of scholars as they come to grips with the politics of 'self-esteem' (Mehta, 2009). The allusion here is specifically to overcome the epistemic wounds inflicted in the past by colonialism on knowledge systems in formerly colonized societies (Cohn, 1996). It is perhaps pertinent to ask if these wounds are now slowly but surely healing. If this is true as I am inclined to argue, it augurs well for the re-theorization of Asia as well as the enrichment of the 'international' character of the discipline of International Relations by consciously bringing these Asian theorizations in conversation with already existing bodies of scholarship in the relevant domains.

A final disclaimer before we proceed. 'Getting Asia' right does not entail rejecting everything from Anglo-American International Relations Theory, merely because of its provenance. However, it necessitates a willingness to scratch the surface and point to anomalies and blind spots in mainstream theorizing where they exist, revise and if necessary reject theories that fare poorly in terms of explicating Asian realities and offer where warranted fresh theoretical explanations based on an empirical engagement of Asian realities. This is not an impossible order.

Many of the scholars and the arguments I present here have demonstrated precisely how some of these un-problematized claims can be contested. These 'opening gambits' might provide a new generation of International Relations scholarship room to creatively engage Asia (Guilhot, 2011). The initial responses may entail widening the theoretical fissures. However, these may

eventually need to speak to rivals in terms of ideas and to also ensure to the extent possible an overall coherence in IR while not glossing over very real differences, both theoretical and empirical. The accent is on contributing original ideas with regard to contemporary Asia and simultaneously contending with a wider global IR community.

Argument 1: The Case for Political Exclusivity

What I intend doing here is present some key propositions that Kang outlines in his 'Getting Asia Wrong' intervention (Kang, 2003, 57-85). There are five key claims, I identify which I shall briefly list here and say something about what insights are potentially worth building on for scholars encountering this scholarship for the first time.

The first claim relates to the 'Eurocentrism' of the discipline. This is not an unfamiliar word to anybody studying International Relations in the global south. There is a long line of theorization along these lines (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2004; Shilliam, 2010; Hobson, 2012; Muppidi, 2012; Seth, 2013; Shilliam et.al., 2014). What is significant is how Kang interprets the damage done by Eurocentrism and what corrective action needs to be taken. Kang argues in this connection that European theories by and large tend to be premised on Western experiences (Kang 2003, 57-60). The 'west' here is used as shorthand, to refer to Anglo-American IR. While there is nothing wrong in building theories based on the European experience, the dangers relate to the lack of recognition of the limits of that experience. Kang asks, should not Asian experience be a guide to theorizing from Asia? Do Asian realities contradict claims made by Eurocentric theories and in what ways? (Kang, 2003: 57-85). These are questions that are bound to surface in any such discussion and are worth probing more closely (Barma et.al, 2009).

Second, Kang takes on John Mearsheimer and his version of offensive realism for misreading Asian countries drawing on the

latter's classic work *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001). He suggests that such accounts tend to be unduly 'pessimistic' in their reading of Asian futures and wrongly characterize countries like Japan as 'semi-sovereign'. Kang argues that Japan remains disinclined to 'balance' with either China or the United States in the Asian theatre. Similarly, he argues that Mearsheimer is mistaken when he ascribes to Japan the characteristics typically associated with realist states. Japan is different and such theoretical frameworks impose their version of reality wrongly when it comes to interpreting the behavior of these countries (Kang, 2003: 61-70).

Third, Kang argues that Mearsheimer's error in reading Japan is not limited to that country. China is also misread in this account. Its behavior has not confirmed what many offensive realists have argued as the natural bellicosity of a revisionist power keen to overturn the old status quo (Mearsheimer, 2001; Wang, 2004). If anything, Kang argues that the evidence shows China is willing to be a member of various international bodies without claiming that it wants to rewrite the international rules of the game in several domains (Kang, 2003:70; Ikenberry, 2014). There is now a large literature surrounding emerging China-US equations that could be profitably mined by students of Asia (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Ikenberry, 2008; Huiyun, 2009; Mearsheimer, 2010; Jerden, 2014; Shi and Huang, 2015; Hao, 2015).

Fourth, Kang also suggests that other Asian nations do not 'fear' China. While there may be specific anxieties, Kang argues to assume that all states in Asia are intimidated by its size and prowess overstates the case. Linked to this point is another key argument that Kang advances in the context of the West vis-à-vis Asia. He suggests that while the West believes in 'formal equality', it actually practices 'informal inequality'. This is in some contrast to Asia, where 'formal hierarchy' is explicitly stated as a preference but it is marked otherwise by 'informal equality' in practice (Kang, 2003:66-72). This is a contentious point and hinges on some degree of 'strategic essentialism' (Spivak, 1996). However, it also provides something to mull over for anybody theorizing Asia and the

question of difference – political, cultural or economic vis-à-vis the West.

Finally, Kang argues that Asia is only on the face of it Westphalian. In practice, it has its own modes of being emanating from its histories, geographies, cultures and political life generating its own autonomous logic and trajectories for states in Asia. Therefore prior to making broad generalizations, scholars need to engage local perceptions, strategies as well as alliances to decipher what may be different in the Asian experience that is currently not captured in existing mainstream theories of International Relations (Kang, 2003: 57-85).

Argument 2: The Case for 'Local Knowledge' Inclusion

In a piece titled 'What (if anything) does East Asia tell us about International Relations Theory,' Johnston argues that it does offer us a fair amount for those willing to listen. He identifies three big questions, the first relating to the efficacy of structural theories when it comes to interpreting rising powers and their propensities towards conflict, second how institutions come into existence, actually work and the outcomes they generate and finally how questions of 'historical memory' generate their own autonomous dynamic and conflict potential in the region often overlooked by structural theorists writing from the outside (Johnston, 2012: 53-78).

Let me distill from this account, some key arguments that I think remain the most salient and have a life as Johnston acknowledges well beyond merely the conscious inclusion of East Asia. In fact, he argues that it is the 'responsibility' of scholars in the field globally to widen the remit of what they include in terms of their empirical base to build theory (Johnston, 2012:53-78). He observes '[i]t is not just that local knowledge allows for better operationalization of variables, better coding, or better-specified spatial scope conditions for some theoretical claims, although all of this is true. Rather, local knowledge has also developed original

theory or theoretical claims that show some mainstream arguments to be very limited, and not just spatially, but also theoretically' (Johnston, 2012:70).

With regard to structural theories, Johnston argues that '[t]he East Asia IR research raises an understudied question in power transition literature: what are the valid and reliable indicators that a power transition is happening?' (Johnston, 2012:59).

Similarly, with regard to institutions, Johnston point out that '[t]he work on East Asian institutions helps fill a hole in the norm diffusion work by adding more agency to the purported targets of diffusion' (Johnston, 2003:65). What is Johnston's fundamental claim along this axis? He observes that '[o]verall, the study of East Asian institutions adds two things to transatlantic IR theorizing. First, it shows the variation in the design of institutions is wider than heretofore understood, and thus allows for more eclectic theorizing about the origin of institutions as well as about their efficacy. Second, it raises the profile of some heretofore understudied questions, such as the role of perceptions of identity, difference and race in actor preferences for institutional purposes and designs' (Johnston, 2003:66).

Finally, in relation to the third axis, Johnston argues that '[f]or many East Asian IR specialists, historical memory (and its expression in nationalism and ethnocentrism) is a key source of interstate conflict, persistent security dilemmas, and ongoing disputes over territory' (Johnston, 2003:69). This has not been the case for those studying conflict through purely systemic and structural lenses.

Thus, on all three counts Johnston here suggests that there is something new to be learnt from engaging the East Asian experience. Anybody invested in theorizing Asia, must also simultaneously invest in finessing their abilities to glean 'local knowledge' to eventually offer us theoretically insightful and original perspectives flowing bottom-up (Johnston, 2003:69-70).

Argument 3: The Case for Asian Intellectual History

Echoing Kang, Acharya contends that '…existing IRTs and recent efforts to apply them to explain Asia's rise be it realist pessimism or liberal/constructivist optimism, fall short because they rely too much on concepts and analogies drawn exclusively from Western history and ignore Asian agency' (Acharya, 2014:123). However, Acharya stops here and does not endorse a full-fledged Asian exceptionalism. He argues that '…attempts to develop an Asian IRT from purely indigenous sources and histories risk being too parochial and neglecting the linkages between Asia and the outside world' (Acharya, 2014:123). The resolution of this dilemma lies in a '…process of deprovincialization in which existing Western-centric theories are localized to fit Asian history and praxis, while local historical and cultural constructs and contemporary practices of foreign policy and intraregional relations are universalized and projected to a world stage' (Acharya, 2014: 134).

In an earlier piece written in 2010, titled 'Asia is not One,' Acharya disaggregates Asia in terms of initially four and subsequently five 'competing visions'. These include 'imperialist Asia', 'nationalist Asia, 'universalist Asia', 'regionalist' Asia and 'exceptionalist Asia'. While imperialist Asia was about coming to terms with Japan's imperial past within Asia, nationalist Asia was the era of anti-colonial nationalist protest movements, universalist Asia built on civilizational affiliations as the glue that holds Asia together, a regionalist Asia directed energies towards contemplating a pan Asian identity and an exceptionalist Asia has tended to coalesce around 'Asian' or some would argue 'Confucian' values as the basis for sociality impacting political and economic behavior in at least a part of Asia. Acharya's piece also examines the conditions under which the pan-Asian identity as an idea and as practice fizzled out with differences emerging within Asian states and an unwillingness to contribute material resources to the cause (Acharya, 2010: 1001-1013).

Prasenjit Duara in the same issue (Duara, 2010) of the *Journal of Asian Studies* authored a contribution titled 'Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for our Times' which both historicizes Asia as well as offers a global vantage point from which to approach the study of Asia. While Acharya points to Asian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Aung San and Ho-Chi Minh, Duara draws our attention to Okakura Tenshin, Rabindranath Tagore and Zhang Taiyan as able 'articulators of an Asian cosmopolitanism' (Duara, 2010: 963-983). Distinguishing between a region ('an accidental conglomeration') and regionalization ('a deliberate political coalition'), Duara argued that Asia like other parts of the world was also faced with two opposing strains – one relating to the logic of global capitalism and the other relating to the logic of the nation-state. While the former was 'de-territorializing' in its impulse, the latter was 'territorializing' in its impulse. Asia like other parts of the world then could be read through this dialectic (Duara, 2010:963-983). While Acharya concludes by suggesting that 'regionalism has not been a singular or coherent set of beliefs', Duara also contends that by the 1990s there was '…no cohesive ideology of Asian values' (Duara 2010: 1001-1013, 963-983).

Both these 2010 interventions by Acharya and Duara hint and throw open the possibility of examining hitherto neglected figures as well as archives within Asia to be considered as a part of the pantheon of International Relations. While historians have devoted considerable time and energy to decoding the make-up and sensibilities of Asian leaders, there is still enormous scope to examine a whole range of not merely nationalist leaders but intellectuals from Asia who viewed the world through particular registers and offered us different models of framing global political realities as they saw them during their times.

Argument 4: 'Conceptual Traveling' in Asia

Different studies of Asia, tend to rely on different definitions of the region. Alagappa's tome on *Asian Security Practices* suggests that as far as his study goes '…*Asia* has been used to refer to the collective

of countries in Northeast, Southeast and South Asia' (1998:3). In terms of a temporal frame, Alagappa contends that the 1990s are an important turning point. He observes in this regard '[i]n the 1990s, Asia is emerging as a more autonomous system, the dynamics of which are likely to be determined much more by indigenous actors than by extraregional powers. The development of this system is likely to be gradual, however, and its configuration may become firm for some time to come. Indigenous powers will become progressively more consequential in the structure and dynamics of the system, although the United States will continue to play a critical role, U.S. influence however, is likely to gradually lessen' (Alagappa, 1998: 5).

Premised on an empirical scrutiny of sixteen countries, Alagappa raises some key questions. These include the following:

1. How is security conceived and executed by the central decision-makers (CDMs) in the selected Asian countries? Are their security practices contested? Why? Have security practices changed over time? If so, how and why?

2. What are the similarities and differences among security practices in Asian countries? What accounts for them? Is there anything distinctively Asian about security practices in Asia? If so, to what can this be attributed?

3. Is the security thinking and behavior in Asian countries best explained by systemic or unit-level factors – or by a combination of both? In each case, which is more salient, material interests or ideational variables? Which paradigms best explain the practice of security in Asia?

4. What are the implications of the Asian cases for conceptualizing security? How should they be defined? (Alagappa, 1998: 13).

While Alagappa comes up with some categorical answers to all these questions, there is scope for further work along these lines. For instance, empirics from regions like Central Asia (absent in the book) might give us another vantage point to respond to these

questions. Given the largeness of these questions, they are likely to continue to prove useful for researchers keen to study specially a classical domain of high politics in Asia, namely security.

Another useful contribution which Alagappa makes in this volume is his attempt to carve out a notion of security that is not overly constraining or too loose to enable it to continue to retain some analytical purchase when it comes to interpreting security. He observes in this context that '[o]ur generic definition of security – *the protection and enhancement of values that the authoritative decision makers deem vital for the survival and well-being of a community* – limits the referent of security to community on the basis that security is for and about people, who normally provide for their individual and group security by organizing themselves into communities' (Alagappa, 1998: 689). This also allows for '…the scope of security may be specified by moving up or down the ladder of generality.' (Alagappa, 1998: 693). Ultimately, Alagappa argues that "…it seeks to distill, preserve, and build on the essential meaning and practice of security. Among the advantages of the proposed conceptualization are its inclusiveness and its facility to engender more concrete and discrete concepts through 'conceptual traveling,' thus facilitating comparative analysis and helping us to find conceptual order among the many neologisms that have now entered the security vocabulary" (Alagappa, 1998: 697).

Argument 5: Decoding State Centrality in Asia

Pekannen, Ravenhill and Foot begin by acknowledging like several of their predecessors writing on Asia that there is need '…to help encourage a stronger relationship between IR theory and the study of Asian foreign relations' (Pekannen et. al., 2014:4). Asia in this idiom includes '…actors and societies in the dominant, middle, and smaller countries in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia' (Pekannen et. al., 2014:3).

Why does Asia matter in this reading? They go on to argue that '[l]ike others , [they] believe IR theory to be incomplete as a result of its general lack of engagement with the Asian experience of global politics' (Pekannen et.al., 2014:4). Gesturing to at least 'four' critical phases in the history of Asia, they point to 'decolonization', a relative peace during the post-cold war years, growing economic clout as a region globally and to a recognition of the big elephant in the Asian room, China and its continually expanding economic footprint globally (Pekannen et.al., 2014:4).

They further identify in their account six key 'characteristics' of Asia. These include the primacy of the state, the economic heterogeneity that both historically and even in contemporary times continues to structure Asia in a particular fashion, the dilemmas posed by China's rise both within Asia and globally, the extent of 'fungibility' of Asian economic power to contribute to further military strength consolidation, the very real 'porousness of the region' and finally the proliferation of 'informal organizational frameworks' in Asia that is also proving to be a game changer in recent times (Pekannen et.al., 2014:5-9).

However, what is of particular relevance for the researcher embarking on a study of Asia (from their joint introduction to their co-edited *Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*) is the spelling out of an intellectual agenda that might be worth pursuing. There are six specific pieces of counsel, which I shall list here for us to mull over briefly. First, there is an explicit recognition that '…we need a better understanding of the sources and categories of state behavior, with a focus not just on systemic processes, structural features, or socialization patterns, but also on the domestic dynamics of foreign-policy making' (Pekannen et.al., 2014:17). This is a sentiment widely shared and echoed by many scholars working on Asia. Kang in his piece on 'Getting Asia Wrong' makes a case for combining both structural level factors with unit level analysis that would make for a more holistic intellectual treatment of Asia (Kang, 2003: 57-85). Some analysts have also labored the significance of domestic politics in shaping political outcomes in Asia (e.g. Tellis, 2007).

Second, rather than treat sovereignty as a given, scholars working on Asia are exhorted to treat it as work in progress. In other words, sovereignty is 'dynamic' and not carved in stone once and for all. Thus, is it is like other concepts subject to 'historical contingency' and scholars will be better off if they come to terms with this (Pekannen et.al., 2014:17).

Third, we need to develop a better appreciation of how Asia can be inserted into larger debates relating to global governance, both in terms of theory as well as practice. Pekkanen and his colleagues here argue that '[w]e need a better way of mapping how and in what ways rising powers in Asia will affect patterns of regional and global governance in the near future. This requires attention to how they attempt to wield influence in both regional and global institutions, how they design indigenous institutions, their sources of authority and legitimacy, and the extent to which their policy ideas are generating acceptance or resistance' (Pekannen et. al., 2014:17).

Fourth, what is the nature of linkages that obtain between the economic and strategic realms in Asia? Is it true as liberals claim that a greater degree of institutionalization is generally conducive the elimination of conflict and the establishment of peace. Thus, '[w]e need clearer understanding of the linkages between economics and security, and the conditions under which the deepening economic regionalization and regionalism we witness in Asia is likely to dampen the security dilemmas rising in the region, and the prospects for conflict' (Pekannen et. al., 2014: 17-18).

Fifth, another are which merits greater attention in this context is the dimension of 'human security'. Pekannen et.al ask what is the audit of human security look like especially '…given the massive and disruptive social changes that have arisen as a result of rapid economic growth, and the emphasis on often violent means of state and regime consolidation'(Pekannen et. al., 2014:18).

Finally, they argue that in our criticism of Area Studies, we must not end throwing the baby with the bathwater. They would

like Acharya and Duara in their own accounts argue that the time is ripe for '…greater incorporation of Asian historical experiences and attentiveness to the intellectual traditions and practices of the Asian world' (Pekannen et.al., 2014:18). This brings us back to the question of intellectual histories from within Asia that could contribute to a much more sophisticated sense of how Asia was viewing the world through its better and lesser-known figures.

Argument 6: Realism revisited in Asia – Universalism I

What do Realists have to tell us about Asia in the 21st century? Drawing on two realist strands in particular, classical realism and neoclassical realism, Michael Mastanduno precisely treads this ground in his account of 'Realism and Asia'. For anybody interested in how IRT deals with Asia, a simple thought experiment would be to ask what a good realist argument might be about Asia. Given the universalist claims of realism, their argument should hold across contexts. Mastanduno in his account offers us five realist propositions with regard to Asia. What are these propositions and what do they tell us about how successful realism is likely to be in 'getting Asia' right.

The first claim Mastanduno articulates on behalf of realism vis-à-vis Asia is that 'regional order in Asia after the Cold War requires a political foundation' (2014:29). He suggests in this connection that '[r]ealists agree that order in the post-Cold War Asia requires some type of stabilizing mechanism. They disagree, however, on what the mechanism should be and what implications are for US foreign policy' (Mastanduno, 2014: 29). In terms of the realist logic, the declining power, United States in this context would be tempted to reduce the extent of its commitments in Asia and withdraw, while a revisionist power like China would seek to fill the power vacuum that is created. Many analysts have however, noted that things have not gone according to the realist script. The US continues to register a prominent presence particularly in the Asia-Pacific and China has not counter-

balanced as was expected (Ikenberry, 2014; Thayer, 2006). This raises some important questions as Kang raised earlier with regard to the limit of conventional realist explanations when it comes to explaining the power transition in Asia.

The second realist claim is that '[t]he rise of China creates a potentially dangerous power transition' (Mastanduno, 2014: 31). Nothing has exerted realists as much as the possibility of China asserting itself increasingly as a consequence of its new found economic strength. The argument is that the moment China feels sufficiently confident of its strength; it will rock the boat, create its own rules of the international game and if push comes to shove may take on the reigning status quoist power, United States if it refuses to concede to the new pecking order. As Mastanduno asserts, '[r]ealists worry that even if China does not aspire to mount a global hegemonic challenge, it will still desire, as would any great power, a sphere of influence in its immediate regional neighborhood. In this regard realists expect China to act no differently that America did during its rise to power' (2014:32). Kang who belongs to the Asian exceptionalist school suggests otherwise and argues that a realism that discounts specific historical and cultural contexts is likely to read countries within Asia wrongly (Kang, 2003:57-58).

A third realist claim is that '[s]tates in Asia will balance in response to some combination of power and threat' (Mastanduno, 2014: 33). Simply put, '[t]o the countries of Asia, China is geographically proximate and, because it grows rapidly, *potentially* threatening. Since the extent to which China appears threatening will affect the calculations and reactions to its neighbors, China has strong incentives to try to shape how it is perceived in the region. This basic logic of threat and intention helps us to understand both Chinese foreign policy and the Asian security environment after the Cold War' (Mastanduno, 2014: 34).

Claim four suggests that '[n]ationalist sentiment and enduring historical rivalry heighten the potential for conflict in Asia' (Mastanduno, 2014: 36). Mastanduno argues that '[i]n Asia, the

experiences of imperialism, occupation, and war perpetrated in the decades before and after World War II remain festering grievances that re-emerge in modern diplomacy as if they occurred last year rather than seventy-five years ago' (2014:37). This claim is further nuanced when he suggests that '[n]ationalism and historical animosities will not lead Asian states to war. But they make diplomacy more difficult and raise the stakes when Asian states encounter territorial disputes or conflicts over trade or natural resources' (Mastanduno, 2014: 38).

A final claim advanced by Mastanduno is that '[e]conomic cooperation is difficult in an uncertain strategic environment' (2014:38). When it comes to Asia, this proposition has been belied and Mastanduno argues that it presents a good research puzzle for scholars to work on. Notwithstanding China's rise and growing strategic capacity has not in any way diluted the nature of economic integration in the region. In fact, on the contrary as several scholars have observed it has led to a 'deepening integration' if anything (Mastanduno, 2014: 38-39). The jury is not out on this one and it appears that '[a]n interesting test of the realist expectation that a colder US-China security relationship will lead to a colder economic relationship will play out in the years ahead' (Mastanduno, 2014: 39).

Argument 7: Liberalism revisited in Asia – Universalism -II

What would a robust neo-liberal institutionalist argument look like when it comes to Asia? Stephen Haggard takes on this challenge and makes a set of interesting claims which run contrary to what realists see as the writing on the wall with regard to Asia.

First to neoliberal institutionalists, institutions are not merely 'epiphenomenal' but influence the trajectory of politics in important ways (Haggard, 2014:45). Haggard argues that for scholars of this theoretical persuasion, the nature of domestic preferences, institutions and economic ties between states will determine the tonality of politics. Liberals have also long held that

greater economic interdependencies between states diminishes the likelihood of conflict breaking out. Scholars within the 'democratic peace' tradition in particular place a great deal of emphasis on 'regime-type' as an important arbiter of political destinies between states. Democracies matter because there is a lower probability of two liberal democracies sparring with each other (Doyle, 2011; Russett, 1993).

Specifically with regard to Asia, Haggard argues that the claim of 'underinstitutionalization' in the Asian context appears no longer tenable (Haggard, 2014: 51-52, 59). East Asia in particular best illustrates this phenomenon. However, having stated this, it also behoves us to consider what makes the grammar of institutionalization different in Asia.

There are at least four distinctive features that Haggard draws our attention to in this context. The first relates to the fact that 'consensus' as a value is important when it comes to Asian institutions. The general preference is for consensual politics, although Haggard clarifies that it does not necessarily imply that everybody is entirely on board with every agreement. In fact he argues that as a consequence of the preference for consensus there is a tendency to "…push toward modest 'lowest common denominator' agreements" (Haggard, 2014:52).

The second feature is that '[c]ommitments are non-binding, voluntary, and in some cases simply imprecise.' Third, there is a reluctance to widen the scope of 'delegation to standing international secretariats or bureaucracies..' Fourth, one of the implications of this particular style of institutionalization is that it '…does not always constrain actors in a meaningful way, and does not provide the foundations for a more rule-governed or peaceful regional order' (Haggard, 2014:52).

The jury is also not out on where current institutionalization processes are headed towards in Asia. Haggard argues that given the 'dynamic' nature of preference formation, one needs to observe how 'interests' shape. Ultimately, cooperation in the region will

depend on the manner in which these processes unfold (Haggard, 2014: 45-63).

The liberal argument thus also provides useful insights for researchers working on Asia. While the general shift is towards greater institutionalization, the specific nature of Asian institutionalization appears to generate its own internal logic and autonomy impacting politics in a more complex and less predictable fashion.

Argument 8: FPA and Asia: Restoring Political Agency

A different point of entry in terms of a critique of purely systemic and structural explanations in International Relations comes from scholars who rely on 'foreign policy analysis' (FPA) as method. Yuen Foong Khong belongs to this tradition and argues that '…structural IR theory appears as inadequate in illuminating state reactions in Asia. It leads to one puzzle after another, which can only be solved by considering unit-level factors or state characteristics' (Khong, 2014:84). What matters from the FPA perspective are decision-makers, the key actors who make critical choices, the process of decision-making and the final culmination of that process embodied in the 'outcome'. Khong identifies a number of significant unit-level variables. These include 'threat perception', 'national identity', 'ideology' and 'leadership' and demonstrates through suitable illustrations how these variables made a difference in different countries within Asia when it came to decision-making. Khong also disaggregates political actors domestically to include 'intelligence agencies', militaries and treasuries as well as various interest groups and non-governmental actors that also contribute to inputs in decision-making (2014: 81-99).

An important claim Khong advances is that neo-realists or defensive realists were mistaken in their forecast about Asia in the post-cold war world. He argues that first, the United States far from retreating has only reaffirmed its strong presence in the Asia-

Pacific (Khong, 2014:87). Second, contrary to claims that China would counterbalance and other Asian states would also seek to use the opportunity to realign with the major Asian power, 'unit level' variables demonstrate that this has not been the case (Khong, 2014:81). Historical suspicions within Asia vis-à-vis Japan as also the reliance of Asian powers other than China on the United States appears to suggest that 'state characteristics' may be more important in these choices exercised by Asian powers (Khong, 2014: 92).

The role of Asian leadership is analyzed at some length and its impact is seen for instance in Indonesia when Sukarno was against an inclusive model of regional cooperation, his successor Suharto played a much more constructive role in the creation of the ASEAN (Khong, 2014:90). Khong also suggests that the kind of 'economic dynamism' witnessed in Asia has not been seen in Africa, South America and the Middle East at least in part because of the 'choices' their leaders exercised when it came to economic reforms (Khong, 2014:93).

FPA is not without its challenges. First there is a 'data challenge' in Asia in terms of available official documents to process trace decisions (Khong, 2014:96). Second, there is also a dilemma the researcher may face in terms of her choice of variables with the possibility of also including 'regime type', 'strategic culture', 'executive-legislative interactions' and 'operational codes' among a host of other possible candidates in a research narrative (Khong, 2014:95). However, neither of these challenges need paralyze the researcher beyond a point and Khong is confident that FPA as method provides us a much better handle in terms of explicating individual foreign policies of Asian states.

Argument 9: Civilization as a Plausible Heuristic

Another challenge that Asia is faced with relates to what broad categorization might help us look at the region with fresh lenses. Peter Katzenstein has argued elsewhere that 'civilizations' might

be a useful category to approach the study of not merely of Asia, but international politics more generically. He views '…civilizations as configurations, constellations or complexes. They are not fixed in time and space. They are both internally highly differentiated and culturally loosely integrated. Because they are differentiated, civilizations transplant selectively, not wholesale. Because they are culturally loosely integrated, they generate debate and contestations' (Katzenstein, 2010:5). A point that is labored especially strongly in this account is the 'plurality' associated with civilizations (Katzenstein, 2010: 1). Thus, it comes to be viewed not as an essential simple unity but marked by internal contestations and subject to change as it encounters other civilizations.

In an interview in 2008 on *Theory Talks*, Katzenstein candidly notes that '… Asia has a completely different culture and history, so why should it look anything like Europe? I know it's difficult for Europeans not to take themselves as an example – like all the Ernst Haas integrationist and now the regionalist literature in IR does – but there is simply no reason to assume that Asia should be heading the same, European way'. In the same interview, with regard specifically to regionalism, Katzenstein also asserts that '[e]ach region has its own measuring rod. From the European perspective, there's no integration in Asia so Europe is a deep, and Asia a shallow form of integration. Well, yes, from a European perspective. But you can turn that around just as easily by looking at market penetrations through ethnic capitalism is occurring at an astounding rate and thus Asia is integrated more deeply then Europe. Both arguments are silly. Asian integration just has a different form, and its institutionalization is not based on law' (Schouten, 2008). Thus, there is a sufficiently strong realization at least among close observers of Asian empirical realities that the study of Asia needs to avoid uncritically employing classic gold standards to evaluate and designate Asia one way or the other.

Finally, the question of retaining methodological pluralism as an option appears to be an important contention that Katzenstein

along with his collaborator Rudra Sil have argued persuasively in favor (2010). They are others scholars like David Collier and Colin Elman who have also advanced a strong case for multimethod research (2010). One distinctive advantage Sil and Katzenstein identify with regard to this approach is that '…it is designed to simultaneously traffic in theories from multiple traditions in search of linkages between different types of mechanisms that are normally treated in isolation in separate traditions. In so doing, analytical eclecticism increases the chance that scholars and other actors will hit upon hidden connections and new insights that elude us when we simplify the world for the sole purpose of analyzing it through a single theoretical lens' (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010:426).

Three further facets are highlighted. These include a consciously practical aspect to this methodological stance, a willingness to contend with weaknesses in existing research programs as also a plea to widen rather than restrict research problematiques and most importantly to account for complexity through causal pathways that are willing to accommodate heterogeneity in approaches to solve these questions (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 411-431). Scholars invested in Asia might take this as another lead in terms of retaining a certain degree of nimble footedness when encountering new empirical material in Asia or alternatively posing research puzzles differently given the nature of the specific material they encounter.

Conclusion

In the course of this intervention, I have sought to map contending theoretical claims vis-à-vis Asia. There were three explicit objectives, I had stated at the outset. How are we faring in terms of these purported goals? To remind our readers, the primary intent was to suggest that Asia provides an exciting set of intellectual puzzles that are worth pondering over. This combined with the global conjunction of a growing interest in a 'rising Asia' provides an element of more durable topicality as well for those embarking

on a study of world politics. Our second objective was to suggest that Asia is a contested space both conceptually and in terms of its lineage as idea and practice. Our third objective was to invite fresh theoretical work drawing on rigorous empirics that could make an enormously useful contribution in the not so distant future.

On all these three counts, my sense is the drift of the current literature suggests that we stand vindicated. With regard to the first objective, during the course of my explication of different slices of scholarship, I have sought to gesture to what scholars embarking on a study of Asia might wish to focus on. The already existing scholarship has thrown a menu of first order theoretical and empirical questions that merit fresh investments and the creation of a corpus of contributions that enrich our overall sense of Asia.

In terms of our second objective, what also emerges from this account is that Asia is no *tabula rasa* in terms of its conceptualization, lineage and lived life. Different scholars tend to conceptualize Asia differently depending on their specific vantage points. North American scholars tend to focus on what they designate as the Asia Pacific, and within Asia itself there have been different historical self-conceptions and referential frames for the region.

The third objective is merely listed here as third but I think carries a particular significance for a new generation of scholars. Apart from the global conjuncture intellectually speaking there is a surge in the confidence within Asia that Asia can be studied on its own terms rather than refracted uncritically through received categories. While we must avoid any simplistic bravado, what we also need is a degree of audacity in postulating fresh theoretical ideas drawing on a sound empirical grasp of Asia and how we may then view its past, present and futures. Further, in terms of methodology, there appears to be no formulaic magic bullet in terms of a recipe for insight. However, the absence of any simple formulaic remedies to approach the study of Asia is yet another opportunity to reside in a whole range of creative spaces and to tap

on a potentially receptive ecology enabling fresh insights from a region that given its sheer demographics is likely to matter for the foreseeable future. We must matter again for other more compelling intellectual contributions as well both within and outside the remits of the discipline of International Relations.

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Subterranean Subregionalism: Interrogating the Role of Borders in Indian IR

Nimmi Kurian

Abstract

The paper critically interrogates the subregional moment in India's international relations and examines the role that border regions are playing in shaping India's engagement with its neighborhood. Delhi's 'new' reading of borders is an admittedly feel-good narrative of rethinking borders as bridges and speaks a comfortable cosmopolitan language. The paper argues that behind its celebratory rhetoric, the subregional moment in Indian IR has been a bittersweet one. While it speaks of a liberal vision of globalism it has at the same time been curiously resistant to step away from the reductionist logic of borders as barriers. The paper engages with this puzzle and the severe distortions it has produced in India's eastern borderlands. It argues that the lack of momentum at the formal intergovernmental offers only a partial understanding of the subregional discourse. It makes the case to look at subterranean subregionalism(s), quotidian processes that are scripting a bottom-up vision of India's subregional imaginary and problematizes the Westphalian idea in fundamental ways.

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Introduction: The Subregional Turn

The subregional turn in Indian diplomacy marks an interesting discursive shift in Indian foreign policy and its engagement of the Asian neighborhood. The idea of subregionalism has gained increasing recognition in discourses of development and offers new insights to mainstream theories of regionalism (Kurian, 2016a). While regional trading blocs and arrangements have been a common phenomenon, subregional cooperation represents a novel extension of this larger idea, in that geographically proximate subregions within two or more countries become sites of transborder cooperation. For instance, the idea of projecting Northeast India as a gateway to the wider dynamic Asian neighborhood has found an increasing measure of rhetorical importance under India's Look East policy as well as the rechristened Act East policy. Through a host of sub-regional initiatives like the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Multi-Sectoral Initiative for Technical and Economic Cooperation), the Mekong Ganga Economic Cooperation (MGC), and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM EC) India has attempted to signal the growing priority it attaches to integrating its eastern region with the wider Asian neighborhood.

The paper argues that the success of the subregional discourse will turn on understanding the role that border regions can play in shaping India's subregional engagement with its transnational neighborhood. The central question the paper engages with is to enquire if instances of a growing subterranean engagement by border regions with its subregional neighborhood problematize the Westphalian idea in fundamental ways. It will specifically look at bottom-up processes by which border actors are engaging, bypassing and socializing the state. Such an enquiry can be valuable since there has been no serious intellectual and policy engagement with the capacity of the border region to either subvert or facilitate the subregional project. The cumulative impact of these processes bears closer scrutiny for its capacity to bring the border region center-stage as partners in shaping India's

engagement with its subregional neighborhood. This has the potential to shine a much-needed light on the borderlands both as a foreign policy actor and as a hitherto missing level of governance (Kurian, 2015a).

Borders as bridges

At the outset, what is clear is that there are two parallel narratives within India's subregional discourse (Kurian, 2014). India's subregional discourse is poised uncertainly between an entrenched geopolitical account of endemic competition and a feel-good geoeconomic narrative of prosperity. The geoeconomic narrative of borders speaks a comfortable cosmopolitan language and lays claim to a universal vision of globalism that project borders as bridges to the Asian neighborhood. The subregional project as a narrative aimed at transforming economic geographies has been raised to the highest levels of importance in India's policy discourse. Since building multi-modal continental connectivity is key to the success of any sub-regional initiative, India has been actively involved in creating a subregional communications network and underscoring the transformational potential of the three Ts- trade, tourism and transport within the subregion (Kurian, 2005). These projects involve the restoration of key road and rail links between India and its immediate neighborhood, many of which were operational even till the late 1960s (Kurian, 2015b). For instance, India is funding the construction of a $51 million rail project, which will connect Tripura's capital, Agartala with Akhaura, the southeastern border town of Bangladesh. The Agartala-Akhaura project promises to bring multiple benefits to India's Northeast. The rail link will drastically reduce the distance between Agartala and Kolkata and allow for freight movement between the two capitals. For example, the distance between Agartala and Kolkata through Guwahati is 1,650 km but the link through Bangladesh will reduce this to just 350 kms. India is also building three rail lines to Bhutan linking Assam and West Bengal with Bhutan. The two lines from Assam are a 51-km track linking

Pathshala and a 57 km track from Kokrajhar to Bhutan's Nanglam and Gelephu respectively. A third rail line will link Hashimara in West Bengal to Phuentsholing in Bhutan through a 17 km track. Another link is a 16 km track connecting West Bengal's Naxalbari to Kankarvitta in Nepal and a 15 km track from Bihar's Jogbani to Nepal's Biratnagar. India is also pursuing an East to West road corridor linking Moreh in Manipur through Bagan in Myanmar to Maesot in Thailand. The highway will further be extended to Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, holding the promise of seamless continental connectivity with Southeast Asia. Together, these cross-border infrastructure projects are geared towards enhancing India's physical, economic and strategic presence along its borders.

Borders as barriers

Parallel to the geoeconomic narrative is a discernible geopolitical subtext to India's moves to strengthen ties with its immediate neighborhood. India has been strengthening close coordination and cooperation among security agencies in the neighborhood. These are expected to yield spillover security benefits in terms of better border management to cope with common challenges posed by drug addiction, AIDS and increasing levels of crime and violence. Close proximity to the Golden Triangle, one of the largest narcotics producing and exporting regions of the world has adversely affected India's security. India becomes not only a convenient transit route but also a potential market for these drugs. Insurgent groups have found safe havens in neighboring countries. Several insurgent groups have had strategic transborder links with similar groups based in neighboring countries. The efforts to secure transnational cooperation on battling insurgency have yielded some notable successes with Bhutan and Myanmar and with Bangladesh since 2009. India has also been regularly sharing intelligence inputs on the safe havens of Indian insurgent groups inside Bangladesh. There has been a steady cross-border cooperation including joint military operations to eliminate

camps. Indian and Bhutanese military have held joint military operations since the launch of the Operation 'All Clear' in 2003. These have targeted the nearly 30 insurgent camps said to be based in Samdrup Jongkhar district in southern Bhutan. Naypyidaw has also responded to India's sensitivities on this issue by bolstering its military deployment on its border with India. India and Myanmar have been working towards coordinated military action against Indian insurgency groups operating from Myanmar such as the Manipur-based United National Liberation Front, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup. Assam Rifles, the paramilitary force entrusted with guarding the India-Myanmar border has started joint border patrolling along stretches of the border with Myanmar. India and Bhutan have also stepped up cooperation to tackle terrorism along their shared border particularly to coordinate operations against the National Democratic Front of Boroland, which has bases in both Myanmar and Bhutan. There appears to be a conscious move to frame security issues, at least at the rhetorical level more in developmental terms. For instance, drawing a link between India's domestic and external security, India's National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon noted the 'first area of focus for our foreign policy is naturally our neighborhood, for unless we have a peaceful and prosperous periphery we will not be able to focus on our primary tasks of socio-economic development' (cited in Kurian, 2014: 132).

Between a rock and a hard place

What has been problematic is that the geoeconomic and the geopolitical narratives have tended to engage each other parenthetically, often with wary resignation. It is this tension at the heart of the subregional imaginary that needs to be pushed and foregrounded. On the one hand, while it speaks of a liberal vision of globalism, it has been curiously resistant to step away from the reductionist logic of borders as barriers (Kurian, 2015a). This problematic binary has also resulted in a confused narrative,

which has rendered its political signaling contradictory and virtually unintelligible. For instance, while Prime Minister Modi's Neighborhood First policy set the right tone with high-profile visits to South Asian capitals,[1] the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, Arvind Subramanian has been on record stating that 'regional economic integration in South Asia is not a first priority for India' (*The Hindu*, 2015). Similarly, while the Act East policy ostensibly builds a narrative of rethinking borders as bridges, there has been an almost pathological fear of open borders. India's border fencing project is a stark metaphor of this conflicted discourse, further evidence of the flawed logic behind equating border control with border security. This binary and its twisted logic have induced a self-destruct mode of schizophrenic subregionalism that increasingly runs the risk of subverting the subregional project itself (Kurian, 2016b). The fundamental problem with the idea of sealing borders is that it happens to be out of step with reality on the ground. A visit to the borderlands tells you why. Ask the Singphos, Nagas, Kukis, Mizos who live on both sides of the India-Myanmar borderlands and clearly the border is hardly the line of control that Delhi imagines it to be but a zone of contact and exchange as it historically has been.

A geoeconomic vision that has run parallel with a geopolitical discourse of fear and anxiety has meant that the subregion has tended to remain suspended in a sort of 'double vision'. These dualisms explain the range of contradictions and distortions that one sees at India's eastern borders. This is evident at the border *haats* that were reopened along the India-Bangladesh border in 2011 after a gap of 40 years at Tura in Meghalaya's West Garo Hills and the Kurigram district of Bangladesh[2]. But the reopening of

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[1]As part of the Neighborhood First policy, India's Prime Minister visited Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and Nepal in 2014 and Mauritius, Sri Lanka, China, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2015.

[2] Two more border haats were opened along the Meghalaya-Bangladesh border at Kalaichar (India)-Baliamari (Bangladesh) and at Balat (India) and Dalora (Bangladesh).

border *haats* has today ended up becoming an exercise in choreographed trade with a pre-selected list of vendors and vendees carrying out trade in a pre-selected list of goods and operating within a pre-demarcated radius of 5 kms on either side of the border. As per these requirements, the total value of such barter trade should not cross $50 per day and is open only to vendors within a 5 km radius from the border *haat*. The discretionary powers wielded by agents of state have also sharpened several of these dichotomies at the borders. The thriving of what is euphemistically referred to as informal trade underlines the role of agents of state in the collusive production of illegality. For instance, the role of 'lineman' or facilitators who enable illegal border crossings is a highly institutionalized one, with the willing connivance of border guards (Carney, 2011). A case in point is the well-coordinated chain of financiers, traders, middlemen and the couriers involved in cattle smuggling across the India-Bangladesh border with an estimated annual turnover of Rs. 5,000 crore. As Shyam Saran rightly argues, 'The reality is that huge volumes of regular trade take place through these points but as contraband, corrupting local officialdom, criminalizing trade and resulting in revenue loss to the government…. While we resist over ground economic integration, underground economic integration appears to be flourishing!' (Saran, 2011).

The trade-off between border mobility and border security being struck has often strengthened the security state while eroding human security. A case in point is the border fencing program along the India-Bangladesh border with the fence often running through villages with houses with 'the front door in one country and the back door in the other' (Banerjee, 2010). Some of these distortions can be seen in the case of the fencing of a 10-km long stretch on the Manipur-Myanmar border at Moreh. Ostensibly meant to prevent militants from using the road to procure arms from international gunrunners but has drastically disrupted the lives of villages situated along the border. After the construction of the fence the village of Muslim Basti today finds itself without any access to freshwater with the Lairok and

Khujariok rivers now both fall within Myanmarese territory. This has also resulted in a grave livelihood crisis for locals, with traditional means of fishing on the Myanmarese side no longer a possibility.

Some of these dualisms can be seen in the abysmal intra-regional trade levels in South Asia when compared to other subregions. For instance, intra-regional trade as a share of total trade for South Asia was less than 6 per cent compared to 55 per cent for East Asia in 2011 (ADB, 2012). India accounts for less than 2 per cent of Bangladesh's exports and 11.3 per cent of its imports. At the Petrapole-Benapole border crossing between India and Bangladesh, the absence of adequate warehousing facilities, insufficient parking space, inadequate banking facilities, lack of standardization of documentation and lack of through bills of lading constitute a range of physical and non-physical barriers to trade flows (De, Khan and Chaturvedi, 2008:29). An Indian exporter to Bangladesh has to reportedly obtain as many as 330 signatures on 17 documents at various stages, which includes cumbersome procedural requirements (De and Ghosh, 2008).[3]

Institutional gridlocks

Many of these contradictions stem from long-standing concerns over state building and assimilation. The postcolonial Indian state's border security fetish has had clear cognitive echoes, casting long institutional shadows on India's federal design, disincentivizing accountability and producing a public order crisis of its own making for the Indian state. These also go a long way in

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[3]This at a time when the neighboring Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has been moving towards a single-window clearance system. The GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) adopted in the late 1990s, covers all trade transit facilitation measures within the region in a single document. These include single-stop, single-window customs inspection, visa regimes, eligibility criteria for cross-border traffic, exchange of commercial traffic rights and standardization of road and bridge design, signs and signals (Srivastava and Kumar 2012).

explaining why India's autonomy model today resembles less the institutional innovation of asymmetric federalism enshrined in the Constitution and more the top-down, linear model that it has morphed into. The strong statutory recognition for the principle of differential provisioning in the Indian Constitution was widely expected to provide the institutional capacity to safeguard the unique historical and cultural identities and aspirations of its regions. But the actual practice has revealed tensions between competing pulls of assimilation and autonomy tilting the equation towards a greater measure of centralization. This explains the preoccupation to integrate the Northeast more with distant Delhi than with its immediate transnational neighborhood despite having a 4,500 km-long international border with only a 26 km link to the Indian mainland.

Some of this is evident in the institutional stasis that characterize forums such as the Inter State Council and the National Development Council. The Inter State Council (ISC), a forum designed to bring all Chief Ministers to work on operationalizing coordination mechanisms between the Centre and the states has remained defunct.[4] Although the ISC was constituted in 1999, following the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations, the last meeting of the ISC was held in July 2016 after a gap of ten years. Bodies such as the North Eastern Council, despite its mandate to function as a regional planning, and placed under the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (MDONER) reflects a law and order approach to questions of development. Other centralized agencies such as the Brahmaputra Board under the Ministry of Water Resources also betray a top-down model and the disinclination to institutionalize patterns of cooperation with subnational units.

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[4]Article 263 of the Indian Constitution provides for a high-level coordinating forum in the form of the Inter-State Council (Sarkaria Commission Report, 1988).

Subterranean subregionalism

How feasible is India's subregional imaginary likely to be within a continued securitised environment that skews the federal bargain unfavorably towards the border region? It is vital to critically engage with this question since the mere opening of borders is often unproblematically assumed to lead to cross-border integration. The lack of momentum at the formal intergovernmental however offers a partial understanding of the subregional discourse. Mainstream research and policy needs to take sharper notice of interesting instances of a growing subterranean engagement by India's border states with its subregional neighborhood (Kurian, 2016e). There are three reasons why it should begin to do so. Firstly, there is growing evidence that border regions are beginning to effectively engage the Indian state to deepen subregional integration processes. Secondly, border actors are on occasion bypassing the Centre and directly forging cross-border issue-based linkages. Thirdly, these processes seek to socialize national policy makers towards a decentered approach to problem solving. It would be interesting to understand what the cumulative impact of these processes implies for the border region to be effective partners in shaping India's engagement with its subregional neighborhood.

Engaging the state

Bottom-up market driven processes of economic integration are today resulting in the rise of a new set of stakeholders with stakes in subregional integration processes. For instance, states of the Northeast have been lobbying the Centre for the resumption of border trade points with the neighboring countries. There are several proposals submitted by state governments to set up border haats with neighboring countries which are pending with the central government.[5] Meghalaya and Tripura recently successfully

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[5]In Arunachal Pradesh, these include the towns of Nampong, Chingsa, Makantong in Changlang district with those of Pangsau, Langhong and Ngaimong in the

lobbied the central government to permit export of surplus power to Bangladesh. Selling power to Bangladesh has been a growing demand by the two border states given the natural logistical advantage that the neighboring market offers as against the constraints of transporting power to the rest of India through the narrow 22-km long Siliguri corridor. As per an agreement arrived at with Bangladesh, power transmission lines from the Surjyamaninagar power grid in western Tripura to Comilla in eastern Bangladesh will supply 100 MW from February 2016.[6] Meghalaya's Power Minister Clement R Marak has also been lobbying with the Centre to sell excess power produced in the state especially during the monsoon period when Bangladesh faces high demand for power. Other states too have begun lobbying the state for more equitable resource revenue sharing. For instance, Bihar has demanded a partnership stake in the power projects being executed in Bhutan particularly from the Puna Psangchhu hydel project. Bihar's Energy Minister Bijendra Prasad Yadav has demanded that atleast 15,000 megawatts electricity from the Puna Psangchhu and the Mangdechu hydel projects in Bhutan and 250 MW from the Arun-III hydel project in Nepal (*The Telegraph,* 2015).

Bypassing the state

Direct transborder subnational links have on occasion bypassed the Centre to break difficult logjams and bottlenecks. A case in

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Kachin province of Myanmar. Proposed border haats suggested by Manipur include points linking Kongkan Thana, New Somtal and Behiang in the state with Aungci, Khampat and Chikha in Myanmar. Mizoram has proposed border haats at Marpara and Sillsury in Mizoram with Longkor and Mahmuam in Myanmar. Nagaland has proposed connecting Avakhung, Pangsha, Longwa and Molhe in the state with Layshi, Lahe and Pansat in Myanmar (Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Proposed Border Haats, 2011).

[6] An Indian delegation led by Tripura Power Minister Manik Dey signed a memorandum of understanding to Dhaka in January 2016 finalised the price of power at Rs 5.50 with transmission to begin in February 2016.

point is the construction of the 726 MW Palatana gas power project in southern Tripura. Palatana will be bookmarked in India's evolving subnational cross-border engagement as arguably one of the first instances of a subregional problem solving. Given the challenges in transporting heavy equipment to Tripura due to the difficult terrain, Bangladesh allowed transhipment of heavy turbines and machinery through its territory. Bangladesh's decision to allow transhipment became a critical factor in the successful completion of the project. Cross-border cooperation between local authorities is proving to be critical in other areas. Manipur and the neighboring Sagaing Division in Myanmar also cooperated in 2013 to facilitate a private sector-led health sector initiative in Myanmar's Sagaing Division. The project's success also owed itself to the direct interest taken by the Chief Ministers of Mandalay and Saigang in expediting modalities.

Effective border management fundamentally requires institutionalized cross-border governance arrangements and platforms. Recently, District Magistrates and officials from Tripura and Mizoram met their Bangladeshi counterparts to discuss border management mechanisms. The Deputy Commissioner of Rangamati district led a nine-member Bangladesh team to Mizoram in 2015 to work towards greater coordination between district administrations on both sides. A meeting of district level officials from Tripura and Bangladesh was also held in January 2015 at Agartala, Tripura's capital. [7]

Socializing the state

A longer-term effect of these processes would be its capacity to socialize the state into seeking subregional problem-solving models with a possible graduated transfer of institutional loyalty

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[7]The meeting was attended by officials from Tripura's four districts, namely Sipahijala, Gomti, South Tripura and Dhalai and from Bangladesh's five districts-Comilla, Feni, Rangamati, Khagrachari and Chittagong.

from the national to local. Arguably, the greatest discursive potential of subregionalism lies in the capacity to reclaim the local as a central actor in the governance agenda. The nature and scope of the agency available to local governments would however be contingent on the stamina for institutional bargaining with the federal government. Sustaining it will call for putting in place the requisite institutional nuts and bolts to make sure that the principle is not left to discretionary federal whims. For this to happen, the functional domains of local institutional actors need to be further strengthened to bring about an effective transfer of power and decision- making authority. It will be suboptimal to conceive them as mere agents for monitoring the implementation of service delivery systems. Consultative processes between key institutional actors have to be both sustained as well as inclusive, bringing together relevant local line departments and officials across all levels-from planning, monitoring to implementation. Much will also depend on the feedback loops that are put in place for information sharing among policy nodes.

The key organizing principle here is that of subsidiarity, the idea that each issue or task is performed most effectively at the local or immediate level. There are successful international instances of local substate actors exercising effective functional autonomy with the role of central authority being a subsidiary one.[8] Strengthening subsidiarity will also be essential to secure good faith participation by states for the successful implementation of federal policies on a range of issue areas such as energy, environment, land use and transport cannot be effectively tackled without the active involvement and support of local level

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[8]The norm of prior consultation and agreement between federal and provincial authorities is a mandatory requirement the Canadian government has to fulfill before it can undertake bilateral and international agreements. Thus, the US-Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 required a prior Canada Ontario Agreement that was concluded the previous year (Manno 1993).

actors.[9] Local networks, both formal and informal, can work with, and not necessarily at cross-purposes with the state on public goods provision (Kurian, 2016c; Kurian, 2016d). National and subnational agencies have considerable scope to consult and coordinate strategies on a range of crosscutting governance issues. For instance, the Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network (AECEN) brings together environmental agencies from 13 countries to collectively address the impact of rapid urbanization and industrial growth. Other examples include the South Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (SeaBRNet), Asian Network of Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources (ANSAB), Freshwater Action Network South Asia (FANSA), Himalayan Conservation Approaches and Technologies (HIMCAT) and South Asian Network on Environmental Law (SANEL) among others.

Subregional Moment in Indian IR

The success of India's subregional turn will critically turn on the capacity to engage with two conceptual concentric circles, namely historicizing the notion of the subregional as well as the notion of the international. Fundamentally, India's subregional discourse needs to distinguish between two parallel narratives at work, the more familiar and contemporary notion of subregionalism as a state-led project with a more textured, complex understanding of it as a process (Kurian, 2014). This can help situate India's international relations within a broader template of social, economic and cultural flows that had little if any relevance to territory. Retrieving this imagination will be central to the success of a rethinking of the notion of borders, territoriality and sovereignty. Subregionalism defined as process allows for non-

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[9] Initiatives such as the Western Climate Initiative initiated in 2007 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of 2003 in the US-Canada border show how the subnational level has led when federal policy has lagged.

state centric readings of territoriality as well as recognize the historical agency of actors other than the state.

Historicizing the Subregional

An engagement with subregional histories fundamentally challenges the reductionist logic of borders as territorial dividers to reimagine these as in-between spaces that can connect, communicate and bridge. Overlooking these processes would mean overlooking the manner in which quotidian IR engages with and fashions norms of territoriality and the role of agency in constituting structure. It is these 'connected histories' that have to be at the centre of any new rethinking on borderlands. It is time to turn the page back and recall these 'histories of Asian cosmopolitanism' to remind ourselves that the contemporary notion of the border region as a landlocked region has little or no historical credence. An instance in point is the critical linking function that transit trade historically performed in the subregion. Historical accounts suggest that Bhutan had a thriving caravan trade with Bengal in the south and Tibet in the north in the nineteenth century. Cooch Bihar in India's West Bengal minted money for Bhutan while Bhutanese horses, wool products and musk found a ready market in North Bengal and Assam while it imported spices, tobacco and cotton from the region (Pommaret, 1999). Quotidian exchanges were often crucial to border economies. For instance, Ladakh's individual 'peasant-traders' were important agents of inter-regional trade were and played a crucial linking function strengthening webs of interdependence within the region. These peasant-traders bartered grain from their fields to the Chang-pa nomads of southeast Ladakh and western Tibet for pashm, wool and salt which they bartered for dried fruits at Skardu in Baltisatan. It was as Janet Rizvi notes 'an economy made self-sufficient' due to the 'enormous input of time and effort' by peasant-traders (Rizvi, 1985:14-15). Ladakh was till 1947 a major hub of a trade network that included Skardu, Srinagar, Hoshiarpur, Kulu and radiated outward to Lhasa and Yarkand.

Leh and Kargil traders would travel to the September market at Gartok in western Tibet to sell coral and gold from Yarkand for the Lhasa nobility (Rizvi, 1985:14).

What comes through these exchanges is the vital role that local labour played in the functioning of the subregional economy. It was clear that the success of inter-state trade depended greatly on a highly institutionalized system of obligatory transport labour for its success. Historical accounts attest the fact that obligatory transport labour was an integral part of hill societies in Ladakh, Tibet and Kashmir, which included inter alia carriage of goods for officials and other important figures. In fact, the key export item of central and western Ladakh was the labour of its porters. The obligatory transport arrangements between Ladakh and Tibet were crucial in ensuring the success and profitability of missions and their commercial functions such as the triennial lo-phyag mission (Lopchak) from Leh to Lhasa and the cha-pa (Chaba) from Lhasa to Leh (Bray, 2008:47). There was an inter-state agreement between Ladakh and Tibet to provide transport labour to assist missions during their travels to each other's territories. (Bray, 2008:43) Trade was the mainstay of the Ladakhi economy with the king 'himself the most important trader' and custom duties constituting a major source of his income. Transport labour was fundamental to the effectiveness of trade networks that crisscrossed the region between Kashmir, Tibet and Central Asia.

A fixation with the idea of borders as a state project has also meant that the role of transnational ethnic social networks in a border region is often not recognized as a form of social capital (Chen, 2000). Transnational social networks based on ancestral and kinship ties and interpersonal trust networks constitute a form of social capital that is integral to a transborder subregion, resting on a highly place-centric sense of self and community identity (Tilly, 2007, Chen 2000). This can be seen in the trans-Himalayan trade with transborder exchanges characterized by highly personalized trust-based relationships. The personalized trust-based contracts were mutually beneficial and its success can be

measured from the fact that these often lasted for several generations being passed on from trader to the next of kin. These also served a crucial economic function by helping to reduce transaction costs given the arduous challenges involved in conducting trade.

Historicizing subregionalism also effectively questions the border trope of a domestic-external binary. It is this binary that 'exaggerates the differences between the two realms' and "obscures the theoretically relevant similarities" (Whytock, 2004:27-28). By presupposing the irrelevance of sub-systemic actors to state behavior, mainstream IR theory tends to flatten out differences and effectively block voices and representations from the margins. Its self-chosen preoccupation with esoteric systemic battles has meant that IR often has little, or at any rate, little useful to say about micro-governance challenges at the borders. By bypassing the sub-state as irrelevant, systemic theories in IR forsake almost unthinkingly the rich potential of how quotidian IR engages with and fashions norms of territoriality. Such a constructivist understanding of subregional IR helps us raise interesting questions about both structure and agency and the role of agency in constituting structure. It then follows that the notion of territoriality is not a freeze frame and an ontological given. But the scope for India's subregional discourse to be a constructive template for bottom-up IR is neither guaranteed nor infallible.

Re-engaging the International

A re-engagement with the notion of borders in India's subregional discourse will also be incomplete without a critical re-engagement with the notion of the international itself. This in turn will require going beyond a limited geopolitical understanding towards a sociological definition of the subregion. Doing so can help disciplinary IR address the charge of ahistoricism and also help Indian IR find ways to make "past history continuous with present

experience".[10] If IR is to make itself relevant to borderlands, it will first clearly have to rethink its conceptual borders. It will also have to problematize the peripheral status of the borders and rethink set categories of ordering spaces. Not doing so is likely to in turn consign IR to increasing marginalization as a discipline. These subterranean processes can be a wake up call for Indian IR to creatively recast its research agenda. While borders are emerging as important sites of transnational social economic and cultural exchange, there has as yet been no serious intellectual engagement with the notion of borders at the heart of the subregional narrative. The subregional moment in Indian IR offers the most opportune cue as any for disciplinary IR to identify implicit research and policy biases in the mainstream discourse on borders. The manner in which scholarship frames many of these questions about the 'periphery' has also been deeply problematic and reduced the borderlands to being 'research peripheries' (Kurian, 2010). This is not surprising for a discipline like IR that so distinctly bears the imprint of its subject matter. An 'excess of geopolitics' as Sanjay Chaturvedi points out has also resulted in the geopolitics of knowledge (Chaturvedi, 2005). Far from offering alternative imaginaries, IR has largely tended to faithfully mirror the 'cartographic anxiety' of the state (Krishna, 1994). The mainstream discourse has been structured to peripheralize these spaces and from this conceptual peg it has been but a small leap to micro managing and the parachuting problem solving models from a distant centre. A new border imaginary will hinge as much on the capacity to identify implicit biases in knowledge production as it would on its ability to problematize notions of space, epistemology and agency (Kurian, 2010). These could recast research peripheries by placing hitherto missing issues onto the agenda and enable the borderlands to reimagine its own future differently.

The field of border research has covered much disciplinary ground over the decades, with different disciplines arriving at the

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[10] This was the mandate the British Committee of the theory of international politics set for itself back in 1959. (Vigezzi 2005: 53)

borders armed with their diverse theoretical toolkits. This has helped populate the landscape with new foci of intellectual enquiry on demographic changes, health, trade, environment and migration, nudging the research agenda beyond the narrow remit of studying the patterns of inter-governmental conflict and cooperation. Border studies have covered an entire spectrum of seeing borders, from being inviolable to being reduced to irrelevance in a 'borderless' world (Ohmae 1990). In between these polarized positions, a growing body of literature on border studies is bringing a whole new lexicon of approaching these spaces as dynamic and socially constructed (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Schofield and Warr 2005; Donnan and Wilson 1994; Donnan and Wilson 1999). New discourses have been engaging with the international in imaginative ways, bringing fresh insights into its domain be it critical geopolitics (Tuathail, 2000; Tuathail and Dalby, 1998), cultural geography (Jackson, 1989; Mitchell, 2000), political geography (Taylor, 1994; Johnston, 2001). It would also be well served as Lloyd Pettiford argues, by a "period of coexistent paradigms" (Pettiford, 1996: 305). Disciplinary IR needs to find a viable interface with these forms of knowledge, be they from the fields of political economy, development studies, postcolonial studies or globalization. In fact, it is these counter-narratives that have to be the theoretical takeoff point for new disciplinary enquiries. These will in turn allow IR to engage with themes of identity, culture and the like which have been relegated to the disciplinary borders of IR.

Boundary lines continue to be important, no doubt, but scholarship is increasingly looking at what crosses these lines and why. Itinerant enquiries are now stepping onto the road less taken, taking as their point of departure the holy grail of the modern state, the linear boundary line that divides and separates. It is reminiscent of Arjun Appadurai's conception of 'process geographies', and he notes, 'Regions are best viewed as initial contexts for themes that generate variable geographies, rather than as fixed geographies marked by pre-given themes' (Appadurai, 2000:6-7). The permeability of borders, and by extension of

sovereignty itself, has created the conceptual space to interrogate IR in ways that would have been unimaginable traditionally (Vivekanandan, 2011).

Bottom up IR can also be a serendipitous moment to reopen the tired debate between social sciences and area studies. Disciplinary and area knowledge projects have clearly failed to co-evolve, impoverishing both traditions in the process (Sahni, 2009:50). This can be seen in the 'intellectually slothful' tendency to compartmentalize regions to absurd levels. An example of this is evident in the sequestering of Ladakh, a montane region that once sat astride many of these traditional trade routes linking India, China and Central Asia, today finds itself segmented into the bifurcated regions of South and Central Asia (Harper and Amrith, 2012: 252). Typically, IR's generalizations have tended to ignore the multiplicity of meanings borders embody, failing to locate the border within its own political, economic, social and cultural specificities. A deliberately simplified categorization robs the border of its rich and varied cultural, historical and social layers of identity. The border bears daily witness to a multiplicity of crossings, much of which, while not being 'official' or 'legal', are very much real in every sense. Border ethnographies seldom obey easy categorization and border-spanning networks reveal the paucity of 'methodological territorialism', in that it tries to trap complex social phenomena within territorial containers (Schendel, 2005). These reconstructions by 'nations from below' offer contra-worldviews to the state on territoriality, history and sovereignty, taking their cue from ethnic boundaries as against state-drawn political boundaries. There also point to inherent synergies between diplomacy and paradiplomacy that can be harnessed effectively for subregional integration (Criekmans, 2008). The foreign relations of subnational governments have been a growing area of subject (Duchacek, 1990; Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Blatter et al., 2008; Marks and Hooghe, 2005).

Bringing the Borderlands (Back in)

The borderlands, far from being the 'periphery', are uniquely positioned at the intersection of national and cultural crossroads. Across the notional 'fixed' line, human geographies have historically reconstituted social and symbolic practice, transforming landscapes into multiple sites of interaction. If these processes were to be dismissed as illegal, or worse as irrelevant, such rich narratives would have no hope of finding entry points into the mainstream discourse. In a typically transnational frame, the border becomes not quite the 'margin' but the centre of a vast and bustling network of social and cultural flows. It is this traffic that is so vital to and an integral part of the everyday existence of border communities and which operate despite the exclusionary nature of territorial mapping. When the state seeks to 'close' its borders through formal measures, informal processes go on to 'open' the same border. While the logic of the former seeks to exclude, the latter is premised on a mutually constitutive relationship that spans the very same markers. These fugitive landscapes thus command respect as subverters par excellence, which succeed in effectively renegotiating relations of power and authority.

What these instances of economic diplomacy underline is that dynamic market institutions and weak formal institutional structures can be sufficient drivers for economic dynamism that can supplement and go a long way to fill gaps that formal inter-state agreements between member economies appear ill-equipped to close. India's subregional diplomacy is clearly producing a modest but valuable space for subnational actors to become active partners in framing and fashioning the terms of India's subregional engagement. It is also clear then that the subnational actor can play a critical role as an interlocutor between the national and the subregional levels. At the end of the day, the subregional project is fundamentally an experiment in co-governance that has to have robust subnational stakeholders as active partners in framing and fashioning subregional orders. Together, these processes can script a bottom-up vision of India's subregional imaginary steered by

subnational India. It is these dynamic processes that constitute subterranean subregionalism, a form of integration that mainstream research and policy has so far not paid adequate attention to.

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Hydro-Political Dynamics and Environmental Security in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
The case of Bangladesh-India Trans-boundary Water Relations

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the hydro-political dynamics and reviews the various challenges to environmental security in the context of trans-boundary water relations between Bangladesh and India, in South Asia. Environmental security is understood as the state of "absence of conflicts, explicit or latent" in the socio-economic and ecological space of human existence. The spatial scope of trans-boundary waters is defined in the present study as the physical extent of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin, with the role of the river construed as a channel for the movement of water; generation, transport and deposition of sediments by the flows; and support to ecosystems and biodiversity. The paper then moves on to identify and discuss the ecosystem processes and services provided by the flows, highlighting the critical linkages between human interventions and environmental security. It emphasizes that the present perceptions of reductionist engineering have generated a hydro-political situation prone to generation of

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disputes over the sharing of flows, especially during the lean season, in the numerous trans-boundary rivers shared between Bangladesh and India. It discusses the need for ensuring overall environmental security related to the trans-boundary flows that need to be based on an ecological perspective. By addressing the limitations of the reductionist engineering vision of trans-boundary waters, this paper emphasizes the need for a framework of an ecologically informed holistic engineering for reducing hydro-political tensions. The need is for a model of hydro-diplomacy in the region based on a negotiated balance between the totality of ecosystem processes and services as well as human well-being.

Introduction

In addressing issues related to the use of the natural environment, the Malthusian creed of 'scarcity induces conflicts' has been the dominant thinking in the policy literature of many parts of the developing world. Such ideas have not eluded the evolution of water policy in South Asia (Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh, 2009; Rasul, 2014). However, there is already a worldwide consciousness that the way water is being managed in river basins, led by this Malthusian creed, is socially and ecologically unsustainable, as well as prone to generation of conflicts. Over the past several years, such concerns have been expressed from the highest international professional platforms (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000: xxi), and in diverse contexts by many leading water professionals (see for example Falkenmark et al., 2000; Gleick, 1998). With such concerns, the last few years have witnessed the ubiquitous call for a change in our existing visions of water systems and way of their utilization (Bandyopadhyay, 2009). The emerging vision, enriched by continuous accrual of new

knowledge, both disciplinary and interdisciplinary, involves the replacement of the present paradigm of reductionist water engineering by a new ecologically informed interdisciplinary paradigm of water-systems management. Here, the term "paradigm" is used in the way defined by Kuhn (1962) in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The term Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) describes one such approach (Allan, 2006; Hassing et al., 2009). This paper hypothesizes that the prime challenge to environmental security in the context of Bangladesh-India trans-boundary waters has arisen due to the reductionist perceptions of looking at rivers as mere 'stock of water' that can be extracted and shared. Such reductionist thinking based on arithmetic hydrology is incapable of identifying and recognizing the issues related to environmental security. In the case of trans-boundary rivers shared by Bangladesh and India, the volume of flow as the sole description of rivers (without consideration of eco-hydrology, fluvial geomorphology, sediment dynamics and associated ecosystem services, and related issues) has restricted the scope of joint management of shared waters to quantitative division of the volumes over short periods of the lean flow season.

Notions Defined: Trans-boundary Water Regimes and Environmental Security

Trans-boundary Water Regimes

Water is a fugitive resource that is prone to cross boundaries. Recent literature defines 'trans-boundary' waters as waters flowing across any boundary including the sectoral (Beach et al, 2000). Trans-boundary issues over water take place not only between nations, but also between federal states of a nation, and occur even between districts within federal state, villages within a district and also between sectors (Ghosh, 2009). Therefore, trans-boundary water disputes happen not only between nations, but also between federal states, and occur even between districts within a federal state and at times go even further down to occur

between the ultimate micro-level units of a society or an economy, like village level organizations.

On the other hand, sectoral water conflicts have become more frequent. Inter-sectoral water disputes are not necessarily trans-boundary in the physical sense. Though, they do not literally involve crossing of political boundaries, they can be thought to be emerging from transfer of water from one sector of use to another. At a certain point in time, a finite resource used in agriculture, cannot be used for other sectors. In a majority of the cases, agriculture accounts for the largest proportion of the water consumed. Often, under conditions of scarcity, the reprehensible squandering of water in agriculture causes problems for the urban and industrial sectors by reducing the amount of available water.

The competing uses of water in industry, irrigation and urban sectors comprise the use of water in an economy, and the sectors together are known as the economic sectors. The existing literature, at times explicitly, and at times tacitly, has acknowledged these competing uses (e.g. Bandyopadhyay, 1995 and 2007; Bouhia, 2001; Holden and Thobani, 1996; Rasul, 2014). However, the realization that urban water crises often arise due to the extensively low-efficiency usage in the agricultural sector has not really come to the fore except, for example, in an account provided by Ghosh (2009).

In the past two or three decades, inter-sectoral water conflicts have taken a new shape with the emergence of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), where the allocation of water for the continuation of ecosystem processes and services has received increasing acceptance (Aylward et al., 2005; UNEP 2009). At a broader qualitative dimension, the two major competitors for water use are the economic sectors based on ex-situ uses and the ecological sector based on in-situ uses (Lemly et al., 2000). Many nations have recognized the importance of the ecosystem services, and kept water for in-stream uses, because of egregious impacts of the constructionist regimes. As noted by Flessa (2004) and Ghosh (2009), in the Colorado Delta and Imperial Valley in the Western

United States, and in the northern Gulf of California, the
environmental impacts of water diversion and the conversion of
land to agriculture have been severe. Considering the holistic
aspect of rivers, nearly 700 dams in the USA and elsewhere have
already been removed and the movement towards river
restoration is accelerating (Gleick, 2000).

Therefore, on the basis of the available literature, the scope of
'trans-boundariness' in this paper in the context of the
international boundary between Bangladesh and India is
delineated by further including needs and demands on water
across sectors, including for maintaining the ecosystem processes
and services.

Environmental Security

The problems of environmental security are usually offered by the
spatial inequity in the availability of ecosystem services of the
natural environment. Otherwise, unwise uses of the natural
environment as sinks of unwanted outputs of human economic
activities, as in the case of the GHGs in the atmosphere, often
generate problems for environmental security. These have often
been the potential drivers of environmental conflicts. Chalecki
(2002) attempted to define 'environmental security' by describing
the notion in terms of the ability of a nation or a society to
withstand scarcity of environmental assets, environmental risks,
adverse changes or environment-related tensions or conflicts. The
idea comes close to Homer-Dixon's *Ingenuity* thesis, where he
stated that the ability of a nation to combat resource scarcity is
through generation of new ideas, which he called 'ingenuity'
(Homer-Dixon, 2000). Steiner (2006) point out that environmental
security is an overarching term that entails energy security, climate
security, water security, food security and health security. He
defines environmental security as a state when cleaner
technologies and renewable energy sources can co-exist with
economic growth and with environmental and social objectives.
Myers (1989, 2004 and 2008), one of the long-standing scholars

working in the arena of environmental security, feels that the nature of the concerns for environmental security have been changing because of the changing nature of the relation between human societies and their ambient environment. Environmental security, therefore, needs to be construed in terms of humankind and its institutions and organizations anywhere and at anytime (Myers, 2004).

This interpretation of Myers (2004) is a very important entry point to the entire discourse on environmental security as, essentially, the interaction of human societies with nature and their resulting dynamic relationship have been at the core of post-Cold War interest (Stucker, 2006). Human activities have transformed the natural environment to such an extent that in many instances the security of humans themselves has often been threatened as a result. This state of symbiotic relation between the changing natural environment and security of human societies is one of the ways of looking at environmental security (Myers, 2008; Homer-Dixon, 1994).

One important concern here is the state of the social stress created by resource scarcity, degradation or extreme natural events, thereby often leading to conflicts. The other important concern is environmental changes that often act as a stressor at the socio-ecological stratum of human existence (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Therefore, a conflict-prone state may exist within the human societies with nature acting as the stressor, while there might also be a state of conflict between the human society and nature that poses a threat to environmental security. The context of conflict within human societies for natural resources is well-evidenced and well-understood. They can be evidenced from the various cases of conflicts, over forests, water systems, agricultural land-use, oil resources, etc. The lesser understood aspect is related to human interventions in the ecosystemic processes and natural resource flows for short term promotion of economic growth, eventually threatening those very ecosystemic processes and services. As an example, anthropogenic interventions in the natural hydrological

flows of rivers have often proved counter-productive in the long-run, despite yielding short-run economic benefits, as has already been stated earlier. Such interventions have negatively affected human livelihoods further downstream by affecting ecosystem services (Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh, 2009). These are all concerns for environmental security.

Thus, environmental security can be defined as *a state of absence of conflicts* in the complex and interconnected relations in and between the biological, social, economic and cultural processes of human societies and the natural environment. One may state that environmental security depends on the dynamics in the natural environment, population change, degree of access to the natural environment, etc. Interaction between and among the determinants of environmental security sets the stage for addressing the related challenges.

Trans-boundary Water Regimes between Bangladesh and India

The Bangladesh-India trans-boundary water regime, in the widely accepted holistic sense, consists of the flow of water, sediments, and biodiversity. Individually, all the three constituents of the flows are significant and have created the fertile region known as the Bengal delta or the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) delta. At the southern end of the GBM delta exist the Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest of the world. The basin can be divided into three sub-basins of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra (Jamuna in Bangladesh) and the Meghna (Fig. 1). A number of smaller streams in the GBM delta, which are vital for the ecological stability of the Sundarbans, drain directly into the Bay of Bengal.

Spread over the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and vast areas in the Tibet region of China, the GBM basin (1,745,400 sq km) is the third largest river flow system in the world, after the Amazon and Congo-Zaire. The annual run-off of the basin is about 1,150 billion cubic meters (BCM) and the peak outflow at the estuary is 1,41,000 cumecs (Bandyopadhyay, 1995).

Fig. 1: Map of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna_basins.jpg

The flow of the Ganges is contributed by numerous tributaries, draining the Himalaya, from Kosi in the east to Yamuna in the west. The river gets the name Ganges at Devaprayag in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, where the tributaries of Alakananda and Bhagirathi meet. Emerging from the Himalaya at Hardwar, the Ganges flows south-eastwards along the Himalayan foothills for about 1500 km through the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. In Bihar, the Ganges turns southwards, crosses the Indian state of West Bengal, to enter Bangladesh, downstream of Farakka. Just after Farakka the flow of the Ganges gets divided into two. The mainstream Ganges enters Bangladesh (locally called *Boro Ganga* or the larger Ganges), while a smaller distributary, the Bhagirathi-Hooghly remains within the Indian state of West Bengal and flows by the port-cities of Kolkata and Haldia before emptying in the Bay of Bengal near Sagar island. The mainstream of the Ganges flows eastwards into Bangladesh, where after Brahmaputra (Jamuna) meets the river, it gets the name Padma. A few centuries ago a

stream called the Saraswati that flowed a few kilometers west of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, used to carry much of what Bhagirathi-Hooghly carried during the last 200 years or so (Dasgupta, 2011). Satga was a port town on Saraswati that Portuguese traders had established. However, with rapid silting up of Saraswati, the Portuguese shifted the port town to Bandel located on the Hooghli-Bhagirathi. This is an indicator of the very dynamic geo-morphological nature of the GBM delta.

The Brahmaputra is created by the flow of three important tributaries from the eastern Himalaya near Sadiya in the Indian state of Assam. They are the Luhit, the Dibang and the Siang or Dihang. The Siang/Dihang is known in the upstream areas in Tibet region of China as Yarlung-Tsangpo. As the Yarlung river enters India from China it is known as Siang and further downstream as Dihang. The Brahmaputra, like the Ganges, receives many tributaries draining the South aspect of the Himalaya, from Buri Dihing in the east to Teesta in the west. Both rivers also receive smaller tributaries from the Central Indian uplands and the

Fig. 2

Meghalaya Plateau respectively. The Brahmaputra (Jamuna) and the Ganges meet upstream of the town of Goalundo and the joint flow is known as Padma. This flow meets the Meghna river further downstream and the combined flow of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna outpours into the Bay of Bengal as Lower Meghna. Between the Meghna and the Bhagirathi–Hooghly lies the GBM Delta.

Due to the interaction of the summer monsoon with the hills in North-east India and the eastern Himalaya, the eastern parts of the GBM basin receive substantially high summer rainfall with Mawsynram in the Meghalaya hills recording 11,873 mms of average annual precipitation. In stark contrast, in the western parts of the basin, semi-arid areas in Rajasthan in India and in southern Tibet, annual precipitation can be as low as 300 mm. This makes the GBM a basin of large spatial disparity in precipitation. This disparity in precipitation is further aggravated by the wide temporal inequity as around 75 per cent of the total annual precipitation occurs during the three and half months of summer monsoon starting in June (Fig. 2). The monsoon precipitations cause various types of floods in diverse regions in the basin (Bandyopadhyay, 2009:49-100). Another important feature of the flow in the basin is that the two main rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Ganges, carry water from the drier parts of the basin to the parts with abundant rainfall. This adds to the high flows and the annual inundations.

In 1947, as India was partitioned into two independent countries, India and Pakistan, the present area of Bangladesh was known as East Pakistan. Thereafter the 'international trans-boundary' characteristic of the GBM basin emerged with several new dimensions. In the accepted conceptual framework, Bangladesh-India trans-boundary waters relations have been diplomatically focused on the sharing of the flows, like of the Ganges and the Teesta. Hydrologically, the flows in 54 rivers and streams that cross the boundary between the two countries are counted as the trans-boundary rivers. However, during the

monsoon high flows, these numbers become much higher and it is not possible to limit trans-boundary flows within these 54 streams or rivers alone.

Anthropogenic Interventions over Trans-boundary Waters and Environmental Security

The 1960s witnessed rapid expansion of human interventions in the water systems in India primarily motivated by concerns about food security. In the last few decades, such interventions in the GBM basin have been made largely in the context of energy security, as hydro-power projects. The more subtle but political role of large storage projects in the redistribution of river waters should, however, not be underestimated. The rivers emerging from the Himalaya, in particular, those providing snow- and glacier-melt flows, became increasingly important in meeting the growing demands in the plains for irrigation in the early summer months.The traditional reductionist approach to river engineering, as initiated by the British, continued to guide the interventions in post-colonial India. Hence, such interventions were frequently based on old ideas and site selections were made several decades back (MoWR, 1989). Many of these were prone to creating trans-boundary disputes in the GBM basin. This resistance to change has been explained as hydrological obscurantism (Bandyopadhyay, 2012). The resistance to change may also be linked with the advantages that the politically powerful gain from such projects as many important negative externalities are conveniently kept out of project assessment as 'market failures' (Menon et al., 2009).

Reductionist Engineering, Hydro-political Tensions and Environmental Security

In the context of India's relation with Bangladesh in respect of water, there is a common perception, right or wrong, that a smaller country receives an iniquitous and poor share of the benefits of the

trans-boundary waters. The Bangladesh-India water relations became centralized on the issue of the Farakka barrage and had actually led to a crisis of trust between the two co-riparian countries (Abbas, 1982). More recently, however, developments based on the MoU reached between the two countries and signed on September 6, 2011, on the cooperative management of the Sundarbans, and the growing cooperation in trans-boundary navigation provides an example of regaining of trust between the two countries. The Sundarbans is shared between Bangladesh and India and located at the southern end of the GBM delta. The Sundarbans depends on supply of freshwater from upstream areas in the GBM delta. The push for this cooperation on the Sundarbans came from more interdisciplinary ecosystem perspective. In presenting the interventions in trans-boundary rivers, the three issues, namely, the Farakka barrage, the proposed transfer of water from the Brahmaputra and tributaries in India's project on Interlinking of Rivers, and the prospects of cooperative management of the Sundarbans will be analyzed.

The Farakka Barrage

The construction of a barrage at Farakka across the Ganges has been historically the most crucial factor affecting the Bangladesh-India hydro-political relations and the perceptions of trans-boundary environmental security issues. Farakka is located just upstream of the point where the main branch of the river Ganges enters Bangladesh and a smaller branch, Bhagirathi-Hooghly, reaches the Bay of Bengal flowing within the Indian state of West Bengal. The barrage was planned to enhance the flow of Bhagirathi-Hooghly branch so as to resuscitate the port at Calcutta, located downstream. The port was rapidly getting silted up and losing navigability. The Government of Pakistan and, after 1971, with the birth of Bangladesh, the Government of Bangladesh were critical of the project as it was apprehended by them that by enhancing the flow into Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the barrage would reduce the dry season flow of the Ganges/Padma into Bangladesh.

This would have serious implications for environmental security including food security in that country (Abbas, 1982).

Islam and Gnauck (2008) attribute the salinity ingression in the Bangladesh Sundarbans delta to the construction of the Farakka barrage in 1975. They find evidence of saline water penetrating the upstream area, with river water salinity increasing significantly in 1976 as compared to the year 1968.

The Bangladesh-India treaty of 1996 on the sharing of the dry season flows at Farakka turned out to be merely an arithmetical exercise. It is not based on a broader and interdisciplinary ecological perspective on river flows. In Bangladesh, the Barrage is blamed for water scarcity and salinization in the lower parts of the GBM delta. Even in India, the drying up of the Indian Sundarbans Delta (ISD) and the consequent saline water ingression in the delta region have been attributed to the streamflow depletion due to sedimentation in the Farakka, as also the rise in sea levels (Ghosh et al 2016). The absence of ecosystem perspective in the case of the Farakka barrage is also exemplified by the recent statement (21 Aug 2016) by the Chief Minister of Bihar, linking the sediment problems caused by the barrage with the floods in Bihar.

Moreover, many unsubstantiated claims fog the hydro-political relations, thereby causing further confusions over the impacts of the barrage on environmental security in the GBM delta region. As recognized by Richards and Singh (2000:1915), "… In Bangladesh, the Farakka Barrage has been widely portrayed in political and media discussions as a symbol of India's evil intent toward Bangladesh. Technical controversy about the 'flushing' process through which the barrage was expected to save the port of Calcutta and its industrial hinterland, as well as India's failure to consider the downstream consequences of the project, left space for the assertion that the barrage was built *because of* its deleterious effects on Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). A second myth of Indian malice has also been widely repeated. This is the assertion that India can cause flooding in Bangladesh through the release of water stored behind the Farakka Barrage. A brief description of the

barrage indicates that it is unequipped for storing more than trivial quantities of water, far too little to have a significant effect on floods in Bangladesh".

Such issues have caused harm to both sides of the border over decades. The progress in the evolution of new ideas has also been hindered by the lack of availability of detailed hydrological data in the public domain. This has obstructed the generation of crucial and new interdisciplinary knowledge on the complex ecology of the GBM basin, especially the delta. Further, professional criticisms from within water technocracy were ignored, as has been the case with Bhattacharya (1954) whose views on river engineering for the Farakka barrage were not in tune with the official position. It is in this background that ecologically informed hydro-diplomacy and holistic engineering had been strongly suggested for the GBM basin by Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh (2009). The impact of the reductionist understanding of rivers is clear from the fact that the decline in the navigability of the port at Kolkata (Calcutta) has not been reversed by the Farakka barrage. The plus side of the barrage, nevertheless, for West Bengal is the flow in the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, especially during the lean season. This has substantially reduced the water problem in the downstream in the densely populated areas of West Bengal.

Interlinking of Rivers in India

While on the one hand, Bangladesh feels that the lack of flow in the dry season months poses a threat to environmental security, a proposal for taking part of the flow of the Brahmaputra to other parts of India was planned. This can be seen as a part of the larger project of interlinking of river in India (ILR) (Fig. 3). Further, linking of its tributaries Manas, Sankosh and Teesta with the Ganges (MSTG Link) is also on the cards. On many platforms, NGOs and civil society groups in Bangladesh have expressed opposition to the river interlinking project. If official negotiations are not completed prior to the completion of the links, it may

become a possible trigger for further disputes over environmental security in Bangladesh (Mirza et al., 2007). This project has also drawn criticism from the perspective of ecological and economic impacts (Bandyopadhyay, 2009:147-183; Alagh et al., 2006). From these publications, it is apparent that an old and ecologically uninformed approach has been used to conceptualize this massive project intervening into several Himalayan rivers. Environmental security in the downstream areas will surely be impacted by such a project but environmental impact studies are very limited in their scope and knowledge base used. While some groups in both Bangladesh and India have been advocating a basin-level strategy to address trans-boundary waters, realization of such ideas has not progressed very much. Again, it is only an ecologically informed hydro-diplomacy and holistic engineering that will be needed to make an amicable progress.

The Preparatory Steps for Cooperative Management of the Sundarbans

The other critical trans-boundary issue related to water is of the Sundarbans ecosystem. The Sundarbans ecosystem extends from

Fig. 3: The Proposed Himalayan Links in the ILR Project

Source: http://wreforum.org/khaleq/blog/4971

southern Bangladesh to the southern part of the Indian state of West Bengal. It is the largest single block of tidal halophytic mangrove forest in the world and became a trans-boundary mangrove after the division and independence of India in 1947. The forest area of the Sundarbans covers approximately 10,000 square kilometers (3,900 sq mi) about 65 percent of which is in Bangladesh with the remainder being in India. The Sundarbans is declared as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The ecosystem is dominated by mangrove forests (one of the three largest single tracts of mangrove forests in the world), spreads over an area of 26000 square kilometers, with 9630 sq kilometers in India. The Sundarbans is located at the southern end of the GBM delta and freshwater flows from the Ganges, Jamuna and Meghna are very much needed for its ecological stability.

With a population of about 8 million (in both Bangladesh and Indian parts), the Sundarbans presents itself as one of the most poverty-stricken regions of the world. The deep-rooted ecosystems-livelihoods linkage can be witnessed from the heavy reliance of the population for livelihoods on the ecosystem services. Therefore, fishery, honey collection, gathering of wood, shrimp larva farming, crab collection, and agriculture are the major forms of occupation.

While 'development deficit' in terms of health, education, and high poverty levels work against environmental security, it has been stated for long that the Farakka barrage has been responsible for reduced freshwater flows into the GBM Delta (Richards and Singh, 2000; Danda et al, 2011; Ghosh et al 2016). Even the expansion of irrigated agriculture has been stated as a reason. The reduction in freshwater flow has been resulting in salinity ingression in the Sundarbans delta regions of both the countries. In the Indian part, saline water ingression has proved detrimental for agriculture, and there are already talks on reviving the salt-tolerant variety of paddy that was discarded during the Green Revolution of the 1960s. The other critical threat has been posed by global warming and climate change. These changes are in the form of

increase in sea surface temperature, sea level rise, changes in the precipitation pattern and more frequent occurrence of storm events (Danda et al., 2011; Hazra et al., 2002; Singh 2007; Pethick and Orford 2013). Further, the proportion of higher intensity events appears to be increasing, possibly as a result of rising sea surface temperatures (Hazra et al., 2002). Analyses of cyclonic events over the last 120 years indicate a 26 percent rise in the frequency of high to very high intensity cyclones over this time period (Singh, 2007).

The importance of the Sundarbans, however, has been recognized by the Governments of both the countries. Interestingly, despite the fragmented nature of water management regimes, both the governments have recognized the Sundarbans as two parts of the same ecosystem. This is particularly of significance from the point of wildlife management. The acknowledgements that the Sundarbans have a broader role to play by the continuation of diverse ecosystem services led the two governments to design and sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Conservation of the Sundarbans on 6 September 2011. This is a non-binding agreement on the part of both countries, with an initial tenure of 5 years, and with the provision of automatic renewal, unless terminated by mutual consent by either party by serving written notice 90 days prior to the date of termination.

There is no doubt that such a form of cooperation, with an ecological perspective to protect and restore ecosystem processes involving trans-boundary forests and water, differs from the agreements on water sharing. However, the inherent problem with this agreement is that it essentially concentrates on the conservation component without any reference to the issues of economic development policy. Though the agreement recognizes the importance of ecosystem services to human communities, there is a need for a holistic statement describing the complex relations between regeneration of the ecosystem and the human economic activities. A very innovative concept in this regard has

Fig. 4: Sundarbans Eco-region

Source: Danda et al (2011)

been put forward by Danda et al (2011). They have conceptualized a framework vision for the Indian Sundarbans Delta (ISD) for 2050 by highlighting the need for a planned retreat of humans from areas with high vulnerability to extreme natural events which can lead to ecosystem regeneration in that zone free from human interference. Ghosh et al (2016) have justified how such an option for adaptation and development is economically more beneficial than the business-as-usual scenario of non-adaptation. This vision presents a holistic statement of sustainable development in the ISD region. However, such types of vision statements are also needed for the Bangladesh Sundarbans region, and could be made a component of the cooperative framework. Nevertheless, the shift of the basis for cooperation to ecosystem regeneration indicates that a holistic perspective of rivers could also promote and advance cooperation between Bangladesh and India.

Environmental Security as a Two-level Game

As observed by Richards and Singh (1997), usually national governments get engaged in a "two-level game" (Putnam, 1988) when dealing with trans-boundary waters. They have to deal with their domestic water regimes, and almost simultaneously get into international trans-boundary water negotiations, keeping in view their domestic compulsions. On the other hand, international agreements also affect domestic hydro-political conditions. A move in one game will typically have implications for the outcome of the other. The ongoing impasse on the proposed Bangladesh-India agreement on the flows of Teesta is a case in point. The Bangladesh-India engagement over the trans-boundary waters complies well with this contention. There is no doubt that the domestic economic interests have been the prime drivers of international negotiations as far as the India-Bangladesh trans-boundary water relations are concerned.

On the one hand, domestic policies based on the traditional engineering paradigm have led to domestic problems over the basin. The absence of a robust sediment management strategy makes it difficult to understand and address the changing course of the Ganges in the upstream and the downstream of the Farakka barrage. The changing course has resulted in extensive land-erosion and flooding generating dispute between the federal states of Jharkhand and West Bengal, creating neo-refugees. Bandyopadhyay and Perveen (2008) have expressed their apprehensions on the interlinking of rivers project and feel that the project may further aggravate interstate water disputes, apart from aggravating the Bangladesh-India hydro-political relations. They identify avenues through which new inter-state conflicts may emerge with the project. It is a fact that the federal states in India have always enjoyed right over water for apportionment and allocation. Already a few states in India have revealed their dissent against the ILR project. On the other hand, a recent report the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, (IDSA) New Delhi, expressed the strong role of the civil society in Bangladesh in the

context of the international dialogues over water sharing with India (IDSA 2010). Bangladesh is also concerned with India's ILR project that would divert water from tributaries to Brahmaputra.

The above examples not only hint at a possibility of interstate conflict, but also at inter-sectoral conflict (irrigation needs versus domestic supplies issues, and also of ecosystem processes, navigation, etc.) whose environmental implications will widely be felt in South Asian hydro-politics.

Knowledge Gaps on Trans-boundary Water Regime: A Concern for Environmental Security

The ineffectiveness of traditional water engineering to contribute to promoting environmental security in the context of population pressure and continuing poverty in the GBM delta can be largely linked to the absence of an ecological perspective, and use of a framework of economics that cannot recognize the ecosystem processes and services in their totality. By not engaging with critical opinions worldwide, the existing view of governmental water engineering has exposed its inability to evolve with the flow of global knowledge. The result has been an exclusive mode of hydro-diplomacy that has essentially resulted in bilateral negotiations between Bangladesh and India on the downstream flows in the basin (Richards and Singh 2000). Whereas worldwide there has been a call for taking an 'ecosystemic' approach for integrated river basin management, the bilateral approach to water resource development moves away from considering the entire river basin as the unit for water resource management. More recently, Bandyopadhyay (2016) has made a strong plea for introduction of river basin organizations in managing rivers in India. Bridging the 'disconnect' between the emerging paradigm and the traditional perceptions still dominating water policy and management in South Asia is going to be critical for water management and environmental security in the context of the transboundary water relations. With global climate change seriously affecting the hydrology of the Himalayan rivers, water

endowment of the rivers and future flows would become more uncertain (Shrestha et al., 2015).

Way Forward for Research and Water Diplomacy

In addressing the state of dispute over shared waters in the Bangladesh-India context, the perception of stock, divert and use needs to be replaced by a form of collaborative water diplomacy informed by ecological characteristics of the GBM river system. The most important remedy to address such knowledge gaps and eventually impact diplomatic thinking is to undertake research in some of the areas that are of utmost relevance in terms of affecting environmental security in the region. The proposed research issues need to be addressed from three perspectives in a holistic and inclusive framework combining various disciplines. These perspectives have otherwise been suggested by Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh (2009).

   a. *The Ecological Perspective: Ecosystem Service–livelihood Linkage:* The river basin needs to be looked at as a collection of productive ecosystems that greatly affects livelihoods further downstream. The growing recognition of the importance of the ecosystems services has been highlighted in the report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). While upstream diversions help agriculture, there is a consequent decline in the downstream fishing economy all along the river as also enhanced salinity ingress affecting downstream economies, leading to partisan and suboptimal decisions. Based on recent research on the economic role of ecosystem services, the satisfaction of the needs of natural ecosystems has become a genuine contender for allocation of water in many countries (Aylward et al., 2005; Dyson et al., 2003). Further, the importance of sediment needs to be understood in a holistic framework of fluvial geomorphology and biodiversity. This element has somehow eluded policy documents so far. Even floods in

the Brahmaputra-Jamuna floodplains need to be understood through a holistic ecological engineering knowledge, so as to manage floodwaters and also sediments.

b. *The Perspective of Economic Valuation:* To complement the ecological perspective, a fundamental re-think has been going on with the internalization of important perspectives of ecological economics, which, more importantly entails identification of economic values with ecosystem processes (Ghosh and Bandyopadhyay, 2009). Such valuation exercises are often conducted with offering a range of values (which, by themselves, are approximations). The important aspect of such valuation exercises is their usefulness in providing means to internalize factors that remained to be considered in the traditional assessment of river projects. A very comprehensive process of valuation has evolved from the Water Allocation Systems (WAS) developed by a project at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on water management and conflict resolution in west Asia (Fisher et al 2005). It is models like these and the ones by Hitzhusen (2007) that need to be developed for comprehensive evaluation at the river basin scale, in the context of GBM. For India, Desai (undated) and Bandyopadhyay and Ghosh (2009) have suggested expansions of the valuation framework in the assessment of projects, though, in reality, little has been done to expand the framework.

c. *The Institutional Perspective:* There has not been much work on the institutional aspects of water management at the basin scale over the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin barring those by Crow and Singh (2000). Crow and Singh (2000) have highlighted the need for extending bilateral exchange to multilateral exchange, and the second is expanding negotiations from conventional diplomacy to

incorporate private economic actors. This implies the consideration of inter-sectoral modes of water distribution, and considering the ecosystem as an important sector that plays an important role in human civilization. On the other hand, there needs to be a redefinition in the ways the property rights over water are being looked at. In western US, property rights over water had been defined in terms of three doctrines: History, Harmon and Hobbes. While the doctrines of History (right belongs to the one who has appropriated the resource first), and Harmon (right belongs to the one who has the water falling on his roof), were leading to conflicts, as different actors in the basin at various levels and sectors defined property rights as per their own convenience, it is therefore better to have peaceful modes of negotiations for defining property rights as defined by the Hobbesian doctrine (Richards and Singh 2001). This might even lead to the development of water markets for defining property rights.

The perspectives, however, should not be treated as independent modes of looking at the challenges of environmental security in the context of the India-Bangladesh transboundary water relations. There is a need to combine the three perspectives in order to conduct research in a holistic framework.

Conclusion

The above discussion highlights that the concerns of environmental security in the context of trans-boundary water relations between Bangladesh and India should be viewed through the lens of the ecosystem processes and services and livelihoods linkages, rather than from the perspective of traditional engineering. Such perspectives and interests have so far led to conflicts at international, national and sectoral levels between stakeholders, and have posed threats to environmental security.

The movement from a state of distrust and suspicion to a state of trust and cooperation can be facilitated with an ecosystem-based approach to basin-level management of rivers. This implies that on the one hand, the relevant stakeholder nations in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin have to be involved in a dialogue. On the other hand, since the environmental security concerns boil down to the most micro-level stratum of the society, there is a need to involve sub-national actors in the deliberation processes, as also to involve them realistically in the decision-making process.

However, research and knowledge creation has to precede policy dialogue to bridge some critical knowledge gaps. While this paper has talked of inclusiveness of diverse stakeholders, it further stresses inclusiveness of diverse disciplines for conducting research. The new research framework needs to be based on a new trans-disciplinary knowledge base created by the emerging science of eco-hydrology, economics, and new institutional theories. There is a need to specially consider the important economic issues of the delta region. The Indian Sundarbans Delta specifically presents a critical challenge of vulnerability of humans and other life forms in the wake of global warming and climate change. On the other hand, there is a need to reconsider the ways floods are being looked at further upstream, and consider their ecosystem contributions and services. On the whole, there needs to be an economic assessment of the demand for water based on scarcity value framework on an immediate basis, with the results being disseminated at a broader policy scale, with clear recognitions of the ecosystem based delineations of a hydro-diplomacy that concerns itself with human well-being, food security, and environmental security.

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Linklater and Critical IR Theory: Discourse Ethics, Territoriality and Citizenship

Shibashis Chatterjee

Abstract

This article looks into some of the major works on critical theory in IR, particularly the inflections of Andrew Linklater, and discusses Linklater's enthusiastic engagements with the evolving 'meaning/s' of some of the key political principles of our times, most notably sovereignty and territoriality. We discuss how critical IR theory has borrowed central ideas of Jürgen Habermas, particularly his ideas on modernity, citizenship, and rights. In the light of the works of Habermas, this article looks at Andrew Linklater's new work on citizenship and critical theory, which argues that modernity and critical theory would lead to human emancipation based on reasoned deliberation and agreement. The claim here is that Linklater's great achievement is to reflect on the dual registers of the modern state and citizenship theory, the gradual overcoming of peripheral and subaltern groups and the making of a unified discourse of citizenship coterminous with the territorial margins of the national security state on one hand, and the moral vacuity of bounded territoriality on the other. Yet, Linklater's theory is only about generality and universalism. He is also sensitive to the questions of identity and difference, of pluralism and diversity, in the process bringing critical theory in line with some of the debates in multiculturalism as well. One of the central arguments advanced here is that post-colonial

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otherness remains problematic for critical theory as the Orient remained a blind spot for Marxism in the past. Critical theory has brought out the sociological gullibility and moral quandary of realism but its own sensitivity to difference and otherness remains contested.

Keywords: Critical theory, rationality, citizenship, rights, postcolonial, difference, territoriality, conflict

Introduction

Critical theory has had a significant impact on International Relations (IR) theory. While the early Frankfurt theorists have also been influential, the works of Jurgen Habermas has particularly inspired critical IR scholars on issues like citizenship, democracy, culture, identity and international justice. While a full-fledged survey of its manifold impacts is beyond the scope of this article, we intend to look into the primary tracks of Andrew Linklater, who has used Habermas's theories to reflect on boundaries and possibilities of human emancipation. These issues have become further complex owing to transformations wrought by globalization, particularly in its political dimensions. Critical theory is particularly relevant in the fraught circumstances of the world, where identity driven conflicts have found a fresh lease of life and the idea of borders stands contested as ever. These contestations may be approached qua many theories. However, Andrew Linklater's work is particularly relevant as it directly looks into these issues. But critical theory of Habermas and Linklater remains an enterprise that is universal in spirit and committed to a politics of ethical humanism that seeks to transcend arbitrariness of all kinds. Is such universal humanism consistent with notions of difference and particularity? This study is essentially an attempt to address this question. It is a normative exercise that seeks to trace how Linklater positions his ideas and their politico-ethical ramifications. The study evolves in four

sections. The first section discusses how Habermas's ideas have gone into critical IR theory; the second section discusses the broad contours of critical IR theory; the third revolves round Linklater's works on nationalism and global citizenship, and the fourth brings up the issue of post-colonial difference as a point of departure and a critique of the attempts by mainstream critical theory to create a universalist discourse of emancipation and rights that does not sufficiently factor in the specificities of the post-colonial experience.

Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas

Critical theory developed out of the research program of the Frankfurt School, primarily in the hands of Adorno and Horkheimer. (Bernstein, 1994; Benhabib, 1986). The concern of the first generation scholars of critical theory lay in developing a body of knowledge which would be distinct from classical Marxism and yet serve the functions of a critique of the bourgeois order, economy, polity, society, culture and way of life. It took its inspiration from the works of Georg Lukacs, most notably from his *History and Class Consciousness.* (Lukacs, 1968). By intent and political association, the critical theory of Adorno and Horkheimer had little to do with sub-structural issues and instead focused heavily on ideological and super-structural categories like art, literary criticism, music and aesthetics. The second generation of critical theorists, especially the noted German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, contributed significantly to socio-political and economic issues, although he never embraced the central categories of classical Marxism to construct his critical discourses (Habermas, 1972; 1976; 1968/1987; 1985a; 1985b; 1987; 2001; Habermas and McCarthy, 1979). As a social philosopher, Habermas never wrote anything specifically on International Relations, although, quite like Sartre, Habermas has offered personal comments on many outstanding international events. Nevertheless, Habermas, like Foucault and Gadamer, has been appropriated and used by International Relations scholars. Critical

theory as developed by Jurgen Habermas is a significant approach to knowledge that has great potential for creating an alternative theory in International Relations. Some scholars in International Relations, mostly in Great Britain and Germany, have recently used Habermas. There are two distinct areas in Habermas' vast philosophical oeuvre which bear close relationship with the concerns of International Relations theory, viz. his analysis of the crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism and the role of the modern state, and the ideas of communicative action, discourses and discourse ethics.

The critical theory of Jurgen Habermas is a vast and complex philosophical-cum-theoretical system, which incorporates a whole array of diverse concepts into a synthetic whole. Although, Habermas belongs to the tradition of critical theory as developed by the Frankfurt School, the ingenuity of his overall thinking and the distinctiveness of his philosophical contributions have turned him into a distinguished critical theorist in his own right. The lineage of Habermas from the early generation of critical theorist, nevertheless, cannot be altogether denied. Habermas, quite like Adorno and Horkheimer, believes that critical theory, as an approach to knowledge, encompasses areas of social experience left alone by classical Marxism. Habermas's critical theory, therefore, is an all-encompassing system, its pervasiveness being justified on the argument that capitalism, which it tries to transcend, is itself a totalizing phenomenon, which, by its very logic of commodification, obliterates the distinction between the public and the private systems by intruding deeply into every area of life - from imaging individuals to inter-personal ties to the processes of programmatic socialization - and must be overcome by a mammoth system (McCarthy, 1978; Kellner, 1989).

However, unlike Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and against the banality of the model of totally administered society of Pollock (who had argued the case of a post-crisis stabilization of capitalist societies of the West) Habermas identifies significant crisis potentials in advanced capitalism, a crisis which is the natural

result of the attempted invasive tendencies prevailing in capitalism, something that paradoxically destroys individuality and particularity, i.e., the pillars of the capitalist order itself. Capitalism, for Habermas, is not a secured and stable order, but is a site for endemic crisis, unresolved conflicts and potential transformation (Habermas, 1979: 33-39). Building on Marx's notion of systems crisis, Habermas defines crisis in capitalism as fundamental social contradictions which are beyond reconciliation within a system governed by capitalist interests. The crisis in advanced capitalism is not only a crisis for the system at large, but also a threat to the very identity of the self-constituting individual. Such threats appear to Habermas as posing grave vulnerabilities to the confirmed and assumed social reproduction of the capitalist order, preparing the ground for its transformation into a post-capitalist direction.

Habermas, however, unlike Marx, does not believe class conflict to constitute the defining criteria of possible transformation of advanced capitalism into a new system, for according to him, under modern capitalism, almost everyone participating in the production, exchange and the other value generating social activities is a 'participant and a victim', although the degree of belonging to one or the other category varies (Habermas, 1979: 38-39). Moreover, Habermas, like the early Frankfurt theorists, and Antonio Gramsci, draws attention to crisis other than economic, which he divides into three inter-related categories - namely, legitimation crisis, rationality crisis and motivation crisis (Habermas, 1979: 61-92). The central thesis states that under advanced capitalism, the ideology of free market exchange has to make place for state management and technocratic steering theories, which produce profound contestation and crisis over norms, rules and patterns of resource distribution within the political, economic and social sub-systems of capitalism.

The idea of systems crisis is further developed by Habermas in his book entitled *Theory of Communicative Action* (1985). In this book Habermas involves the metaphor of the "life world", arguing that

the life world was variously colonized by the totalizing system of advanced capitalism. The life world consists of three constituent elements, namely, culture, society and personality, each bearing correspondence with specific modes of dialogic understanding via what Habermas calls 'communicative action'. The total system of advanced capitalism consists of sub-systems of the economic system and the state bureaucracy, which are ruled by power and wealth (money). When does crisis take place in this system? When the subversive colonization of the life world, by the unremitting imperatives of the capitalist system, along with the degradation of culture, interpersonal and social relations and personality, conspire to produce alienation and anomie - the state of meaninglessness and psychological anomalies - leading to the crisis of the system itself. Crisis, again, are of three different kinds - the economic crisis when the requisite value cannot be produced by the economic sub-systems; the rationality crisis due to deficiency of rationality or steering ability of the state; and motivational crisis caused by the withdrawal of motivation in the system. The result will be the crisis of legitimacy affecting the system as a whole. (Kellner, 1989: 199-200)

Habermas's notion of systems-crisis in general, and his analysis of the crisis potential of advanced capitalism in particular, have opened up new possibilities to address the question of system transformation or social change in capitalist states by showing that capitalism, its unprecedented advancement in science and technology notwithstanding, is prone to economic and rationality crises. In spite of this promise, however, Habermas does not delineate the ways to actually achieve the desired social transformation in a post-capitalist direction. Like the early Frankfurt theorists and Marcuse, Habermas denies the status of self-authenticating agency to the proletariat as the motor of social transformation in advanced capitalism.

Habermas in fact attempts a reconstruction of the science of materialism by modifying classical Marxism's two basic assumptions, viz. the theory of base and super structure and the

dialectic of production forces and the relations of production. As to the economist version of the base-superstructure thesis, Habermas complains:

> The context in which Marx propounded his theory makes it clear that the dependence of superstructure on base is valid only for the critical phase during which a social system is passing onto a new developmental level, what is meant is not some ontological constitution of society, but rather the guiding role that the economic structure assumes in social evolution (Love, 1995: 44-66).

The Marxian dialectic of production forces and relations of production, Habermas believes, is incapable of precisely locating the developmental mechanism. It can explain the systems problems, but not how these problems can be solved.

The most significant contribution of Habermas, it appears, is to devote attention to the multiple potential of conflict in advanced capitalism, conceived as an ideology of self-denial and deception. Habermas has provided a comprehensive account of how the disaffected individuals, alienated social groups, and the marginal voices in the making of history, can all contribute to the dialogue of transforming the exploitative character of advanced capitalism. What is missing in Habermas's open and sophisticated schematization of systems conflict, however, is a powerful political statement of resistance. He wishes to resolve the tension between social interests committed to brutal uniformity and individual interests indifferent to society. His proclamation regarding a possible transformation of the capitalist order, therefore, is hesitant and tentative, as it does not provide any politically viable alternative to a class solution to the problems of capital which he himself finds unworkable.

Habermas's contribution in the formulation of discourse ethics and communicative action has been widely used in International Relations theory. Habermas's pragmatism has been frowned upon and considered politically debilitating by his critiques. Thus, Habermas's negative assertion that the strategic actions of the

leadership in the course of political struggle could not simply be justified on the basis of revolutionary theory is a distinct manifestation of a deep sense of skepticism regarding the potential of critical theoretical knowledge to transcend the contemporary order. Habermas apparently makes a case for a differentiation between the conception of emancipation as a 'relentless discursive validation of claims to validity', on the one hand, and the practical change of established conditions on the other (Habermas, 1994: 259). One possible interpretation of this can be that practical political changes will have to be mediated through discursive processes. It means that it is only via the power of arguments (argumentative praxis) that social deformations can be cured.

Habermas's discourse ethics is predicated upon his distinction between strategic and communicative action. Strategic action induces success-oriented behavior of another by means of the threat of sanction or the prospect of gratification, in an attempt to perpetuate interaction in line with the more powerful actor. In communicative action, on the other hand, the accent is on *understanding*, where 'understanding' is defined as a "process seeking to arrive at a rationally motivated argument" (Habermas, 1994: 261).

Discourse, according to Habermas, refers expressly to processes of argumentation that hopes to arrive at a rational consensus solely on the basis of the demonstrated force of the better argument (Habermas, 1994: 262). Habermas distinguishes between two kinds of discourses-theoretical and practical. Theoretical discourses originate from the challenges to existing or dominant truth claims; practical discourses, however, deals with claims to normative lightness. The practical discourse, configured in the social world, consists of shared political and moral spaces, institutions, diverse practices, applies directly to International Relations.

This automatically raises the question of how to decide the legitimacy or otherwise of competing claims to normative validity of the dialogic modes of interaction prevailing in world politics.

The claims to normative validity are borne essentially by norms and are only derivatively held in speech acts (Habermas, 1994: 262). However, by Habermas's own admission, the 'mere existence of a norm is not sufficient to imply its worthiness to the recognized', and often norms with claims of validity do not attain recognition or approval. Habermas's solution to the problem is the principle of discourse ethics according to which 'only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse' (Habermas, 2001; Haake, 1996: 262-269).

At this point it is essential to bring out the logical problems or deficiencies of the steps leading to Habermas's argument. The most crucial limitation in Habermas's agreement exists in the form of an unstated underlying assumption - one that links understanding a speech act with agreement over its content. It is, however, not clear whether it is logically compelling to agree to the validity claims involved in a particular speech act in order to understand it (Fay, 1987: 188). To give an illustration, in a debate over the respective merits and demerits of different variants of democracy, the assumption that it is required first to demonstrate or establish the veracity of each of the contending validity claims (upheld by the proponents of each model) to understand the agreements invoked by each participant in the debate is quite unwarranted. Understanding, therefore, is logically independent of agreement. It automatically follows then that free understanding, unencumbered by power or any other consideration, cannot be, and is possibly not, an obvious guarantee to the attainment of an overarching and universal rational consensus.

Moreover, Habermas seems to be saying that in order that speech acts generate understanding, the participants (speakers and hearers) must share their meaning. However, continuity in communication among the participants, and the fact that this communication is possible due to certain assumptions shared by the participants regarding the life world, are inadequate as the

basis for inferring the truth or value of each of these assumptions. Therefore, even though communicators or participants, may sincerely aim at a rational consensus, and act with the presumption that such a consensus is, in fact, possible to attain, it still does not follow that the rational consensus would inevitably emerge (Fay, 1987: 189)

The theory of communicative action and discourse ethics would apparently work where all the participants share the assumptions of the eventual possibility of obtaining an overarching rational consensus by means of open dialogue, where only the force of better arguments prevail. It would not explain situations where the participants fail to agree to the possibility of a rational consensus through open communication and/or where such rational consensus could not be reached in spite of all the background factors and conditions operating favorably to the process. It is doubtful, nevertheless, whether this criticism is logically binding to the theory of discourse ethics, for it is still possible to reasonably argue and demonstrate cases where the favorable operation of discourse ethics actually lead to rational consensus, i.e. a solution agreeable to all the participants in the dialogue. The utility of the criticism, nevertheless, is in exposing practical possibilities where discourse ethics and communicative action might not supply the desired outcome. Therefore, if nothing, at least the universal validity of Habermas's conceptual tools becomes somewhat suspect.

Moreover, Habermas's concepts do not make adequate provisions for the notion of power. Put in perhaps the simplest way, the compulsion of better argument can essentially be the workings of power, although it may not become intelligible to the participants. In situations marked by great disparity in wealth, productive power and social prestige, there is not much to expect from the inherent qualities of better argument to create an egalitarian and just social order. Further, for Habermas, it is often possible that a norm with a redeemable claim to authority may fall short of actual recognition or appreciation. Habermas does not supply us with possible ways that can actually establish the

validity of truth claims, which do not receive universal approval/ recognition for anomalies not accountable to reason.

How has critical theory penetrated International Relations theory? Application of critical theory within International Relations has often taken the form of expositions relating to the construction of bounded communities & how such communities relate to each other. Among others, Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater, Mark Hoffman and Mark Neufeld have contributed much to rethink and problematize the conventional categories of the state, communities, international ethics, etc. (Haacke, 1996: 272-281). Of these, it is useful to cast some light upon the scholarship of Robert Cox and Andrew Linklater, who have, in their distinct ways, tried to develop a critical perspective in International Relations theory.

Fragments of Critical Theory IR: Cox and Linklater

The Coxian perspective takes global production as the primary category of analysis and explains the relationship between revolutionary upheavals and political movements in the Third World states against the marginalizing effects of globalization (Cox and Sinclair, 1996). A significant part of Robert Cox's more recent writings is devoted to social analysis of globalization of the means of production, and multilateralism or neo-institutionalization, and emerging patterns of elite-mass relationship throughout the international system. Within this basic structure, Cox has analyzed the question of internationalism of the capitalist state in an era of globalization. What has emerged in the process is definitely not a state poised to die of inanition, but one that plays a crucial role in the very dynamic of globalization itself. Cox visualizes the total historical process as a shifting kaleidoscope of historical structures conceived as ensembles of material capabilities, ideologies and institutions working against various forms of social forces, states and the world order. These categories, "in their respective combination," stand out as heuristic devices for Cox, to be used to understand the process of "macro historical changes and explore the further possibilities of more

desirable transformation." (Haacke, 1996: 279). The most prominent aspect in Robert Cox's thinking is his manifest prioritization of the concept of production. However, influenced heavily by the views of Antonio Gramsci, Cox includes the interactions of ideas, institutions and social practices, as distinctive subjective (or super structural) elements with the production process within his broad theoretical structure. There is, however, an unmistakable admission in Robert Cox's ideas about the primacy of the material life from which all the struggles over inter-subjective factors derive. Cox's notion of critical theory is, therefore, nearer to Gramsci's historical sociology than the ideas of communicative action and discourse ethics of Habermas.

The affinity between Gramsci and Cox is once again revealed in Cox's ideas regarding the agency of possible transformation of the global order (Cox, 1976, 1981). Cox retains faith in the creative power of the social forces to construct alternative world orders against the contemporary hegemony of international capital. Although social forces inevitably delineate plural groupings, nevertheless, Cox boldly privileges the working class - the force most intimately related to the dynamic of international production - as the prime mover of historical transformation against the imperialism of the capitalist powers. This self-intended privileging of the working class (which need not necessarily connote the organized proletariat alone) betrays an unflinching faith in historicist Marxism which definitely takes Cox away from the Habermasian world of an ideal speech situation. For by virtue of its ontological primacy, the argument of the working class will have to prevail over those other social forces, in their interaction with the international production process. Such an orientation makes Cox to focus his praxis to the consciousness of the chosen social class, and not to the category of understanding through unencumbered communication. There is little hope in the theoretical discourses of Robert Cox that force of better argument shall prevail over the views of the subject possessed of a definite teleological mission of consciousness (Haacke, 1996: 273).

Compared to Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater's critical theory is far more central to the categories of Jurgen Habermas (Linklater, 1990a; 1990b; 1992; 1996). Linklater's faith in the critical promise of communicative action and discourse ethics, universal pragmatics and the ideal speech situation, makes him dwell more on the issues of knowledge construction, community formation, and the use of the binary of exclusion and inclusion of bounded communities, and less on global production processes and even less on the practices of the working class. Linklater's emphasis is to bring out the "changes affecting the social bond which unites members of the sovereign state and separates them from the outside world", and his primary concern is "with the nature and future of the state as a bounded moral and political community" (Linklater, 1996: 287). Linklater's concerns are obviously not limited to the future of the state, but throughout his diverse writings, the notion of the bounded community has remained a consistent theme.

Andrew Linklater's focus is how national and international developments are weakening the bond between the state and its citizens and diluting the hard-shelled communities in many parts of the world. Among factors contributing to this, Linklater mentions the increasing disutility of force among the major industrial powers which is leading to the pacification of the Western or pro-Western regions of the world. This pacification is closely connected with globalization. Along with pacification one witnesses the rise of movements for greater political representation and participation from national minorities and migrant organizations, who feel threatened with the consolidation of the dominant conception of the "pacified" community and its purpose. Linklater also refers to the cultural consequences of globalization, which, on the one hand, induces centripetal tendencies to embrace 'the cosmopolitan culture of modernity', while conversely encourages rebel against 'the intrusion of predominantly western symbols and images'. The result of such plural efflorescence (of responses) is the promise of new forms of political community, something which realism or neo-realism, being wedded to the immutability thesis, cannot effectively

explore. According to Linklater, it is the task as well as the function of critical theory to make for such explorations into the domains of international sociology (Linklater, 1996: 287-289).

Linklater feels that discourse ethics offers the key to the understanding and the eventual emancipation of bounded communities. Acknowledging the validity of the critique of discourse ethics, that it emphasizes on universalistic ethic at the probable cost of suppressing cultural differences, Linklater, nevertheless, defends discourse ethics on the ground of procedural universalism, claiming that it does not indicate the universalization of a single conception of good life. Critical theory, for Linklater, does not presuppose total consensus as the inevitable requirement or an absolute precondition for reaching an agreement (Linklater, 1996: 292).

Linklater has further developed this line of thinking by conceiving four forms of human understanding, which he names as anthropological, strategic, Socratic and political, respectively (Linklater, 1996: 292). Anthropological understanding involves an enquiry into the motives, interests and aims of the other (adversary) with a view to control and out maneuver the adversary. Socratic understanding is a mode of dialogic understanding where actors suspend their truth claims to listen to the views of each and all to discover the truth. And political understanding involves both an appreciation of the "plurality of moral views" to facilitate agreement about the principles of exclusion and inclusion" and understanding of the rules of co-existence where the conflicting antithetical claims fail to settle in an agreement. According to Linklater, anthropological, Socratic and political understanding is relevant for the emancipatory project of critical theory. The defining character of critical theory, therefore, is its commitment 'to redeem an understanding' without necessarily rejecting the claims to difference. Linklater tries to avoid the criticism against Habermas of having connected consensus to understanding, by delinking them with a plea to provide lexical priority to the commitment to reach an

understanding rather than attaining a moral consensus on the basis of such an understanding (Linklater, 1996: 293).

The starting and the posited end points of Linklater's critical theory are to realize a moral and political community for mankind. A possible way of realizing this is to extend such political and moral communities along certain trajectories, although being careful of avoiding the charges of him advocating any linear progress of moral development and a universal political morality that subsumes every difference of culture. In order to achieve this, Linklater calls for a dialogue between Realism, Rationalism Marxism, including his owns critical theory. From Habermas Linklater takes the conception of dialogue (discourse ethics) and the idea that the force of the better argument will prevail in the four-side dialogue (Haacke, 1996: 276). There is undeniably a great amount of unresolved tension and ambiguity in Linklater's 'plural forms of praxis', which originate from the intermeshing of such diverse strands of theories. By Linklater's own admission, the creation of an ethical political community will have to await a critical theory enquiry into 'the history of socialisation of norms' and 'the practices of exclusion' in order to 'realise (concrete) prospects for new forms of community... immanent within existing social relations', and 'the practical project of extending the community beyond the nation state' (Haacke, 1996: 278).

The most obvious limitation of Linklater's thesis seems the very improbability of ever achieving his ethical political and moral community through an open dialogue among Realism, Rationalism, Marxism and Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. There is also the crucial problem of judging the force of better agreement by an independent ethical criterion. The perspective promoting the widest and truest possible understanding can be such a criterion. However, this, by Linklater's own admission, may not culminate into a rational or moral consensus. It is axiomatic that no ethical and political community can hope to survive short of equilibrium of a minimum rational and moral consensus regarding its fundamental norms and structures. Linklater's

eclectic idealism typically provides a Utopia, introduces complexities, and then negates the possibility of realizing the Utopia as an objective tendency in the international order.

Critical IR Theory and Citizenship

The critical theorists have argued that globalization has created enough space to explore the possibility of new forms of political organization in which states would relinquish some of their power to exclusively decide affairs within their territories, relax the assumption that national loyalties are always primary and overriding, and recognize their fundamental moral duties to outsiders. Globalization has seemingly created a new consciousness of a shared human project where citizens and outsiders can together pursue their common interest in security and welfare. Scholars like Linklater feels that fulfilling this normative project requires a radical break with the parochialism of the modern sovereign state, which is not about giving up sovereignty as an institution but modifying substantially how it is practiced. In this, the commitment is not to relinquish sovereignty, but work toward the construction of international norms that would enable states to see the wider moral point of view (Linklater, 1997: 323-324).

One of the arguments here points to the relatively recent history of the modern nation state as a totalizing project. Otto Hinje, in his pioneering work, has shown how modern practices of citizenship grew with the state demanding compulsive conscription. As the state became more exacting, people demanded recognition and rights (Gilbert, 1975). The extensive works of modern historical sociology by Mann and Tilly have analyzed the making of the modern state through the institution of war (Mann, 1986, 1993; Tilly, 1975, 1992). Wars with neighboring states reinforced this process of citizen making. The modern practices of citizenship culminated in this process. The extensive project of territorial citizenship evolved through the waves of civil, political and social rights that West European states bestowed

upon their members over two centuries. T.H. Marshall's path-breaking studies on citizenship documented how the affinity between the modern citizen and the state grew up through the package deals of civil, political and social rights through 18th and 20th centuries (Marshall, 1950). Modern citizenship was built on the legitimacy of the struggles of the excluded and its moral capital consisted in an inclusionary politics parleyed through welfare rights. The modern idea of citizenship had been a part of the cultural logic of modernity that enabled people to question and resist forms of exclusion within the boundaries of the state.

Modern citizens were formed as unitary subjects. There multiple identities were steamrolled into a seamless political identity conceived as a passive legal status. However, many groups that lacked status began to mobilize for recognition as economic development did not address this problem. This led to the communitarian and subsequently multicultural politics in many Western liberal societies that have espoused a difference blind theory of rights. No matter what happened to multicultural struggles the world, many minorities within states did receive cultural protection of some form or the other. Group rights took partial care of the problem of difference within states (Kymlicka and Wayne, 1994: 352-381). However, while this discourse of rights has strengthened the rights of citizens, outsiders continued to be discriminated. In fact the domestic and international compulsions produced paradoxical effects for the outsider. As welfare and group rights demanded money, the cost for protecting refugees had very few takers. For most states, the plight of outsiders, for the hapless victims of conflict induced refugees who languished without the rights accorded to citizens, fell on deaf years. The project of European citizenship had also built upon the crimes of colonialism and colonial powers withheld rights to the colonial subjects that were bestowed upon the White citizens (Robins, Cornwall and Lieres, 2008: 1069-1086). The narrative of empowerment associated with citizenship hides this ghastly sub-text of deprivation and silencing. Critical IR scholars have been in

the forefront to highlight this duality and question the moral basis of the prevailing practices of territorialized citizenship.

Globalization has impacted upon the arguments that critical scholars have advanced in two ways. It has, first, raised profound questions about the relationship between citizens and aliens, but has also simultaneously drawn attention to the need for deepening of sensitivity to cultural differences. Globalisation has made people more aware of shared risks and vulnerabilities across borders. This has at least made it possible to argue that security is not necessarily something to be realized against the adversary but can be achieved with it (Palme, 1982; Browning and Matt, 2013: 235–255). The global risks of pandemics, environmental, water and energy induced conflicts are generating victims that require regional if not global responses. The intermittent deep economic crises of contemporary capitalism generate global consequences, creating serious dislocations and social unrest that impose enormous pressures of adjustment upon societies across the world (Gilpin 2000; Held and McGrew, 2000; . Stiglitz, 2006). No state today can remain within the paradigm of national sovereignty to respond to such crises. Its commitment upholding the social rights of its citizens require attention to the rights of outsiders who cannot be excluded effectively like they were in the past. National economies are increasingly parts of a global network and chains. Hence, welfare cannot be defended as an exclusive privilege of the citizens of developed states as their income is sourced more globally than at any time in history.

Further, the relationship between citizens and aliens has got problematized as instances of transnational harm detract from the worth of exclusionary national citizenship (Beck, 1992, 1995). Environmental concerns have rapidly forced states to explore appropriate frameworks to secure social and other rights by forging platforms beyond and over the modern state. A question before critical IR theory is: can material transformations lead to cognitive changes that induce citizens to visualize them as moving toward transnational citizenry? Critical IR theory is thus a logical

culmination of the debates of multicultural citizenship that occurred within states; it questions the moral economy of differences between citizens and aliens as morally relevant distinctions. States increasingly face the moral dilemma of territoriality owing to globalization and its blurring of exclusivist borders. Critical theorists have questioned the moral significance of cultural differences across artificial borders that cannot account for these distinctions.

However, Linklater recognizes that it is a mistake to assume that cultural and other differences between human beings are immaterial. Rights are not only universal but are also needed for diversity and for minorities who demand recognition of their otherness. Citizenship is thus a matter of double registers, one of class and the other of status. For critical theory, this involves a dual challenge; it is as much a matter of redefining the relations between citizens and the s state as working to extend the boundaries of political community across territorial borders. In the words of Linklater,

> Political association would no longer assume the fusion of sovereignty, territoriality, citizen ship and nationalism. Post-nationalist communities and expressions of citizenship would be more universalistic, more sensitive to cultural differences and more deeply committed to the eradication of social and economic inequality as a result. (Linklater, 1997: 337-338).

If critical theory, true to its Marxist heritage in part, had demanded the recognition of social rights, its liberal inheritance predisposed it to strengthen the case for civil rights so that individuals wronged by the state can appeal to international courts for justice. Critical international theory also invests in cultural rights either by empowering the local communities or strengthening the international protection of minority nations, refugees and displaced persons.

According to Linklater, critical theory scholars challenge the main arguments of realism conceived as a totalizing process that

legitimated the politics of competition denial of the other in the search for a monopoly of human loyalty towards the state. The mainstream ontology of IR rested on this fierce competition for exclusivist human loyalty. The process was both domestic and international. The national security state solved the problem of modern citizenship together with the projects of democratization and social rights. The national security state created the basis for exclusionary territorialized political loyalty of the modern citizen, separated from aliens and outsiders. While every state had a certain majoritarian national making, and the national security state was far from being genuinely representative of classes and groups, the gradual spread of democracy, political and social rights solved the problem of domestic exclusion in the 20th century.

Critical theorists like Linklater's work has shown that forces of globalization have created opportunities for transnational decision making and exposing the moral deficits of the modern national security state that stands on an increasingly untenable mismatch of moral and security horizons of modern citizens. As Linklater argues, the modern state was based on the "notion of the totalizing project to summarize some of the key features of state-building … the increased regulation of society, the creation of homogeneous national communities and the exaggeration of differences between citizens and aliens in order to foster national solidarity." (Linklater, 1997: 328). The modern state came up as a violent fusion of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and nationalism. Globalization has posed major difficulties on the path of the territorialised state. A major aspect of the normative project of critical IR theory is to extend these boundaries to make political forms more universal yet sensitive to diversity at the same time.

Critical IR theories of Linklater have drawn considerably from the various tracts of globalization. For it is globalization that has opened up the possibilities for post-national citizenship, not in the sense of denying the force of nationalism and citizenship but in problematizing many of the claims of unitary sovereignty as the basis for the same. Globalization has dented the state's economic,

political, cultural and moral capital. Risks are increasingly shared in today's world as are many kinds of vulnerabilities. States find it increasingly difficult to respond meaningfully to economic crisis. Politically, the moral basis for sovereign territoriality stands contested. States are increasingly caught in a bind. On the one hand, the demand for democratic legitimacy is incessant as never before; on the other, states are loath to part with their modern entitlements, based on sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism and citizenship.

The criteria of sovereignty are, thus, far more nuanced. Sovereign control rivals with legitimacy and rights as criteria of territoriality. Most crucially, the materiality of globalisation has provided the epistemic space for critical theorists like Linklater to question the moral basis of citizenship. They have clearly exposed the paradox of expanding the contours of security and contracting the boundaries of moral community by the mainstream discourses of International Relations. Most specifically, Linklater has challenged the many exclusions of the modern project of the totalizing state, be it within or outside national borders. Globalization has thus helped retrieving the right bearing human subject as a legitimate actor in world politics. States may still dominate the ontology of the international, but its arbitrary moral exclusions have become increasingly untenable due to global transformations. Critical theory has not delivered an appropriate politics of change to redeem the human project. But it has opened up a theoretical space that was unimaginable prior to the changes ushered in by globalization.

The Non-Western 'Other' and the Follies of Critical Theory

This account of critical theory deliberately speaks in a universal tone that flattens local histories and silences the post-colonial 'other' that cannot be rammed into this seamless account of redeeming a human project premised on critical self-reflections and modernity. The non-West is in many ways not constituted in the same way as the West and their differences are critical for the

making of a genuinely dialogic theory of human emancipation based on critical theory tools. We seek to identify what needs to be problematized in the discipline's interrogation of the non-Western world: the conceptual histories of the nation-state, nationalism, sovereignty, territoriality, security and identity. The basic argument is this: we require historicizing the meaning/s of the state, nation, the imaginations of political community and the constitution of territorial units upon a pre-existing landscape of a plethora of identities to make sense of the nature and causes of violence and conflicts in the non-Western world. In most non-Western societies, colonialism exorcised most of the erstwhile constitutive idioms and practices, and the idea of the sovereign territorial state and nationalism came to dominate the public or political imagination in these societies, thereby completing the process of globalizing the Westphalian project. As a result the non-Western world witnessed, in one form or the other, the inevitable clash between two dynamics, one based on culture and civilization that historically delineated regions of common reference as space/s of communication and meaning, and the other more modern idea of territorialized, sovereign nation-hood, thriving on the principles of exclusivity, differentiation and loyalty.

The social and political categories of the non-Western world remain caught in this bind, precariously poised in the combustible interactions of the two radically divergent registers that are equally active in defining their existential realties. As modernity reinforced the territorial power-speak of the nation-state, the non-coincidence of culture and territory opened up scope for conflicts, whether within or between states, whose explanations require sustained engagement with historical processes and cultural anthropology that had been streamlined and steamrolled even by the mainstream critical theory of the kind pioneered by Linklater. The categories of refugees and internally displaced persons, insurgents, revolutionaries, and mercenaries do not have universal meanings in the discourses of IR; they hint at a distinctive ontology that requires radical departures from some of the ontological presuppositions of critical theory.

Nowhere is this disjuncture more acute than in the existential struggles of post-colonial societies that do not follow the clear inside-outside distinction on one hand and yet valorize that very distinction as the sine qua non of their geopolitical identity on the other. The peculiarity of geopolitical interests of the post-colonial states must be read in the nature of the relationship among state, nation, and territoriality relations in the post-colonial world. Identifying the contested process of decolonization as the primary cause of contemporary Asian inter-state territorial conflicts, Itty Abraham analyses the political implications of establishing a fixed territorial homeland as a necessary starting point for both international recognition and national identity. In his words, "In the absence any possibility of meeting the newly sanctified standard of national self-determination, colonial nationalists sought to redefine the prime criterion for independent statehood as unified political control over a defined piece of land, or territorial sovereignty. Once territorial sovereignty was established as the way out of the impossible one-land-people-state trinity, the loss of state territory could become nothing less than the loss of state power" (Abraham, 2014: 12). His conclusion is that states cannot compensate for territory as it is vital to the legitimacy of the postcolonial nation-state, which has little to do with their potential for economic gains or imagined narratives of historical memory. As he puts it,

> The core problem with territorial loss is that it opens the door to an excavation of the relationship of state and nation. It exposes the nation as a historically contingent formation and being, and brings into question the state's claim to represent this nation, now and in the past. (Abraham, 2014: 14).

The post-colonial articulation of the sovereignty has created the ultimate paradox for the elites. They realized immediately the artificiality of their constructs, the historical anomaly involved in this model of nation-state, and hence, invested completely in the idea of territoriality, which was much more than mere physical land, but was a terrain of political legitimacy for the new state.

Borders thus became exclusionary and non-negotiable, and if the space outside was disorderly and dangerous, this was also the *raison d'être* for disciplining the inside lest weakness is exploited by others in challenging the legitimacy of the state led nation-building project that sought to bring about the trinity of the one land-state-people.

Conclusion

This article has chronicled major contributions of critical theory in IR, particularly the inflections of Andrew Linklater, and looked into Linklater's passionate engagements with the evolving 'meaning/s' of some of the key political principles of our times, most notably sovereignty and territoriality. It has also sought to place Andrew Linklater's exciting work on citizenship and critical theory in this context. Linklater's work is vital for a number of reasons. First, he has brought in successfully a number of radical concerns, together, by creatively drawing upon the perspectives of Marx and the Frankfurt School, particularly, the philosophy of Habermas. He has also in the process expanded our understanding of human emancipation and community. Marx's transnational community was based on the eradication of class and private property. Writing in a very different context, Habermas was far more sensitive to the issues of plurality, identity and difference. Yet both Marx and Habermas invested in the making of a modern world where transnational community/communities would be built on the foundation of reason. Linklater follows them closely in believing that modernity and critical theory would lead to human emancipation based on reasoned deliberation and agreement.

Linklater's great achievement is to reflect on the dual registers of the modern state and citizenship theory, the gradual overcoming of peripheral and subaltern groups and the making of a unified discourse of citizenship coterminous with the territorial margins of the national security state on one hand, and the moral vacuity of bounded territoriality on the other. Linklater shows brilliantly the yawning gap between our responsibilities towards

fellow citizens and the outsiders that is justified by a realist discourse of 'otherness' without any correlation to any theory of morality. Linklater has caught the bluff of realism perfectly. It has no moral theory of community at all. Critical theory is poised to fill in this gap. It draws succor from globalization as vulnerabilities and risks have made national decision making apparently weak across the globe. It sees in the transnationalization of the materiality of life and the increasingly global semiotics of communication the seeds of a transnational citizenry that would open up and expose the moral poverty of maintaining the Westphalian distinctions amid a number of demonstrated failings of the nation state. While critical theory is not by definition anti-state, its moral language unquestionably goes against the justifications piled up by the national security state.

However, Linklater, is also sensitive to the questions of identity and difference, of pluralism and diversity, in the process bringing critical theory in line with some of the debates in multiculturalism as well. Linklater's sensitivity, nevertheless, comes at a price. It substitutes the pure Marxian imagination by the quasi-Marxist and Habermasian ontology of a mainstream critical theory that codes the categories ultimately in the language that it knows: the coda and doxa of the West. The citizens, the alien, the refugee, the stateless, are all similar categories across time and place and they can be emancipated through the same processes. Critical theory falls like a hood upon them just as Marxism had fallen a century before. In this discourse of transcending citizens and the outsiders in the quest for a reason based and consensual human emancipation, histories are flattened and people whose experiences do not fit with the West are denied of their specificities. Linklater has, thus, no special theory for the post-colonial world. While this is understandable from the normative presuppositions of critical theory that did not give up faith in reason and modernity despite much skepticism, as a theory of the world it has little to offer to societies that for reasons good or bad are not trustworthy facsimiles of the West. Post-colonial otherness remains a thorn in the flesh of critical theory as the Orient has been to Marxism in the

past. While critical theory exposes the sociological naiveté and moral poverty of realism its own democratic credentials remain contested.

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Acknowledgment

The Paris Agreement: Indian Perspectives and Pledges

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Abstract

The Paris Agreement has generated so much euphoria that one wonders if it is for real. Before this, the Rio Earth Summit and its baby, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, followed by the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, galvanized the environmental community. The Kyoto Protocol belied all hopes. The jubilation at the adoption of the Paris Agreement on 12th December 2015 was more than matched by the overwhelming turnout in New York on 22 April 2016 when the Agreement was thrown open for signatures. A record 175 Parties to the UNFCCC put their signatures on the document that was seen as the first step in the long march to entry into force. India has pledged to reduce emission intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030 and to achieve 40 per cent electricity

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installed capacity from non-fossil fuel sources, but ratification of the agreement will be contingent upon several factors including fulfillment of Kyoto commitments by developed countries, adequate climate finance and India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This paper discusses the implications of the dilution of differentiation of obligations for the developed countries and asks the question whether India will be able to fulfill its pledges.

Keywords: Paris Agreement, INDCs, India, global emissions, global warming, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol

Introduction

Delegations from 196 nations, led by their heads of state and government, gathered in Paris between 30 November and 12 December 2015 and approved a universally-applicable climate agreement after two weeks of intense and exhausting negotiations. For the first time in the history of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) all nations agreed to make meaningful and concrete contributions to combat climate change, *de facto* diluting the principle of differentiation between the developed and developing countries built into the structure of the Convention. The Paris Agreement, based on voluntary bottom-up approach, will replace the top-down legally-binding Kyoto Protocol in 2020.

Though the combined pledges of all nations communicated to the UNFCCC through the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are insufficient to limit global warming to targeted 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures (Schiermeier, 2015), the congruence achieved at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) in Paris is set to serve as a blueprint for future action on climate change. Nature (2015) described the event as a seismic shift, the reverberations of which will be felt for decades and centuries.

As a separate and significant event at the COP site, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched an International Solar alliance (ISA) where he invited all countries located between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn to join. As many as 121 countries are partners in the project which is headquartered in Gurgaon near New Delhi. At the Leaders Event on the opening day of the conference, PM Modi called for climate justice and sustainable lifestyles as "the lifestyles of a few must not crowd out opportunities for the many still on the first steps of the development ladder", calling on the developed world to vacate the 'carbon space' for the poor of the world (Modi, 2015).

Comparison of national contributions is not easy since countries furnished them in different formats. The UNFCCC has estimated that if fully implemented the combined pledges would lead to temperature increase by 2.7ºC by 2100 (UNFCCC, 2015). However, the pledges will deliver emission reductions of four gigatons (Gt) by 2030 compared to pre-INDC trajectories.

The main reason for the overwhelming success of the Paris Conference was the voluntary nature of the mitigation actions and they are likely to remain so since neither the majority of the developing countries nor the United States want binding commitments. One indicator of the US intention became apparent in a so-called 'should incident' which nearly derailed the deal at the last moment (Vidal, 2015). In the last plenary when the final document was presented, the US objected to the word 'shall' in the developed country mitigation efforts in Article 4.4 of the Agreement, wanted it to be replaced with the word 'should' as was applied to the developing countries. The US wanted both the developed and developing countries to be treated at par legally (Raman, 2016). The developing country delegations did not raise any formal objection and the incident was passed off as arising out to undetected error in the final draft. The US also objected to the language of Article 4.2, which originally stated that each Party 'shall implement the nationally determined contributions', since this would make it obligatory to implement the emission targets.

The US concern was addressed by changing the language to 'Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives.' This allows the Parties flexibility to not actually achieve the target but to aim at achieving them. (Raman, 2016). This means the mitigation contributions will be voluntary.

Brief History

The climate change negotiations started in 1991 at the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) after the release of the first assessment report (IPCC, 1990) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The 11 INC meetings (ENB, 1995) between February 1991 and May 1992 were held in the backdrop of a report by the World Resources Institute (WRI), a Washington-based research group, which held the developing countries responsible for global warming on account of their methane emissions from the rice fields and livestock (WRI, 1990). In response, Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain of the Centre for Science and Environment came up with a strong rebuttal of the report, calling it an example of environmental colonialism, and made a distinction between the 'luxury emissions' of the developed world and the 'survival emissions' of the developing world (Agarwal and Narain, 1991). This and two more papers by Jyoti Parikh — 'Consumption Patterns: The Driving Force of Environmental Stress' (Parikh and Gokarn, 1991) and 'IPCC Strategies Unfair to the South' (Parikh, 1992) — set the tone for the negotiating stance of the developing countries, which culminated in the formulation of the UNFCCC at Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

At the beginning of climate negotiations in the INC, India positioned itself as a defender of the global South (Sengupta, 2012) and took the lead within the Group of 77 (G 77) and China to present a combined stand for the developing countries. The negotiations reflected a deep North-South divide as well as major differences within both these groups (Dasgupta, 2012). The

Convention that emerged as a result of these negotiations makes a clear distinction between the developed and developing countries, known as the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR). It notes that the "largest share of historical and current global emissions … originated in developed countries," and hence they have to share the larger burden of mitigation efforts (UNFCCC, 1992). The first Conference of Parties was held at Berlin in 1995 and after two years of intense negotiations the third COP culminated into the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). But the Kyoto Protocol has been considered a failure as it divided the world into leaders and "free riders" and there have been consistent efforts to dig at the roots of the UNFCCC. India maintained taking no commitments until COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 when India and other developing countries agreed to take voluntary commitments to reduce their emission intensity (Gupta, Kohli, and Ahluwalia, 2015). India pledged a 20–25% reduction in the emission intensity of its gross domestic product (GDP) by 2020 from its 2005 levels (India, 2010b). This was the beginning of the gradual erosion and reframing of the principle of CBDR which made the Paris Agreement possible.

The dilution of CBDR, which began at Copenhagen, continued in Durban in 2011 which applied 'dynamic interpretation' of the principle. After Durban, the differentiation terminology narrowly referred to the concepts of targets for developing countries, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), and concessions on reporting obligations (Aguilar, 2012). The Durban agreement does not even mention equity and CBDR but calls for negotiating an agreement with a legal force "under the Convention" applicable to all Parties. The Paris Agreement brings back the terminology of CBDR but totally omits any reference of Annex I and non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC. It uses the terms developed country and developing country Parties for differentiation which is applied to finance, technology transfer and the way whether mitigation contributions will be absolute or relative to business as usual (BAU) or expressed as reduction in emission intensity of their GDP.

The Paris Agreement

The major achievement of the Paris Agreement is the political consensus to limit global average temperature increase to 2° C above pre-industrial levels by the turn of the 21st Century, and make all efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The goal of limiting global warming to 2°C was first articulated upon scientific advice at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but the Copenhagen Accord had limited support from Parties and thus was not adopted by the COP but was 'taken note of' (ENB, 2009). The second important feature is that adaptation has been accorded equal importance as mitigation and the COP requested the Adaptation Committee formed as a part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework to take steps to facilitate the mobilization of support for adaptation in developing countries. Third, loss and damage has become an integral part of climate regime but the Agreement expressly bars poor countries from holding wealthy counties liable for loss from extreme weather events and claiming compensation from big emitters. All Parties must review their pledges, and possibly strengthen them, every five years.

Though the Durban Platform, which laid the ground for the Paris Agreement, envisioned the outcome as an instrument with 'legal force', mitigation pledges are so far voluntary. In the present form, the Agreement lays out a political framework and the detailed rules and procedures for its implementation will be worked out before 2020 when Kyoto Protocol will pass into history and Paris Agreement will take over. This is s common procedure for international accords where framework agreements are negotiated first and then detailed rules are framed later on. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, opened for signatures in 1998 and the detailed set of rules, known as Marrakesh Accords, were adopted by COP 7 at Marrakesh in 2001 (Morel and Shishlov, 2014).

The question is whether the Paris Agreement will remain a non-legally binding document, driven purely by voluntary actions, or would it commit Parties to binding obligations?

Bodansky (2015) argues that the Paris Agreement is a treaty as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Although there are no enforcement mechanisms in the current form of the Agreement, its legal character may matter if domestic acceptance requires legislative approval and implementation or can be adjudicated by national courts. The Durban Agreement called for the development of "a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties" (UNFCCC, 2012). The language reflects that it falls under the definition of a treaty but it is not necessary that every provision will create a legal obligation on the Parties.

During the Paris Conference, The European Union pressed for the NDCs to become legally binding but the United States opposed it as it cannot accept emission reduction obligations because of the Byrd-Hegel Resolution, passed unanimously by the US Senate in 1997, which forbids the country from becoming party to any protocol which would "result in serious harm to the economy of the United States" (US Congress, 1997). Going by the past record, the United States Congress was expected to put hurdles in the path to ratification. The only way for the United States to join the Paris climate change agreement without seeking the approval of the Senate or Congress, could have been for the President to do so on his own since there is no prospect the Senate will approve the Paris Agreement by a two-thirds majority (Bodansky and Spiro, 2016).

There are no compliance mechanisms in the Paris Agreement, but the legally-binding nature of the Kyoto Protocol did not prevent the US and Canada pulling out without any penalty and Japan and Russia opting out of the second commitment period (Aguilar, 2011).

The Agreement was signed by 175 countries on the first day of the document being thrown open for signatures. This was only the first step in the long march to entry into force, which requires 55

countries accounting for 55 per cent of emissions ratifying the Agreement.

Before starting work on implementation and compliance of Paris Agreement, work on implementation of second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol should start in earnest. Several preconditions put by developing countries during the run up to the Paris Agreement are yet to be met. These include commitments under the Bali Roadmap which remain unfulfilled in the pre-2020 timeframe. Many developed countries are yet to ratify the Doha Amendment, which establishes the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). So far only 61 countries, mostly developing, have ratified the Doha Amendment. Many developed countries, including the European Union, are yet to ratify and implement the Doha Amendment.

Another indication of things in store came from Minister of Environment from India, Mr. Prakash Javadekar who said that implementation and entry into force should not be done in haste and all countries should be allowed to follow their national processes. Articulating India's stand, he noted that the "developed world must take enhanced targets and declare them as soon as possible for 2016-2020. There cannot be 'action holiday' of five years." (PTI, 2016).

However, the recent global emission trends point towards the success of voluntary targets taken at the Copenhagen Conference. Global emissions nearly stalling in 2014 (Tollefson, 2015) and are on path to decline by 0.6% in 2015 despite continued economic growth, as compared to an annual increase of 2.4°C during the last decade (Weiss, 2015; Jackson et al. 2016). The decline in emissions has been largely attributed to decreased coal use in China along with slower global growth in petroleum and faster growth in the use of renewables. China had taken voluntary Copenhagen target of 45 per cent reduction in the emission intensity of its GDP by 2020 from its 2005 levels.

Adequacy of Paris Goal and Pledges

Considering that the average global temperatures have already risen 0.85°C from the pre-industrial levels and impacts are already being felt (IPCC, 2013), the margin of error for limiting warming to 2° C is very low. Even this may be inadequate. A research report authored by 19 climate scientists and published after the Paris Agreement warns that a 2°C warming "could be dangerous" and swift action is necessary to ward off a global emergency (Hansen et al. 2016). It estimated that sea levels may rise 6 to 9 meters in the next 50 to 150 years. The research used climate simulations, paleoclimate data and modern observations to interpret the events of last interglacial approximately 115,000 years ago, when sea level rose 6 to 9 meters, storms were extreme and the Earth was less than 1°C warmer than today. Warning of a global emergency at hand, the paper predicted that there is a real danger that we will hand over to the next generations a climate system that is out of their control.

A UNFCCC assessment of the combined effect of 146 INDCs submitted before the Paris Conference covering 86 per cent of global GHG emissions indicates that the temperatures could rise by 2.7°C by 2100 though they will dramatically slow global emissions (UNFCCC, 2015). The Climate Action Tracker, a scientific consortium of four research organizations tracking climate action, analyzed 160 submissions reflecting 187 countries (including 28-member EU) and calculated that in the absence of policies or baseline scenario temperatures will rise by 4.1°C to 4.8°C, under current policies by 3.3-3.9°C and with Paris pledges by 2.4-2.7°C (CAT, 2015).

In addition to global temperature outcomes under different scenarios, CAT also assessed the gaps between expected emissions and benchmark emissions consistent with 2°C and 1.5°C. With the current pledges, the emission gap for scenario consistent with 2°C warming is 15-17 gigatons carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO$_2$eq) by 2030. This means emissions overshoot the emissions required under the scenario by 15-17 GtCO$_2$eq, i.e. the median emissions

should reach 38 $GtCO_2$eq instead of expected 55 $GtCO_2$eq with current pledges. This compares with 48 $GtCO_2$eq emissions in 2012. The emission gap for 1.5°C scenario has been calculated to be 21-23 $GtCO_2$eq (CAT, 2015).

Analysis of INDCs

UNFCCC released its Synthesis Report (UNFCCC, 2015) before the Paris Conference which assessed the combined effect of the 119 INDCs submitted by 147 Parties (including 28-member EU) by 1st October 2015. It gave estimates of emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the full implementation of INDCs and concluded that the pledges were insufficient to meet the ambition of limiting the warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels but will lead to temperature increase by 2.7°C by 2100. The pledges will, however, bring down average global per capita emissions by 9% in 2030 from the 1990 levels and deliver emission reductions of 4 gigatons (Gt) by 2030 compared to pre-INDC trajectories. The number of countries taking climate action through absolute, BAU, intensity or peaking year-based targets has more than doubled from 61 in the pre-2020 period to 127.

Considering that different countries furnished their contributions in different formats, it was not easy to convert them to absolute reductions. Annex I countries provided absolute targets for reducing economy-wide emissions, half of INDCs provided targets below their BAU level, less than 10% contained intensity reduction targets, and less than 10% specified their peaking year. EU, Russia and some other Annex I Parties took 1990 as base year, most non-Annex I Parties included reduction targets from 2005, 2010 or 2015.

Some parties gave unconditional contributions, over 70% identified conditions for full implementation of their contributions, and others included an unconditional component alongside an enhanced conditional one. Some Parties included a

long-term vision for low-emission development with the aim of achieving zero emissions.

The median global emission levels will reach 55.2 $GtCO_2eq$ in 2025 and 56.7 $GtCO_2eq$ in 2030. Global cumulative CO_2 emissions after 2011 are expected to reach 541.7 $GtCO_2eq$ in 2025 and 748.2 $GtCO_2eq$ in 2030. Compared with global emissions in 1990, global emission levels with full implementation of the INDCs are expected to be higher by 37–52% in 2030. While the global emissions will continue to grow until 2030, the growth is expected to slow down substantially to 11–23% in the 2010–2030 period compared with 24% in the 1990–2010 period.

As many as 100 Parties included an adaptation component in their INDCs. They include 46 African, 26 Asia-Pacific, 19 Latin American and Caribbean, 7 Eastern European and two Western European states. They underscored their determination to strengthen national adaptation efforts and some stressed that adaptation was their main priority since they perceived it to be strongly linked to development, sustainability and security.

Table -1
Paris Pledges by Major Developed and Developing Countries
(Listed in Descending Order by their Emissions)

Country	Emissions $MtCO_2e$	INDC	Mitigation Measures
China	10,684.29	Lower CO_2 emission intensity by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level by 2030. Peaking year 2030.	Increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 20%.
United States of America	5,822.87	Cut GHG emissions by 26% - 28% below 2005 level by 2025.	Adopted fuel economy standards for vehicles, and finalized measures addressing buildings sector emissions.
European Union (28)	4,122.64	40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 from 1990 level.	Domestic legally-binding legislation in place for the 2020 climate and energy package. Policy to include LULUCF into the 2030 GHG mitigation framework will be established before 2020.

Country	Emissions MtCO₂e	INDC	Mitigation Measures
India	2,515.66	33-35% reduction in emission intensity of GDP by 2030 from 2005 levels.	Achieve 40% cumulative electricity installed capacity from non-fossil fuel based resources by 2030. Create additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tons of CO_2 equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.
Russia	2,254.47	25-30% reduction from 1990 levels by the 2030.	Reducing energy intensity of the economy and increasing share of renewables in the Russian energy balance.
Indonesia	1,981.00	Unconditional reduction of 26% and conditional 29% from BAU on international support by 2030.	Submitted Annex on "Indonesia Climate Resilience Strategy", including "Indonesia's Vulnerability to Climate Change" and "Priority Actions for Climate Resilience."
Japan	1,207.30	26.0% reduction by 2030 compared to 2013 (25.4% reduction from 2005)	Steel and cement industries have attained the highest level of energy efficiency but further improvements planned. More technological innovations planned.
Canada	856.28	30% below 2005 levels by 2030.	Stringent emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles, coal-fired power plants, and renewable fuels regulations.
Mexico	748.91	GHG emissions 25% below BAU by 2030, implying 40% cut in emission intensity from 2013.	National Strategy on Climate Change, Carbon tax (2014), National Emissions Registry (2014) and energy reform (2014).
Australia	685.05	26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2030.	Renewable energy scheme, National Energy Productivity Plan.
South Korea	661.39	GHG emissions lower 37% from BAU level by 2030.	Expand power generation from renewable sources; establish green building standards; environment friendly public transport; incentives for electric and hybrid vehicles.
South Africa	463.75	Emissions by 2025 and 2030 will be in a range between 398 and 614 MtCO₂eq.	Sustainable development plan; climate compatible sectoral plans; integrated energy and electricity plans; and industrial action plans.
Colombia	199.68	Reduce emissions by 20% from BAU by 2030.	National strategy for REDD+; prepared Sectorial Mitigation Action Plans.

Country	Emissions MtCO₂e	INDC	Mitigation Measures
Bangladesh	189.86	Unconditional reduction of GHG emissions 5% below BAU and 15% below BAU conditional on international support.	Reduce energy intensity by 20% in 2030 from 2013 levels; energy management program; energy efficiency labelling program; and biomass-based thermal energy generation.
Algeria	189.08	GHG emission reduction of 7% to 22% from BAU by 2030.	Produce 27% of electricity from renewable sources by 2030; thermal insulation of buildings; Increase share of natural gas in energy mix; methane recovery from landfills; and prevention of forest fires.

India's Pledges

India has pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33-35% by 2030 from 2005 level. The INDC also announced an ambitious plan of achieving 40% cumulative installed capacity for electricity generation from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030. In addition to these, India will create an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO_2 equivalent through forest and tree cover by 2030 (India, 2015).

Going by the past experience, the targets appear to be within reach. India has already reduced its emission intensity by 12% in the five years between 2005 and 2010, against the voluntary commitment of reducing emission intensity of GDP by 20-25% by 2020 from 2005 levels taken at Copenhagen in 2009 (India, 2010a). The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has acknowledged in its Emissions Gap Report 2014 (UNEP, 2014) that India is on the path to achieve its Copenhagen pledge. For achieving 40% electricity generation from non-fossil fuel sources, which includes nuclear power, India will need 200 GW of new renewable and nuclear power capacity, which will make India as a major renewable energy player (Mitra et al., 2015).

For achieving additional carbon sinks through forest and tree cover, India will require an average annual carbon sequestration to

increase by 14% over the next 15 years. Green India Mission, which is one of India's eight missions under the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), is expected to deliver 50-60 percent of this (Mitra et al., 2015).

Adaptation is one of the components of India's INDC which is planned to be achieved by enhancing investments in development programs in sectors vulnerable to climate change. These sectors are agriculture, water resources, Himalayan and coastal regions, health, and disaster management. It is admitted that India has resource gaps and for achieving the goals set in the INDC India will mobilize additional funds from domestic and developed countries to implement the mitigation and adaptation actions. It intends to build capacities, create domestic framework, and use international architecture for quick diffusion of climate technology. It will set up joint collaborative research & development facilities for future technologies.

Discourse in India

Climate discourse in India has shifted over the years. Navroz K. Dubash (2009) has identified three groups leading the debate — growth-first stonewallers, progressive realists, and progressive internationalists. Isaksen and Stokke (2014) have shown Indian climate discourse shifting from 'Third World' to 'Win-Win'. The discourse around the Paris Conference was stimulated in November 2014 by the bilateral deal by US and China in which the US pledged to reduce its emissions by 25-28 per cent of the 2005 level by 2025 and China announced to peak its emissions by 2030 and generate 20 per cent of its electricity from zero-emission sources. The deal was welcomed by Dubash as a move that would infuse energy into the global process (Chauhan, 2014), and by former minister for environment and forests Jairam Ramesh, who exhorted India to come up with its own firm commitments (Ramesh, 2014). Sunita Narain, director-general of the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), however, called it a disaster for climate change as the deal was ambitious, effective or equitable,

while the deal put pressure on the Indian government to decide on its own policy (Menon, 2014).

Sunita Narain (2015) penned hits and misses of the Agreement. A plus for India is that the Agreement will be guided by the principles of equity and CBDR and global stocktake will be done in the light of equity and the best available science. On the negative side, there is no differentiation in mitigation, review and reporting.

Dubash (2015) argued that the Agreement preserves space for greater energy use, but India's actions will be subject to scrutiny. "We should use these mechanisms to hold others to account." In his view, on CBDR, developed and developing country categories are retained but made more fluid. "India demonstrated some nimbleness at Paris, by shifting from arguing for blanket invocation of the principle to seeking its specific application in key areas."

Future Projections and Conclusion

Future projections have been made taking into account the submitted INDCs and the BAU trajectories with current climate policies. Under the BAU scenario, the share of Annex I emissions will be larger than it will be if they implement their Paris pledges. The euphoria generated by the Paris agreement and the overwhelming support from 175 Parties on the opening day of the signing ceremony in New York on 22nd April 2016 (AP 2016) may yet unravel as North-South fault lines are still present and battle lines are drawn across the North-South divide. Already, India has sought more time to implement the Paris Agreement and the double threshold system of ratification takes a long time. It took the Kyoto Protocol seven years for entry into force after the document was opened to signatures in 1998.

Neither India nor the US are in a hurry to ratify the Paris Agreement. The US will face obstacles from the Republican-dominated Senate while India has made its position known that the ratification will depend on several factors such as fulfillment of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol by

developed countries, adequate climate finance and India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Ananthakrishnan, 2015; Sethi, 2016).

If the Ad Hoc Working Group on Paris Agreement, which was formed as part of the decision to adopt the accord, comes up with some legally binding provisions, several developing countries and the US will not accept that. This is evident from the Byrd Hagel Resolution and the bipartisan debate within the US after the signing of the China-US climate deal (Nakamura , O'Keefe and Mufson, 2014).

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Southern Horizons: South Asia in the South Indian Ocean

Alan D. Hemmings

Abstract

The paper examines facets of the emerging international regulatory structure largely around Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) in the South Indian Ocean sector of the 'Greater Southern Ocean', both north and south of the Antarctic Convergence. In the South Indian Ocean sector, apart from the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources where India is a decision-making and Pakistan a non decision-making party, no South Asian state is a party to any operative RFMOs. Surprisingly, this non-participation includes the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement. The paper reflects on the varying conceptions of the 'South Indian Ocean', particularly within Indian strategic discourse. It encourages critical thinking by South Asian social sciences scholars about framings, interests, and South Asian engagement in South Indian Ocean institutional development.

Keywords : Antarctica, Antarctic Treaty System, India, Pakistan, South Asia, South Indian Ocean, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, marine living resources management

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Introduction

The focus of this paper is South Asia's (and particularly India's) engagement with Antarctica, but *not* with the continent that is ordinarily taken to mean 'the Antarctic'. Here it is the oceanic area that attracts our attention. The better biophysical, legal and geopolitical conception of Antarctica captures the entire continental, insular and oceanic area south of the circumpolar Antarctic Convergence or Polar Front (Antarctic Convergence here). It is within this oceanic area of Antarctica, and in a further oceanic band immediately to its north, that some of the greatest economic transformations – and as a result, geopolitical transformations – in the entire Antarctic region are presently occurring. These transformations include increasing levels and diversity of human activities associated with marine harvesting, tourism, maritime traffic and potentially minerals resource activities. This pattern of transformation is evident in the oceans of *both* polar regions (Dodds and Hemmings, 2015). This does not appear to be a transient event in regional terms; indeed such trends as are presently discernable appear likely to deepen and accelerate over the next decades. To a greater or lesser extent, these trends are evident all around Antarctica. But, for a variety of reasons which will be considered below, they appear currently most advanced in the South Indian Ocean region, and (at least to an outside observer) to present particular challenges there.

Strikingly, the activities now occurring in the oceanic area of Antarctica in the South Indian Ocean region, and the institutional development that both responds to and enables it, is only weakly engaged with by the states to the immediate north – the states of South Asia. South Asia is understood here as the states which are parties to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, thus: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Cohen, 2015: 341). To an outsider, the presently limited engagement of South Asia in the South Indian Ocean region of Antarctica seems anomalous, given the profile of the Indian Ocean in the domestic and regional policy debate within Indian policy elites in particular (Karnad, 2015), and

increasingly at the international level. The latter includes both national strategic assessments (e.g. [US] National Intelligence Council 2012, [Australian] Defence Department 2016) – particularly in relation to concerns about Chinese 'expansion' into 'the Indian and Pacific Oceans' (Secretary of the Navy, 2015: 3) and popular coverage of the region (Kaplan, 2010). The present paper is intended as a modest opening of a discourse around what horizons South Asia, and India in particular, might have in the far south of the historically critical Indian Ocean if we are indeed to see 'a new cosmopolitanism in a postcolonial setting' (Bose, 2006: 282). It forms part of an ongoing and broader research project around the transformation of Antarctic politics (Hemmings, 2017) and what I have termed 'The Greater Southern Ocean' (Hemmings, 2016).

This Antarctic Convergence varies in its location around the Antarctic continent. In the South Pacific sector it occurs at 60° South (S.); in the South Atlantic at 50° S.; south of Australia at 55° S.; and in the South Indian Ocean (the particular focus of this paper) at 45° S. All these positions are approximations, since the Antarctic Convergence is a dynamic feature. These approximations to the position of the Antarctic Convergence are provided by the northern boundary of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)[1], which is specifically defined in Article I of that convention, and illustrated in Figure 1 below showing the convention area.

The CCAMLR area reflects the historic significance of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) in the international governance of the Antarctic region. The ATS is anchored in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which provided an accommodation through its famous Article IV in relation to the various positions around unresolved territorial sovereignty situation on the Antarctic continent and islands south of 60° S.; gave parties open-access to all parts of

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[1]Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, adopted in Canberra 20 May 1980, entered into force 7 April 1982, 1329 UNTS 48.

Antarctica; established a contingent demilitarization of, and obligation to peaceful purposes in, the entire area south of 60° S.; encouraged international cooperation; established science as both the primary mechanism of national presence and as the declaratory purpose of the international cooperation. Whilst initially involving only twelve states, membership has grown to include now twenty-nine decision-making Consultative Parties and twenty-four Non-Consultative Parties which are not involved in decision-making.[2] The 1959 treaty did not address resource issues, but the institutional architecture that it established has allowed subsequent and separate treatment of the resumption of commercial sealing, through the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS);[3] the 1980 CCAMLR already mentioned; the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)[4], which was abandoned before coming into force and replaced by the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol)[5]. For a recent substantive background on the ATS, see Ben Saul and Tim Stephens' introduction to their *Antarctica in International Law* (2015).

Whilst the 1959 treaty notionally applied to the entire area south of 60° S., there was uncertainty in relation to its capacity in these oceanic areas. Whilst Article VI of the treaty established that it should 'apply to the area south of 60 South Latitude, including all ice shelves', the same article then went on to say:

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[2] A complete list of the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty is available at the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat website at http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e (accessed July 19, 2016).

[3] Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, adopted in London 1 June 1972, entered into force 11 March 1978, 1080 UNTS176.

[4] Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, adopted in Wellington 2 June 1988, never entered into force, 27 ILM 868.

[5] Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, adopted in Madrid 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998, 30 ILM 1455.

but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of rights, of any state under international law with regard to the high seas within that area.

These reservations around traditional high seas freedoms were seen as applying not only to other states which were not party to the Antarctic Treaty, but to the Parties themselves. Particularly in the context of the Cold War, nobody was prepared to assume a general waiver of high seas freedoms, even if within the Antarctic Treaty Area to which Parties had just agreed.

This is the reason why seals and later marine harvesting were not considered tractable within the Antarctic Treaty, and CCAS and CCAMLR were negotiated and adopted as separate instruments. The successive main conventions adopted after the Antarctic Treaty have therefore taken the ATS increasingly into the oceanic realm of the Southern Ocean. Whereas, CCAS, CRAMRA (had it entered into force) and the Madrid Protocol, like the Antarctic Treaty, have an identical area of application – the area south of 60° S. – CCAMLR's area of application is even greater, extending northward, as we have noted, to the Antarctic Convergence. Although all of the ATS main instruments in force (and a host of subsidiary agreements under these) may have application in the Southern Ocean, it is generally CCAMLR that is most significant in this respect. Not only does it apply to the larger area, but its focus (marine harvesting) is presently the dominant economic activity in the entire Antarctic region (its nearest competitor - tourism - is substantially less capitalised and still largely centred on the continent of Antarctica) and the primary resource activity that is covered by any instrument of the ATS. The other long term marine living resource activity, whaling, is subject to a separate International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and its International Whaling Commission[6], outside the ATS. Potential activities on the deep seabed would fall,

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[6] International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, adopted in Washington DC 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 November 1948, 161 UNTS 72.

through the Law of the Sea Convention[7], to the International Seabed Authority under Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention[8], which of course is also outside the ATS. Biological prospecting is not separately regulated under the ATS but it is subject to its generic obligations (see Joyner, 2012), and also subject to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), although the jurisdictional lines between the ATS and CBD have not yet been clarified in the Antarctic.

Figure 1: The CCAMLR Area

Source: CCAMLR   Secretariat,https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/ CCAMLR-convention- area-map-large.pdf

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[7] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in Montego Bay 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 397.

[8] Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Part XI Deep-Sea Mining Agreement, adopted in New York on 28 July 1984, entered into force 28 July 1996, 1836 UNTS 42,

Historically, the substantive regional regulatory structure of the ATS was bounded by a sort of *cordon sanitaire* in which little human activity occurred immediately north of the Antarctic Convergence. As a result, whilst key global instruments such as the Law of the Sea Convention clearly applied there, in practice there was so little activity that this was essentially moot. For the same reasons, there was little regional institutional development. Taxa-specific instruments addressing cetaceans (ICRW) and southern bluefin tuna (the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CSBT)[9], whilst periodically exciting contention within their institutional context, were thematically isolated, and effectively decoupled from the ATS, even when one might have expected otherwise (Hemmings, 2006).

This picture has now significantly changed. First, we have seen the extension of fisheries into areas beyond national jurisdiction in the ocean space between the southern inhabited continents and Antarctica, and the associated adoption of major new Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) in the South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans. Each of these three new RFMOs (considered in detail below) takes CCAMLR's northern boundary (the approximation to the Antarctic Convergence) as their southern boundary. Secondly, there is the growing economic and strategic focus on southern sea lanes and trade routes. This has arisen through global economic growth, including in the Global South (in South, South East and East Asia in particular), with consequential changes in the regional and global order. This includes the associated power projection by emerging global powers, most obviously China and India, alongside (or in competition with) the dominant global power of the United States. Thirdly, we are seeing the transformation of the biophysical reality through the agency of anthropogenic climate change, whereby historic oceanic boundary, circulatory, and ecological verities are in flux.

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[9] Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, adopted in Canberra 10 May 1993, entered into force 20 May 1994, 1819 UNTS 359.

These changes mean that the functional area for the management of the area around Antarctica – what I term 'The Greater Southern Ocean' – is now probably better seen as the oceanic area up to around 35º S. Greater precision is probably not possible yet. This is, obviously, a much larger area than that circumscribed by the Antarctic Convergence, and a more complicated jurisdictional space. In the Indian Ocean sector of Antarctica, this translates into a 'South Indian Ocean' starting at 35º S., and continuing down to the coast of the Antarctic continent. At some point (and this could be the Antarctic Convergence, or it could be the Antarctic Treaty Area boundary at 60º S.) the 'Indian' becomes the 'Southern' Ocean. But functionally it is the same space, and it makes sense to have an overall strategic conception and policy in relation to it. Operationally, *how* one operates in this space alters at 60º S., when one enters the Antarctic Treaty Area.

The paper is structured as follows. It opens with a summary of South Asian engagement in the regional institutions providing the international governance architecture in 'The Greater Southern Ocean'; first within the Antarctic Treaty System; then in four RFMOs that manage fisheries in this ocean space – two of which have a particular focus on the South Indian Ocean. The paper then reflects upon the general economic and geopolitical considerations which have driven states to the development of this governance architecture, and follows this with some observations on both the declaratory, and seemingly evident, interests of South Asia – and in particular India – in the ocean space variously understood as the 'South Indian Ocean'. The paper concludes with some brief observations on the options for South Asian states in relation to these matters.

South Asia in the Antarctic Treaty System

In the post World War II period of the late 1940s and 1950s, when the options for addressing what was termed 'the Antarctic Problem' in an international context were first considered, the only

South Asian state that was in a position to give the matter any intellectual attention was India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru articulated the case for a wider international interest in the region, but post-independence India plainly had to prioritize domestic and near-region policy issues (Chaturvedi, 2013a), and was unable then to either establish an Antarctic presence, participate in the International Geophysical Year programs in Antarctica, persist in its UN engagement in relation to Antarctica (Chaturvedi, 2013b: 54-57), or subsequently break into the narrow group of states (including the Soviet Union) collected together by the United States for the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty. Nehru provides perhaps the first true internationalist perspective on Antarctica as a political space, but active Indian engagement took several more decades to eventuate. No other South Asian state has a comparable history of high-level engagement.

Whilst individual Indian scientists participated in the programs of other Antarctic states from the early 1960s, steps towards an autonomous Indian presence only commenced in the 1980s, a decade in Antarctica that saw a 'discursive transformation, especially with respect to its actual and imagined resource endowment' (Chaturvedi, 2013b: 57). India's first expeditionary landing in Antarctica occurred in January 1982. Union-level sign off on the decision to join the Antarctic Treaty occurred in July 1983 and India acceded to the treaty on August 19 1983, and was accorded Consultative Party status on September 12 1983[10] – which is still by far the shortest period between a state acceding to the Antarctic Treaty and gaining the top-tier decision-making status of a Consultative Party. Chaturvedi, Khare and Pandey (2005) provide details of this formative period for India in relation to the Antarctic. In the 1980s the Antarctic Treaty parties were in the

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[10]Data on accession and Consultative Party status from Antarctic Treaty Secretariat website at http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e (accessed on July 19, 2016).

midst of contentious Antarctic mineral negotiations and exposed to criticism that they (largely Western states and a minority of the world's states) were appropriating the continent, particularly in the annual 'Question of Antarctica' debates in the United Nations General Assembly. India's accession (and that of other major states in the Global South) during the mid-1980s was argued as evidence that the ATS was an open-access regime. So there were both domestic Indian and external 'demand-side' factors in the precise timing of India's arrival in the ATS. India has operated three main Antarctic stations: the seasonal station *Dakshin Gangotri* (1983), which Indian officials advice is now abandoned, and the two functioning year-round stations *Maitri* (1989), and *Bharati* (2012).[11] In 2007 India hosted the Thirtieth annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in New Delhi (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2007).

The only other South Asian state to accede to the Antarctic Treaty is Pakistan, but this only occurred on 1 March 2012, and Pakistan remains a Non-Consultative Party, and therefore is not involved in decision-making at the Annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), although it may attend and participate. Pakistan established a small Antarctic station *(Jinnah)* in 1991, which, with other sites, has since been only sporadically operated during the summer.

Both India and Pakistan are parties to other component instruments of the ATS. They are the only South Asian states in the ATS. Whilst neither are parties to CCAS, both are parties to the Madrid Protocol (January 14, 1998 and March 31, 2012 respectively). More immediately pertinent is that both India and

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[11] Data on India's Antarctic stations from Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs website at https://www.comnap.aq/Information/SiteAssets/ SitePages/Home/Antarctic_Facilities_List_13Feb2014.xls (accessed 19 July 2016).

[12] Data on CCAMLR acceptance (India) and accession (Pakistan) from the Depository Government (Australia) website at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ other/dfat/treaty_list/depository/CCAMLR.html (accessed on 19 July 2016).

Pakistan are parties to CCAMLR[12]. India is, as in relation to the Antarctic Treaty, a decision-making state – what is termed a Member of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, established under Article VII of the Convention. The criterion for this is, in India's case, that it is "engaged in research or harvesting activities in relation to the marine living resources to which this Convention applies."[13] India has been a Member of the Commission since 1985. Pakistan is, since 2012, an Acceding State to CCAMLR and, in the absence of the required research or harvesting activity, is not a decision-making state.

To summarise this situation: Only two South Asian states are party to ATS instruments: India and Pakistan, which are each parties to the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR. India is a decision-making state in relation to both instruments and Pakistan a non decision-making state.

South Asia in the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations Abutting Antarctica

The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)

CCSBT, which has already been mentioned, concerns itself with southern bluefin tuna *Thunnus maccoyii*,[14] across their range. This species is "found throughout the southern hemisphere mainly in waters between 30 and 50 degrees south but only rarely in the eastern Pacific. The only known breeding area is in the Indian Ocean, south-east of Java, Indonesia".[15] Five states are party to the Commission (Australia, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). Four other state-level entities (The European

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[13] CCAMLR Article VII, 2(b).

[14] CCSBT Article 1.

[15] 'About Southern Bluefin Tuna' CCSBT website at https://www.ccsbt.org/en/content/about-southern-bluefin-tuna (accessed on July 19, 2016).

Union, Fishing Entity of Taiwan, South Africa and the United States) are Observers (Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 2015). No South Asian State is engaged with CCSBT.

Three other RFMOs that abut the CCAMLR area have been mentioned above:

The South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO)

SEAFO, which gives effect to the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean.[16] There are seven Commission Members.[17] No South Asian state is a party.

The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO)

SPRFMO, which gives effect to the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean.[18] There are fourteen Commission Members, and four Cooperating non-Contracting Parties.[19] No South Asian state is a party.

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[16] Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean, adopted in Windhoek 20 April 2001, entered into force 13 April 2003, 41(2) ILM 257.

[17] South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation website at http://www.seafo.org/About/Contracting-Parties (accessed 19 July 2016).

[18] Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, adopted in Wellington 14 November 2009, entered into force 24 August 2012, ATS 28.

[19] South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation website at http://www.sprfmo.int/ (accessed 19 July 2016).

The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA)

SIOFA,[20] has eight Commission Members (Australia, Cook Islands, European Union, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, and two Indian Ocean states: Mauritius and the Seychelles).[21] Again, no South Asian state is a party. SIOFA's area of application (Figure 2) is defined in Article 3 of the Convention:

> Commencing at the landfall on the continent of Africa of the parallel of 10° North; from there east along that parallel to its intersection with the meridian of 65° East; from there south

Figure 2: The SIOFA Area

Source: FAO, Regional Fishery Bodies Summary Descriptions, South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/siofa/en#Org-OrgsInvolved

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[20] Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement, adopted in Rome 7 July 2006, entered into force 21 June 2012, UNTS Reg. No I-49647.

[21] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations website at http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/siofa/en#Org-OrgsInvolved (accessed 19 July 2016).

along that meridian to its intersection with the equator; from there east along the equator to its intersection with the meridian of 80° East; from there south along that meridian to its intersection with the parallel of 20° South; from there east along that parallel to its landfall on the continent of Australia; from there south and then east along the coast of Australia to its intersection with the meridian of 120° East; from there south along that meridian to its intersection with the parallel of 55° South; from there west along that parallel to its intersection with the meridian of 80° East; from there north along that meridian to its intersection with the parallel of 45° South; from there west along that parallel to its intersection with the meridian of 30° East; from there north along that meridian to its landfall on the continent of Africa.

General Economic and Geopolitical Factors Driving South Indian Ocean Institutional Development

The dominant economic activity in the ocean space of the South Indian Ocean, as elsewhere in the circumpolar Greater Southern Ocean, is currently marine harvesting – 'fishing'. Considering the entire circumpolar space, fishing activity is most actively pursued by European (including Russian); East Asian (most notably Japan, South Korea and increasingly China); and (to a lesser extent) South American and Southern African entities. The national identities notionally attached reflect where the economic control of the activity resides. In practice, the vessels may be registered just about anywhere, and whilst the senior officers of the fishing vessels generally come from the states where the activity is economically controlled, crews are now drawn from a global pool and are often from the Global South. Amongst the factors which have contributed to the establishment, and particularly the recent growth, of this fishing activity in higher latitudes are:

1. The continuing effects of the Law of the Sea Convention's establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). What were historically referred to as distant water fishing fleets,

continue to be displaced into areas beyond national jurisdiction;

2. Overfishing in traditional/historic fishing grounds, which has depleted particular stocks and drives the fishing industry to seek new stocks further afield;

3. Increased demand for fish and fish products, in part generated by the emergence of new wealth and consumer communities, including in the Global South;

4. Technological enablement, which means that previously remote and severe ocean areas may now be more readily accessed and fished; and

5. Perhaps the geopolitically perceived need for states to demonstrate presence and acquire or retain influence in areas that may be seen as strategically significant.

The institutional architecture that is most developed relates precisely to the management of fishing. For the South Indian Ocean this comprises successive 'shells' provided by CCAMLR, CCSBT and SIOFA. These provide a Southern Ocean / South Indian Ocean fisheries regime from the shores of the Antarctic continent at approximately 66° S. up to (at its furthest north) 10° N., and across the entire width of the South Indian Ocean from the coast of Africa to the coast of Australia. This is a massive area. Only three states: Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea, are parties to all three instruments; but France and the European Union are party to CCAMLR and SIOFA. This pattern is of itself perhaps not surprising. Japan and South Korea are global fishing states, with active participation in most RFMOs. Australia is an Indian Ocean littoral state, with its metropolitan territory to the east, a subantarctic island territory in the Heard and MacDonald Islands in the South Indian Ocean, and a generally unrecognised Antarctic territorial claim to the extreme south of the area in question. France possesses four island territories in the South Indian Ocean, comprising subantarctic Crozet and Kerguelen and the Amsterdam and St Paul archipelagos. These, plus the French

Antarctic claim (which is south of Tasmania and thus not within the Indian Ocean sector considered here) are administered by France as the Terres Australes et Antarctiques Françaises (Aldrich and Connell, 1992: 51). For 'territorial' states such as Australia and France, the involvement in fishing activity in areas relatively proximate to their EEZs is a factor. So too is their 'strategic' interest in these areas, which have long been within the policy and security purviews of their governments. The EU, through the Common Fisheries Policy,[22] is the primary voice of Europe in global fisheries bodies, although France and the United Kingdom have autonomy in relation to their vestigial colonial possessions,[23] and may explain the non-participation of key fishing states such as Spain as separate parties.

In the longer term – and over what time horizon this might eventuate is presently unclear – deep seabed mining and biological prospecting (the latter potentially through the water column, seamounts and the deep seabed) are further possible activities in the region. A discussion of the complexities of ocean management, and the variety of challenges in this environment, is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Smith, Suárez de Vivero and Agardy, 2015). It is not unreasonable to see, even in the best of situations, that oceans management in the South Indian Ocean is likely to involve more issues and thus to become more complex.

Immediate conventional 'security' interests in these oceanic areas may not be particularly acute at the present time (and this may be one region of relatively low concern about 'terrorism'), but the enduring strategic attention to sea lines of communications and control means that for major powers this is also likely to be a matter of interest in even the higher latitudes of the South Indian Ocean. The extent to which the greater regional or global security situation

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[22]Details of the Common Fisheries Policy available at the European Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/index_en.htm (accessed on 19 July 2016).

[23] Plainly the situation of the UK will change as a result of its decision to leave the EU.

ebbs and flows (the 'West' vs China, the US vs China, India vs China, etc.), and how both the present and potential economic interests actually develop in the South Indian Ocean over the next several decades, will determine the level of security concern in the south. For example, a decision (or even a sense that this is a possibility) to look at mineral resource activities in Antarctica, through an ending of the mining prohibition that is presently in place sometime after the middle of this century, might appreciably affect states' judgements about engagement in the South Indian Ocean more generally. From a contemporary perspective, hydrocarbons (oil and gas) from sedimentary basins beneath, or offshore, Antarctica appear the most likely incentive to revisit the minerals prohibition. But high value minerals known to be present on the continent, such as platinum-group metals (if accessible and in commercially viable quantities) or polymetallic nodules on the deep seabed (subject to the International Seabed Authority,[24] in addition to whatever authority the ATS may assert and thus presenting complex jurisdictional issues) might also stimulate reassessment. However, the process for overturning the present open-ended minerals prohibition is complex and may not readily be achieved (see the detailed discussion on the issues in Gilbert and Hemmings, 2015).

Similarly, and perhaps more readily, were the coastal states exercising sovereignty over the various subantarctic islands mentioned above to initiate or licence major commercial activities (or establish military facilities) on these islands, this too might alter the calculations. None of this is presently on the horizon, but assessments beyond a decade ahead are notoriously difficult. The substantive question may be whether it is reasonable to suppose that there will be no further instruments negotiated in the South Indian Ocean. The present author's assumption is that this is unlikely.

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[24]Polymetallic nodules are explained at the International Seabed Authority website at https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG7.pdf (accessed on August 4, 2016).

The Apparent Interests of South Asia in the South India Ocean

To an outsider – and as an Anglo scholar located within an Australian-New Zealand-United Kingdom tradition of enquiry, notwithstanding a cosmopolitan inclination, the present author is plainly such – there are two immediately striking aspects to the present South Asian engagement with the South Indian Ocean considered here. Firstly, that South Asia, and most particularly its largest and most advanced state, India, are so slightly engaged with the existing instruments addressing marine harvesting to its immediate south. Secondly, and again particularly in relation to India, that there appears such a mismatch between the declaratory focus amongst Indian foreign policy elites on the South Indian Ocean and the state's actual operational engagement in those international forums that now exist. A subsidiary point in relation to these observations is that the forums that are in existence are both at the relatively 'easy' end of international relations and only recently elaborated. They are 'easy' because they relate to resource and environmental management well away from the metropolitan territories of the participating states (rather than, say, use of shared waterways or issues of territory), the activity levels are still relatively low in global resource-issue terms, and we are near the commencement point for the activities that we are seeking to manage (so there are fewer entrenched positions). The participation costs do not appear to be high, in terms of staffing, skills-base, time and cost; nor do the risks of error appear to pose such frightening costs that great caution and consideration is called for before joining the fray.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi observed that 'The Indian Ocean links India to Antarctica. The entire area is of deep interest to us, and ocean studies are of vital importance' (quoted in Dey, 1992: 177). What Sanjay Chaturvedi has termed 'the Indian Ocean dimension of India's Antarctic engagement' has continued ever since (Chaturvedi, 2013b: 62-64). So it seems surprising that India at least has not involved itself in SIOFA, an RFMO that bridges the ocean space between CCAMLR (where India is a Commission Member) and the waters immediately south of India itself.

Whilst joining the ATS took India into a regime, rather than just into the Antarctic Treaty (notwithstanding that acceding to that treaty was the necessary first step), and joining SIOFA would plainly be a more limited initiative, one might enquire whether it would deliver some of the same benefits that the Government of India itself identified in Parliament in August 1983 in relation to joining the Antarctic system. In Anita Dey's phrasing:

> (a) India would be able to exchange scientific information with other members … thereby enhanc[ing] its analytical capabilities; (b) … project effectively its own views … and (c) … be able to participate in the ongoing discussion on the resources of Antarctica and ensure that any regime that might be set up there would be in harmony with its overall policies and objectives (Dey, 1992: 177).

Not only does this nicely capture the benefits that most states would likely argue in relation to joining the ATS, it essentially states the advantages and purposes for joining *any* international instrument and/or institution. To that extent, precisely these arguments could surely be mobilized in relation to joining SIOFA, or any of the other RFMOs now surrounding the CCAMLR area.

One question that arises may be quite what is meant, in different policy discourses, by the term 'South Indian Ocean'. Clearly, at least some of the proponents of an Indian strategic policy in the Indian Ocean have a conception of that area as including the South Indian Ocean considered in this paper. Thus, Bharat Karnad has recently argued for India to be the:

> premier power in the 'strategic quadrant' encompassed by the East African littoral and the Caspian Sea in the west, the Sunda Strait and western Australian coast in the eastern and southeastern reaches of the Indian Ocean, the central Asian Republics in the north and the waters up to Antarctica in the south …. (Karnad, 2015: 15).

Presumably the same author has this area in mind when he cites correspondence with Vice Admiral (Retd) Ganesh identifying

'Future strategic tasks … in more remote areas such as the southern Indian Ocean trade routes …' (Karnad, 2015: 340), but this is not entirely clear. Similarly, President Pranab Mukherjee has stated that:

> The primary area of Indian maritime interest ranges from the Persion Gulf in the north, to Antarctica in the south, and from the Cape of Good Hope and the East coast of Africa in the west, to the Straits of Malacca and the archipelagos of Malaysia and Indonesia in the east (in Scott, 2015: 468).

However, the terms 'South Indian Ocean' or seeming analogues such as 'southern Indian Ocean', whilst regularly used in Indian strategic and policy writing, are rarely unambiguously defined. Thus, the 'Southern Indian Ocean Region, including Antarctica' is identified as one of 'India's secondary areas of maritime interest' in the Indian Maritime Doctrine (Indian Navy, 2016: 68). The Doctrine also reports that:

> The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has accorded pioneer investor status to India of 75,000 sq km of the seabed in the southern Indian Ocean. Advances in technology are expected to enable deep sea mining, whereupon India may be able to harness its own seabed resources, including minerals and hydrocarbons. (Indian Navy, 2016: 64)

But in neither case is the actual area constituting the 'Southern Indian Ocean' specified.

Indeed, the presumably broader term 'Indian Ocean' is rarely operationally defined either. A gap is evident between what may be a reasonably clear as a geographical area (the Indian Ocean) and exactly what is intended when it comes to applying Indian strategic doctrine or strategy to this oceanic space. Some sort of boundary is provided by Antarctica to the south (in the case of the Indian Maritime Doctrine it appears to be set at 60° S.); the Indian Ocean is manifestly a focus of Indian strategic interest; but where the South Indian Ocean ends and Antarctica begins is often unclear. Indeed, the *Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* does

not even include 'South', or 'southern Indian Ocean' in its index. And so, for a strategic discourse invariably orientated around the Indian Ocean, one is left uncertain about what exactly is meant by *South* Indian Ocean. These are not slight issues. Clarity about them is critical at multiple levels. First, in relation to ensuring compliance with international obligations. The Antarctic Treaty Area (south of 60º S.) is an area formally demilitarised; and a practice has evolved of not ordinarily deploying active naval vessels ('grey hulls') within the area. So, to the degree that 'South Indian Ocean' may include areas south of 60º S., this is one consideration there. Second, in relation to actually thinking about how one functions – or exercises influence - in a particular locality. It may be that influence is not about presence on the sea at all (or not *only* about presence) but about participation in active politico-legal forums concerned with the area in question. And in order to do that, one has to specify the geographical or topical space. And finally, a strategic focus (and this does not necessarily mean a military focus) generally requires a multi-faceted approach.

If this is true for India, it is even more the case with the other South Asian states, for which no publicly available statement of an overall Indian Ocean policy or strategy is available. This is not to suggest that these states do not have particular concerns in the region. There have, for example, been reports that Pakistan is considering promoting the Indian Ocean as a nuclear-free zone (*Dawn*, 2016). None of this is to suggest that it is necessary (far less a good idea) for conceptions of the Indian Ocean, or the South Indian Ocean, to be securitized (*Economic & Political Weekly*, 2015). This is certainly not the present author's argument. If one takes the experience of the Antarctic area, the success of the collaborative international project there has been in no small degree due to the demilitarization of the region and the development of the ATS regime in the context of 'peaceful purposes'. What may be lacking here is a thorough regional strategic conception, in its broadest sense. Is this just a minor technical/administrative failing, which can be easily rectified; or is it better explained by what Sanjay Chaturvedi has called India's '[lack] of a strategic culture'

(Chaturvedi, 2013b: 50)? For an outsider this is very hard to determine, but it may warrant further attention by social science scholars in South Asia.

Concluding Observations: Options for South Asia

The present author sees a new geopolitical space emerging in the circumpolar oceans around Antarctica, including in the South Indian Ocean sector. This 'Greater Southern Ocean' region, no longer strictly bounded by the Antarctic Convergence, appears to be emerging as a new critical functional unit in terms of international governance. Whilst presently largely about fishing regulation, that activity alone is burgeoning and seems unlikely to represent the end point of economic (and thus strategic and geopolitical) interest in the region. Without wishing to be alarmist, the South Indian Ocean may be one of the more acute sectors of this new 'frontier' in oceanic resource and environmental aspiration.

Is South Asia happy to leave this space to be shaped – not only in relation to the activities, but the international regulatory structures – by other states? If the Indian Ocean remains a meaningful region for South Asia (and surely it does), then does it not have a vital interest in a more active participation in such instruments as presently exist – and in those that may yet be to come?

An obvious, and of itself not particularly onerous, option is for India (and some other South Asian states) to become parties to at least SIOFA, and perhaps the other RFMOs considered here. An obvious enquiry for scholars is why India has *not* already become a party. But, of itself, joining would alter only the appearance of the situation. The critical requirement (and there is nothing peculiar to the states of South Asia in this respect) is to engage in a manner and at a level that effects *influence* within the institutions one has joined.[25] For these separate instruments and institutions need not only to work individually by with each other if we are to most

effectively and efficiently to manage a huge oceanic space such as the South Indian Ocean in our common interests.

Consideration of what that might entail, of what policy the state pursues and the manner in which it does so, with all the questions of agency engagement that this entails in a modern national polity, are questions not only for another place, but for considered analysis by social sciences scholars in South Asia.

Acknowledgements

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[25]An examination of Indian engagement and influence within the Antarctic Treaty System may provide some insights. Some preliminary information is available in Dudeney and Walton (2012).

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Urban Living and Quality Time with Family: A Study of Delhi and Chandigarh

Sumedha Dutta

Abstract

It has often been hypothesized that the sanctity associated with family values in India is not far from perishing. This argument implicitly lays claims to the idea that with growing urbanization and industrialization, people spend increasingly less amounts of quality time with their families. In this context, this paper would attempt at unraveling the sustained significance of 'family time' in the lives of city dwellers. It would help in assessing the diverse meanings, which educated urbanites impute to the concept of 'family time', in the metropolitan cities of Delhi and Chandigarh. The study unveils how the trends of development, and modern work culture, have in fact created a situation whereby the family is becoming one of the major factors of stress relief in the busy and frenzied schedule of urban existence.

Keywords: Urban living, family, quality time, Delhi, Chandigarh

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Introduction

A social group is defined as an aggregate of individuals, in which definite relations exist between the individuals who constitute the group, and where every member is conscious of the group itself and its symbols (Bottomore, 1986). Most of the typologies of social groups are found to have been based on binary characteristics, such as the famous distinction between *Gemeinschaft* or community, and *Gesellschaft*, or association, which was proposed by Tonnies (1887). While community is defined as 'intimate, private, and exclusive living together', with 'public life' Tonnies identifies association which is consciously or deliberately entered upon. Examples of community, according to Tonnies, are the family or kin group, the neighborhood or rural village, or a group of friends, whereas he primarily mentions groups which are based on economic interests, while illustrating the notion of an 'association'. In this context, it would be fruitful to note that in distinguishing between community and association, Tonnies depended on two major criteria: first, individuals in a community are involved as complete persons, who are able to satisfy all or most of a wide variety of purposes in the group, whereas, in an association, individuals are not completely involved, rather they look towards the satisfaction of particular ends only. And secondly, a community is united by an accord of feeling or sentiment between individuals, but in an association, individuals are united by a rational agreement or interest (Bottomore, 1986). Like Tonnies, Cooley (1909) distinguished between *primary groups* and other groups. By primary groups, he implies those that are characterized by intimate, face-to-face association and cooperation. His definition involves three conditions: physical proximity of the members, the smallness of the group, and the enduring nature of the relation. In this sense, primary groups in a way resemble Tonnies' community (Bottomore, 1986). Similarly, while Maine (1870) had explicated on the *status* to *contract* dyad, Redfield (1941) had enunciated on the *folk-urban continuum*, which were more or less based on similar criteria.

Nowadays the term association is often used to suggest voluntary, or public, associations, formally constituted and non-commercial organizations, of which membership is optional within a particular society (Marshall, 2004). The rise of such associations has often been identified with the phenomenon of urbanization and industrialization, as these associations are believed to soften the 'dehumanizing' effects of the urban-industrial culture. It is argued that before the Industrial Revolution, the community, church and the extended family were able to gratify the felt needs of human fellowship, personal security and emotional satisfaction. However, with the intensification of the process of industrialization and its affiliated processes of urbanization, geographic mobility, bureaucratization and secularization, these institutions are supposed to have weakened, resulting in the 'alienated', 'atomized' and 'free-floating' individual seeking comfort in the voluntary associations such as youth and women's clubs, labor unions, credit associations, social service associations, etc. which, having emerged as responses to this challenge have taken over the functions of traditional institutions (Oommen, 1975). Again, Weber's (1922) emphasis on rationalism and Durkheim's (1893/1997) analysis of the growth of individualism in the modern era, also pointed towards the slackening of ties based on affectivity. Similarly, Parsons's (1967) modernization hypothesis did lay claims to the fact that particularism, affectivity and diffuseness, all of which characterize the family as an institution, or Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft,* would increasingly give way to universalism, affective neutrality and specificity, or *Gesellschaft.* Thus, Parsons observed that many nurturing and educational functions have now been transferred from the family to the public domain, where they are increasingly seen to be provided by service professionals, thereby signaling the decline of the traditional family (Turner, 1993).

However, studies by scholars such as Mayo (1949), Warner et al (1947 and 1950) and Whitehead (1938) not only reported the functioning of primary groups in the urban industrial complex,

but also contended that these groups perform important functions for the furtherance of complex industrial organizations, namely increasing productivity, facilitating mobility and maintenance of industrial peace. Similarly, scholars such as Leighton (1945) and Richardson (1945) have identified the role of primary groups in getting policy decisions accepted by the people, while Lazersfeld and Berelson (1955) have interrogated the influence of these groups in political decision making (Oommen, 1975). Similarly, Schwarzweller's (1971), analysis of Appalachean families undergoing transition and Hareven's (1975, 1978) study on the mill families of Manchester from 1900 to 1930, significantly highlight the role of kin group in recruitment, work assignment, supervision and functioning as representatives on labor matters. This makes one rethink the oft taken for granted simplistic dichotomy between impersonal, rationalized relationships among individuals in urban-industrial settings, in contrast to the personal relations existing between members of primary groups like the family, which are supposed to be predominantly characteristic of simple, non-industrialized, and non-urbanized settings.

The frenzy of urban living vs quality time with family: a paradox?

The family is defined as an intimate domestic group made up of people related to one another by bonds of blood, sexual mating or legal ties (Marshall, 2004). In India, the institution of the family has always held a special place in the social fabric. It has been attributed immense significance in the religious as well as secular imagination, to the extent of being deemed a sacred institution, and has been upheld as a vital manifestation of the collectivistic nature of the Indian national character. The family has also been one of the major nodal points of social science research, and it has seen a great deal of theorizing around it over the years. As has been mentioned above, it has often been argued that with growing industrialization and urbanization, the importance of the family has seen a steady decline and its functions are increasingly being

performed by other institutions. Some scholars have even gone to the extent of theorizing on the 'demise of the family' in the post industrial world. The 'decline of the family' has been attributed primarily to the factors of divorce (Dobson and Bauer, 1990; Popenoe, 1994), single parent families (Blankenhorn, 1995; Murray, 1993; Whitehead, 1993) inadequate socialization of children as compared to the past (Whitehead, 1993), and child poverty (Whitehead, 1993; Murray, 1993; Wilson, 1993). Some scholars have identified family decline with a growing public concern about the decline of the institution of the family (Popenoe, 1994; Wilson 1993). Brooks (2000) analyzes that public concern with family decline in the United States of America increased steadily after 1980, and this concern was found to be more widespread among the evangelical Protestants who attend the church regularly. Again, Simic and Custred (1982) perceives the decline of the American family as resulting from the 'fragmenting forces of modernity' manifesting in widely accepted values of individualism, rationalism and universalism, which the authors argue are in direct opposition to the values giving way to the corporate existence of the family. The authors have also identified the 'relatively short developmental cycle of the household, the prevalence of pre-marital as well as post-marital neo-locality, emphasis on individual privacy and on the inalienable right to personal property and space, stress on peer group solidarity rather than on sibling unity and filial respect, focus on extra-familial recreation and volunteerism, application of democratic ideals in familial relationships, de-emphasis within the household as in the larger society on the sexual division of labor, cultivation of economic individualism even in the very young, and cultural routinization of such phenomena such as divorce and serial polygamy', as reasons for the demise of the American family.

It has been observed that research on the family in India had commenced in the 1940s with Indological studies of ancient Hindu texts. Over the years, there appears to have been a shift in the studies on the Indian family, from an emphasis on jointness (Gore, 1968; Mandelbaum, 1959) to the concern over the disintegration of

the joint family into nuclear families, a critique of jointness being the predominant rule of family structure in India (Goode, 1963; Shah, 1968, 1996), that structural changes in the family has been accompanied by functional jointness (Agarwala, 1955; Kapadia, 1956; Beteille, 1964; Desai, 1956, 1964; Gore, 1965; Singer, 1968; Aiyappan, 1955; Khatri, 1975; Singh, 1988), and finally the shift of focus on the coexistence of a multiplicity of family patterns, joint families, nuclear families, single parent families, dual earner and adoptive families.

Again, various studies have clearly shown how the family is still a very significant source of emotional retreat, the expressive functions of which have not yet found a significant alternative source of fulfillment. As far back as the end of the nineteenth century, while responding to Pearson's (1893) analysis of the onset of the disintegration of the institution of the family, the functions of which would eventually be obtained and performed by the state, Muirhead (1896) observes that it is yet to be proved that the family is unable to adapt itself to the changing environment. Rather, the author observes that it is undergoing the requisite 'alterations and adaptations' to suit the needs of the changing times. In fact, the affective individualism thesis argues that rapid industrialization has given rise to the 'closed domesticated nuclear families' characterized by intimate emotional bonds, domestic privacy, a preoccupation with love and with the rearing of children for expressive, rather than for instrumental reasons (Thadani, 1978). Although this child-centered closed domesticated nuclear family as a product of industrialization thesis may have been contested on various grounds, one cannot overlook the importance of cathectic, expressive functions of the family in today's world, the significance of which can be highlighted through the mapping of the amount of time which people invest in their relationships with their family members, even amidst the frenzy of their urban life-style. Studies on 'quality time' with family have primarily focused on the parent-child interactions (Snyder, 2007), work-family balance between employed parents (Milkie et. al. 2010), with comparisons made between single parent vs. married parent- child

relations (Ben Porath, 1980; Coleman, 1988; Fine, 1986; Velez, 1989, Asmussen and Larsen, 1991) parent – child quality time and child order (Price, 2008) etc. However, few studies have been conducted on the actor's perception of the idea of spending quality time with one's family, based on the indices of the type of profession, social class, etc. in a transitional society like India, which is undergoing rapid changes in all aspects of societal existence.

Thus, the following paper seeks to negotiate the degree and extent to which urban, metropolitan city dwellers of two cities of North India, namely Delhi and Chandigarh, spend time with their family members in a range of activities in their day to day lives, in a comparative perspective. The primary objective of this study was to interrogate as to what activity is perceived by the respondents as constituting the ideal definition of 'quality time with family'. Besides, the study seeks to highlight the importance, which spending 'quality time' with one's family members, has in a metropolitan city dweller's life. The data for the study was collected using a set of uniform structured questionnaires, in addition to the interview method, from 400 individuals (200 from each city), representing adults from diverse genders, a variety of income groups and professional backgrounds, to reflect a stratified sample. The respondents for the survey were however identified through purposive and snowball sampling, to ensure adequate representation in each category. Since both Delhi and Chandigarh are metropolitan cities, the sample constituted a heterogeneous mix of population, depicting diversities of language, religion and culture, professional and educational backgrounds.

Varying definitions of a 'good family man/woman'

The survey revealed that in the context of the residents of the capital city of Delhi, nearly 32 per cent of the respondents believed that going out and spending time with their family members is the criterion by which they would define themselves as having been a 'good family man' or a 'good family woman'. However, it was observed that while many private sector employees as well as

business men and women (34 per cent each) considered going out for shopping or an outing as the most appropriate option of spending quality time with family, most government employees did not consider spending time outside their homes as the best possible option of attaining the 'best family man/woman' status, and comparatively more such employees defined themselves as a completely indoor person (20 per cent). However the survey revealed that for a female home-maker, it is indeed difficult to conceptualize the notion of a 'family woman' separately from her existence as a 'woman', and most such women observed that they spend most of their time with their families, doing the household chores and looking after their family members. The study found that while most of the respondents in the lower socio-economic stratum, earning less than 0.2 million rupees per annum (50 per cent) and the middle classes, defined themselves as a good family man/woman in terms of frequently going out in order to spend time with their families, people of the upper socio-economic stratum, earning more than 0.8 million rupees per annum, preferred going out less frequently with their family members. This study clearly indicates that in Delhi, both middle and lower middle class groups are more frequent visitors of malls and shopping complexes than the higher income groups, a factor which they also consider as an indicator of their being a 'good family man/woman'.

Like Delhi, an analysis of the data collected from the city of Chandigarh suggested that it is the government employees, more than people from any other profession, who would rather stay at home and spend time with their family during their leisure hours, to earn the title of a 'good family man/woman', although many of them admitted to going out sometimes to spend 'quality time' with their family members (38 per cent). Again, just like the city of Delhi, most private sector employees (50 per cent) observed that going out with their family members in their free time is the best way of spending quality time, and none would like to stay back at home in their free times. However, unlike Delhi, business men/women of Chandigarh preferred to go for outings with their families on

special occasions alone (41 per cent). The survey also unveiled that people belonging to the lower income group (earning less than 0.2 million rupees per annum) in Chandigarh, mostly prefer to go out with their family and friends, with none preferring to stay completely indoors, while in the middle-income category (earning between 0.4 million to 0.8 million rupees per annum), the trend is towards going out occasionally with their family members. Interestingly, the most number of people who like to stay completely indoors in Chandigarh, fall in the highest income bracket, i.e. those earning above rupees 0.8 million per annum (17 per cent).

Diverse opinions on the best possible way of spending 'quality time' with family

In the capital city of Delhi, going against the common perception, almost 31 per cent of the respondents considered helping their partners in household chores as the best possible way to spend time with their families, and this was the dominant trend for respondents from across professions. The survey suggests that private employees and business persons do comparatively less household chores than government employees. Nonetheless, the survey also highlighted the fact that certain activities are still the luxury of the upper middle class and upper class groups, for instance, spending time with one's spouse while going out for a long drive. An income wise distribution on the indices of spending time with family on weekdays revealed that while people in the middle income bracket would spend most of their spare time in general gossiping with family members, most people in the upper income bracket of more than 0.8 million rupees per annum confided that they hardly had any time to spend with their families on such days.

However, in the city of Chandigarh, the study revealed that on weekdays, the maximum number of government employees (38 per cent) as well as retired persons and house-wives (33 per cent) enjoy spending time with their families mostly by watching

television, while this number is lowest amongst the private sector employees (7 per cent) and business men and women (9 per cent), who like to spend the maximum time with family members engaged in general gossip (43 per cent of private employees and 36 per cent of businessmen and women). An income wise distribution suggests that people in the highest income bracket in Chandigarh like to spend their time with family over the dinner table on weekdays (33 per cent), while people in the lowest income bracket spend the maximum time with family members on weekdays watching television (40 per cent). However, on such days people between income groups of 0.2 to 0.6 million per annum spend most of the time with their families engaged in general gossip. It may be noted that as against the prevalent stereotype, in both the cities, general gossiping was identified as a factor which was accepted as having been indulged in more by males than by females, as a favorite way of passing time with family members (35 per cent males and 21 per cent females in Delhi, and 37 per cent males and 22 per cent females in Chandigarh).

Family time and the 'weekend-effect'

This study unveiled how feelings of happiness and fulfillment tend to reach the zenith on weekends, and as the week commences, the respondents were found to be having comparatively lesser amounts of time for one's family, and a lesser sense of commitment towards family values. This was found to be true for respondents from across social classes in Delhi as well as in Chandigarh. The survey laid bare the fact that the 'weekend effect' was largely associated with the ability to spend quality time with one's family members in the activities of one's choice and liking. Thus, the survey unveiled how while weekdays were 'public', weekends were defined by the respondents as being 'private' and personal. In the city of Delhi, on weekends, both private sector employees and businesspersons were found to engage in a much larger variety of activities as compared to any government employee or homemaker. However, the homemakers were found to have

almost the same pattern of lifestyle on weekdays and weekends alike, as most of their time would be spent doing the household chores (91 per cent). Again, in the city of Chandigarh, it was observed that during weekends, the maximum number of private sector employees (54 per cent) and the lowest number of homemakers and retired persons (only 12 per cent) prefer to go for outings with family members, while most government employees (38 per cent) as well as businessmen and women (32 per cent) preferred to spend their weekends exchanging general gossip with family members**.**

Varying expenditures on family leisure time activities

In terms of expenditure, it was observed that most public sector employees (60per cent) of Delhi would spend less than 1000 rupees per week for family leisure activities, while only 10 per cent would spend more than 5000 rupees on such undertakings. The trend was found to be almost reversed in the case of businessmen and women as most of them (44 per cent) would be spending more than 5000 rupees on such activities in a week, while a significant percentage of private sector employees claimed to be spending between 1000 to 5000 rupees. An income-wise distribution revealed that the fact that one earns a high income is not sufficient cause to ascertain that one also spends lavishly on family leisure. Thus, it was observed that the middle-income group of the city of Delhi tends to spend more as compared to the higher income groups in their day-to-day family leisure activities. In fact it was observed that most people in the income bracket of 0.2 to 0.4 million rupees per annum spend more than 5000 rupees per week in leisure time activities, while only 23 per cent of the respondents with an annual income of more than 8 million rupees per annum spend such an amount on the same.

On the other hand, the study reveals that mostly private sector employees of the city of Chandigarh spend more than 5000 rupees per week on leisure activities (45 per cent). Again, it was noted that only 5 percent of businessmen and women spend less than 1000

rupees on their leisure activities per week, as they spend mostly between 3000 to 5000 rupees on such activities (48 per cent). Like Delhi, of all the professional categories studied in Chandigarh, the least number of public sector employees spend more than 5000 rupees on their leisure related activities (18 per cent). However, unlike Delhi, where social class does not seem to determine expenditure on family leisure, the study revealed more or less that expenditure on leisure activities in Chandigarh varies by income, with only 5 percent of the people with income less than 0.2 million per annum and around 60 percent of the people in the income bracket of more than 0.8 million per annum, spend more than 5000 rupees per week on their leisure related activities. Again the data made it apparent to conclude that all the people between the income brackets of 0.4 million to more than 0.8 million per annum spend more than 1000 rupees on family leisure activities.

Festivals and vacations enhance 'quality' of time spent with family

Apart from the above variables of determining 'quality time', a significant proportion of respondents (30 per cent in Delhi and 25 per cent in Chandigarh) who identified themselves as having their roots or families of origin/extended families, in states/regions other than the city in which they are earning their livelihood, defined what they called 'actual family time' as that which they spend with their extended families during religious/secular festivals or vacations, when they go back to their native places, to reunite with their kin, or when their kin join them in these festivities. Festivals were unanimously seen as a major stress buster for most of the respondents, even within the nuclear households, as well as for uniting members of extended families and those of the same ethnic group living in the same city, and were an ideal definition of spending 'quality time' with family members, across professions, genders, and classes, in both the cities. However, respondents from middle class families and those in government services were more vocal about the importance of

festivities to replenish and even forge ties between family members of nuclear as well as extended/joint families. This may be explained on the basis of the general tendency of the new middle class in India to be more inclined towards religiosity, and that globalization has in fact enhanced the religious connect amongst India's emerging middle class (Jaffrelot, 2010; Nanda, 2011). Besides, as mentioned before, these instances also signify the fact that structural changes in the family have been accompanied by functional jointness, as seen during the family unions during festivities. Again, holidaying and pilgrimages with family were seen as an important mechanism for strengthening family ties, across the sample. The expenses claimed to be made during the festivities and vacations/holidays, however, varied by class, gender and profession, in Delhi as well as in Chandigarh.

Key changes in family time in the last five years

Finally the study unraveled the major changes that have occurred in terms of spending time with family in the last five years, as perceived by the respondents across all categories, in both the cities. Thus, the homemakers of Delhi observed that the outing has become a part of their life, both during weekdays as well as on weekends, unlike what it used to be five years ago. For instance, almost 42 per cent of the homemakers interviewed responded to their going out frequently for window shopping on weekdays while 50 per cent of such women confided to their going out regularly with their family members during weekends. Again, the study unveiled the fact that it is the public sector employees who perceived themselves as spending more time with their families, nowadays, during the weekends (40 per cent) as well as on weekdays (20 per cent), as compared to any other professional group, while the businessmen and women found themselves to be spending lesser and lesser amounts of time with their families over the past five years, during the weekdays. Most of the private employees interviewed (33 per cent), observed that they are going out more frequently with their family members during weekdays

nowadays than ever before, while the business men and business women (47 per cent) are most likely to be going out during weekends with their families for spending quality time on an activity of their choice, in the current times.

Again, in Chandigarh, in terms of the changes in the ratio of spending time with family on weekdays, as compared to weekends, over the past five years, the data gathered revealed that government employees are spending more time with their families on weekdays (63 per cent) than any other professional group, while private sector employees spend more time with their family members on weekends (36 per cent). House-wives and retired persons (33 per cent) appear to be going out to socialize more frequently on weekdays than any other bracket, while private employees least prefer to go out frequently on weekdays (only 7 per cent). Again, more private employees in the city of Chandigarh are going out frequently with their families on weekends (29 per cent) in the present times than ever before. Irrespective of weekdays or weekends, some businessmen and women appear to be spending equal amounts of time with their families (27 per cent), while they also go out with their families as frequently during weekdays as on weekends (23 per cent).

Besides, the study also unveiled the fact that 'holidaying with family' has come to be recognized as a very important mechanism of rejuvenating family ties, in the last few years, and a greater number of families (60 per cent in Delhi and 55 per cent in Chandigarh) in both the cities are venturing outside their hometowns more frequently than ever before, with their families for holidays or on pilgrimages. This change has been attributed by the respondents to the easing of transport and communication facilities, and the multiplicity of choices available with regard to traveling.

Towards some Conclusion

The findings enlisted in Table 1 reveal that in this age of 'network

society', where the 'space of flows', made up of 'electronic circuits and information systems', appears to have taken center stage, the 'space of places' or that 'based in meaningful physical proximity' (Castells, 2000), continues to persist as a major source of experience and function, even for the frenzied city dwellers. Thus, it would be fallacious to argue that face-to-face interactions with family members and spending quality time with them, has been totally replaced by impersonal, secondary contacts and relationships, the boom in communication and information technology, along with new forms of associationalism, for instance that of humans and non-humans, to use a Latour-ian (1993, 2005) phrase, notwithstanding. Although it may be true that some of the functions of the family are now being performed by other rationalized, bureaucratic institutions, in the public domain, the family as a unit of emotional gratification remains a central feature of the Indian social system. Thus, family values are far from perishing in the urban Indian set up, as people are still spending a considerable amount of their free time in varied activities with their family members. This trend can be seen to be manifest even in the metropolitan cities of India. This is despite the variations in the amount of time and money which people from across the socio-economic stratum, invest in familial relationships. These variations are nonetheless important, as they help us to locate the nodes of social change. Besides, the study also revealed that the way people perceive and experience 'family space' also varies across the socio-economic stratum. While some sections of the population, especially the government employees and the upper class, consider 'the home' as the best space to invest in family time, middle class families in both the cities were found to be willing to 'create' their 'family space' outside the home as well, for instance in shopping malls and eating joints. Again, 'exclusive spaces' outside the home were considered ideal for the upper class for spending quality time with family. This fact, along with the tendency to avoid visits to crowded malls for the economic elite can be read as a manifestation of their 'status consciousness', following Weberian (1922) analysis of status groups, which is observed by maintaining

a particular life-style, as well as by observing social distance (Bogardus, 1925) from people belonging to other socio-economic strata.

However, this study remains limited by the fact that it does not generate substantial data on the power dynamics within familial relationships, which may significantly affect the amount and quality of the time which one can spend fruitfully with one's family members, engaged in an activity of one's choice. Besides, the amount of free time that people actually spend with their family members, in contrast to that spent with peers and colleagues, also needs to be ascertained. Nonetheless, this paper points to the fact that the frenzy of urban living has generated a great need amongst city dwellers to invest time in familial relationships, through different forms of activities, depending on the nature of their profession and income. This has resulted in the family being a major source of stress relief for the metropolitan city dwellers. The range of activities through which they might spend time with their family members may have changed over time. But across the sample, a common way of judging oneself as a good family man or woman was by the amount and quality of time which one could manage to spend with one's family members. It was observed that feelings of well being and contentment for most of the respondents, reached the zenith on weekends, whereby they could spend maximum amounts of time with their family members, while on the other hand, their stress levels tended to increase with the commencement of the week, as the levels of family time also declined. The study however pointed to the fact that for homemakers, there was not much of a variation in life-style during weekends as compared to weekdays, since they argued that most of their time throughout the week was spent in providing varied services to their family members. It also helped in dispelling myths about gossiping being the prerogative of women, with males indulging more in the exchange of general gossip with family members during leisure. Further, the study also helped to understand that while structural changes may have been effected in the institution of the family, owing to the pressures of the urban,

industrial living, functional jointness still persists as regards the Indian family, as is manifested during festivals, when the kin group seeks to be united.

To conclude it may be fruitful to observe that one's notion of spending 'quality time' with one's family is contingent on one's profession and income, and also on the type of city in which one resides. The options available for family leisure activities may be quite limited and different in a small town, or a village, as compared to a metropolitan city, on the one hand, while on the other, the amount of time that one has at one's disposal for devoting to one's family may be quite restricted in a metropolitan city in comparison to other places. Further, it may be observed that the notion of quality time is not a generalized notion, but rather a subjective one, as it has to take into account the variations in several factors, in order to account for a near correct analysis. Nonetheless, the study proves that modernization in India has been a heterogeneous configuration, far beyond a mere shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, as instrumental role structures are being complemented with categorical values. Thus, as Singh (1973) rightly pointed out, one can observe that despite the proliferation of instrumental role structures in modern India, the importance of categorical values, like family values, have survived the test of rapid social change. This is true even in the 21st century, as quality time with family is largely perceived as providing stability in the face of the growing frenzy of the modern, urbane, metropolitan existence. However the significance of such a phenomenon can be grasped only if one dares to look beyond the dualisms of modernity (Latour, 1993), which sees a widening gap and inconsistency between the supposed poles of 'traditional values' and 'modern lifestyle'.

NOTE

Table 1
'Quality time with family' in Delhi and Chandigarh at a glance

Criteria	Delhi	Chandigarh
Definition of a Good Family man/woman	• 32 per cent of the respondents, primarily private sector employees and from middle and lower classes, believed going out and spending time with family members is the criterion by which they would define themselves as a 'good family man' or a 'good family woman'.	• Private sector employees, especially people of lower income groups, believed going out and spending time with family members is the criterion by which they would define themselves as having been a 'good family man' or a 'good family woman'.
Best way to spend quality time with family	• On weekdays 31 per cent of the respondents, primarily government employees, considered helping their partners in household chores as the best possible way to spend time with their families.	• On weekdays maximum numbers of government employees (38per cent), retired persons and home-makers (33 per cent), and those from the lowest income bracket (40 per cent) enjoy spending time with their families by watching television.
	• 35 per cent males and 21 per cent females identified general gossiping as a favorite way of passing time with family members	• 37 per cent males and 22 per cent females identified general gossiping as a favorite way of passing time with family members
Weekend effect	• Weekends are 'private', in which both private sector	• Weekends are 'private', where maximum number of private sector

	employees and business persons engage in a much larger variety of activities as compared to any government employee or homemaker	employees (54 per cent) prefer to go for outings with family members
	♦ Homemakers spend most of their time on weekdays and weekends doing household chores (91 per cent).	♦ Most government employees (38 per cent) and businessmen and women (32 per cent) prefer indulging in general gossiping with family members on weekends.
Expenditures on family leisure.	♦ High income is not sufficient cause for spending lavishly on family leisure. ♦ Middle income group tends to spend more as compared to the higher income groups in their day to day family leisure activities.	♦ Expenditure on leisure activities varies by income. Only 5 per cent with income less than 0.2 million per annum and around 60 per cent in the income bracket of more than 0.8 million per annum, spend more than 5000 rupees per week on leisure related activities
Festival, vacations and 'quality' time with family	♦ 30 per cent identified themselves as having their roots outside Delhi; defined 'actual family time' as time spent with extended families during religious/ secular festivals or vacations, when they reunite with their kin.	♦ 25 per cent identified themselves as having their roots outside Chandigarh; defined 'actual family time' as time spent with extended families during religious/secular festivals or vacations, when they reunite with their kin.
Key changes in last 5 years	♦ For homemakers of Delhi the outing has become a part of their life, both during	♦ Homemakers and retired persons (33 per cent) appear to be going out for socializing more

weekdays (40 per cent) as well as on weekends (50 per cent), unlike five years ago.	frequently on weekdays than any other category.
♦ Government employees spending more time with their families, nowadays, during weekends (40 per cent) as well as on weekdays (20 per cent).	♦ Government employees spending more time with their families on weekdays (63 per cent) than any other professional group.
♦ Businessmen and women spending lesser time with their families over the past five years, during the weekdays.	♦ Some businessmen and women spending equal amounts of time nowadays with their families on weekdays and weekends (27 per cent).
♦ Private employees (33 per cent) going out more frequently with their family members during weekdays nowadays than ever before.	♦ Private employees least prefer to go out frequently on weekdays (only 7 per cent) and are going out more frequently with their families on weekends (29 per cent)
♦ More number of families (60 per cent) venturing outside their hometown more frequently than ever before, for holidays or for pilgrimage.	♦ 'More number of families (55 per cent) venturing outside their hometown more frequently than ever before, for holidays or for pilgrimage.

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Mobile Phones and Students of Remote India

(A study to understand the penetration, consumption pattern and uses of the contents of mobile phone among the students of remote India)

Manash Pratim Goswami

Abstract

The unprecedented growth in terms of mobile phone consumer base, infrastructure and competition for providing users with better quality of services in the last two decades made India second only to China in terms of subscriber base. The growth of reach and subscriber base of mobile phones in the country can be understood from the available connectivity of mobile network and presence of users in the remote corners of the country, even where there are no roads and where people are struggling even for basic healthcare facilities and primary education.

Amarkantak, the place known as Tirthraj or "king of pilgrimages" is a small pilgrim place situated on the border of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. It has a sizable population of several tribal groups of central India. Although, the religious significance, weather and scenic beauty have been the main attractions for people to visit the place, connectivity of transport to

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this place has been the biggest hurdle for the socio-economic development and flow of tourists to the region as well.

With the establishment of Indira Gandhi National Tribal University, Lalpur, Amarkantak, Madhya Pradesh, to facilitate avenues of higher education and research primarily for the preservation of art, culture and tradition of the tribal dominated, remotest and economically poor region of the country, this small place has been emerging as an educational hub for higher education and research in recent times. In spite of poor economic backgrounds, the efforts and enthusiasm of the students to enlighten themselves with knowledge and skills from the university can be experienced from their desire for better employability and livelihoods ahead.

This is the result of the communication revolution that connects the students of the university with the development of the other parts of country. The 3G services of the state owned BSNL and a few leading private telephone companies, though not providing the best of services, are available in the campus and nearby locality. The paper makes an attempt to assess the penetration, consumption pattern and uses of mobile phones by the students of one of the remotest parts of the country to meet their educational, socio-economic and entertainment needs.

Keywords: Mobile phone, Digital India, Remote India, Students, Mobile content

Introduction

The landline phone that once signified the status of a family, is vanishing fast. The mobile phone has seen unprecedented growth in the last two decades, making India second only to China in terms of subscriber base. The mobile telephone has reached the remotest corners of the country, even where there are no roads to reach and people are struggling hard for basic healthcare facilities.

In areas, where several developmental constraints exist, such as low literacy, poor healthcare and transport facilities, low per capita income, a high level of poverty and a host of problems related to poor infrastructure, mobile phones have been emerging as an easy and cheap mode of communication, entertainment and information. Mobile phones have been facilitating the need-based and user-centric information and services at such a low cost that even the rural population can easily afford them. The mobile phone is seen as a device that has the potential to break the rural–urban developmental gap by delivering information on a variety of economic and social issues (Aker and Mbiti, 2010).

In a survey report entitled 'Capturing the Gains', by Balwant Singh Mehta, that explores the socio-economic impact of mobile phone usage in rural areas, the author reveals several significant benefits that mobile phone users have been reaping in rural India. Mobile users benefit by obtaining timely information on a variety of subjects, including employment opportunities and higher education for their children, by transferring funds and even by calling family members during emergencies (Mehta, 2013).

Smartphones, mobile phones with more advanced computing ability and connectivity, that comprise functions such as portable media players, low-end compact digital cameras, pocket video cameras and global positioning system (GPS), have been emerging as essential gadgets for better livelihoods. With the popularity and functions offered in the smart phones, there has been an increase in demand for them (Park and Chen, 2007). Consumers have become highly dependent on smart phones which they can use when they commute, relax at home, travel overseas and so on (Genova, 2010). With these multiple benefits smartphones have already become an inseparable part of the lives of citizens of developed counties.

With tele-density already crossing over 75% percent of the overall population, and more than 50% of the population being rural, the country has been growing as a favorite destination for smartphone manufacturers. For Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Digital India dream, the government of India has been projecting

smartphones as a tool of empowerment for all. As part of the Digital India project, the government has already opened windows for the idea of ensuring cheaper communication facilities and easy availability of smartphones by 2019.

By switching over from bar to smartphones, the government of India desires to ensure that all the services such as health, education, retail, banking, insurance and several other services are provided on mobile phones to empower the masses. In fulfilling the Digital India dream, it is believed that smartphones can play a crucial role in promoting the social and economic objectives of the country and for India to push forward. The experts believe that easy and cheaper availability of smartphones and reliable internet would also give a boost to e-commerce in the country. University and college students are among the highest contributors to the increasing number of smartphone sales. The factor that most influences the increase in smart phone usage is the functionality that helps users in their daily life especially business people and students of universities and colleges (Jacob and Isaac, 2008).

Indira Gandhi National Tribal University, established to facilitate avenues of higher education and research primarily for the preservation of art, culture and tradition, is located in one of the remotest corners of the country that is tribal dominated and economically poor. Although, situated a stone's throw away from holy place of Amarkantak, the place known as Tirthraj or "king of pilgrimages", the connectivity, in terms of transport, to this place has been the biggest hurdle for the socio-economic development of the locals and has been hindering the flow of tourists to the place. Students mainly from Anuppur and its neighboring districts Shahdol, Dindori and Umaria of Madhya Pradesh take admission in the university. It must be noted that as per the census report 2011, Dindori, Anuppur, Umaria and Shahdol districts rank 4th, 7th, 8th and 9th in terms of the population of scheduled tribes in the state of Madhya Pradesh. These districts have also been officially listed in the low income level districts of Madhya Pradesh consisting of people primarily dependent on cultivation and working as

laborers in agricultural and household industries. The population of people earning a livelihood from government and private jobs and business activities is very small in these districts. Pendra Road and Pendra, two tehsils situated in Bilaspur district of Chhattisgarh, nearly 25 and 32 kilometers away from the university respectively, contribute a small percentage to the strength of the students of the university, with students having similar demographic and economic backgrounds.

As per the official data, the university has a total of 2710 enrolled students in various departments as on 31st March 2016. Of the enrolled figure of the students, 1469 (53.8%) and 1261 (46.2%) students are male and female respectively. The enrolled figure of the total number of students constitutes 627 (22.97%) in general, 326 (11.94%) in scheduled caste, 1106 (40.51%) in scheduled tribes, 661 (24. 21%) in other backward class and 10 students (0.37%) in physically handicapped categories. The students of the various faculties mainly belong to lower and middle income groups of farmers, small businessmen, private, government and semi-government employees. There are a total of 1677 (61.42%) in undergraduate courses, 684 (25.05%) in postgraduate course, 284 (10.40%) in 4 year integrated courses, 33 (1.20%) in PhD and 52 (1.9%) in Diploma and certificate courses. The students' overall economic profiles pertain to the low and middle income and illustrate a high dependence on agriculture oriented livelihood. Presently, only a negligible percentage of students hailing from other districts of Madhya Pradesh, excluding Dindori, Umaria and Shahdol, or other states of the country take admission in this university. In spite of the meager socio-economic background, the efforts and enthusiasm of the students to enlighten themselves with knowledge and skills from the university can be experienced from their desire for better employability and livelihood.

It is the result of the communication revolution that connects students of the university with the development of the other parts of the country. The 3G services of state owned BSNL and a few leading private telephone companies, even if not the best in terms

of their services, are nevertheless available in the campus and nearby localities. It is due to increasing tele-density and smartphone users in the campus that all telecommunication companies have been investing in better infrastructure and lucrative schemes to lure the students, employees of the university and local dwellers towards their networks.

Statement of the Research Problem

This study aims to assess the penetration of mobile phones and the dependence of students on its facilities and contents for their education, information, career, social and entertainment needs, employment and convenience. This research also examines whether students' dependence on mobile phones influences their socio-economic behavior as well. In a nutshell the research seeks **to** examine and assess the penetration, consumption pattern and uses of the contents of mobile phones by the students of remote India to meet their educational, socio-economic and entertainment needs. The popularity of smartphones, and its wide uses, among the students will also be the focus of this study.

Objectives of the study

Studies on the various effects of mobile phones in different demographic and psychographic situations are numerous. The current study encompasses the impact of mobile phones, especially smartphones, on the students belonging to the low and middle income level group of families, studying in a university located in the remotest part of the country. The objectives of the study include the following. To :

(a) assess the penetration of mobile phones, especially the smartphone, among the students of a remote part of the country.

(b) examine the uses and periodic expenses made by students to avail mobile voice and data services from the service

provider.

(c) understand the usage patterns of different services of mobile telephony.

(d) comprehend the dependency of the students on mobile phones for meeting their social, economic, educational and entertainments needs.

Hypothesis for the Study

The pre-survey assumptions made on the basis of the personal experience, observation, informal interaction with the target group and review of literature include:

(a) the penetration of mobile phone in the campus is 100 %, and that of smartphone is growing at a rapid pace;

(b) the use of internet services on mobile handset among the students are growing thick and fast;

(c) rather than the basic voice service, the students are more inclined towards internet and value added services of mobile phones;

(d) the dependency of the students on mobile phones, especially smartphones, is gradually increasing towards meeting their social, economic, educational and entertainments needs.

Research Design

In total, 600 questionnaires, with 20 relevant questions related to the subject of the research, were asked to the respondents, selected irrespective of their social and economic backgrounds, but excluding the students hailing from districts other than Dindori, Umaria, Shahdol and Anuppur. The negligible percentage of students belonging to other states was also not included in the study.

A sample size of 600 students, representing 21.97% (nearly 22%) of the total population of 2730 students as per university records on 31st March 2016, was randomly chosen. If we exclude the students from places other than Madhya Pradesh, the figure does not even go beyond 2%. Therefore, it is assumed that the sample size of 600 students reasonably represents the basic socio-economic nature of the total population of the region.

A simple random sampling method was adopted to make the collected data unbiased, so there existed an equal opportunity for any student to be chosen to fill up the questionnaire. The randomly picked respondents, comprising a mix of students from rural, semi-urban and urban areas of the region, studying in undergraduate, post graduate courses, 5 year integrated courses and PhD programs, were asked to fill up the structured and pre-tested questionnaires.

Statistical Analysis

The collected primary data was coded, tabulated and analyzed statistically to draw interpretations from the study. Standardized statistical methods that include percentage analysis, cross tabulation, etc. were carried out to draw interpretations from the study.

Finding of the Study

When structured and pre-tested questionnaire were filled by the randomly picked students of the area, several interesting facts came to light. Although there was no deliberate effort in terms of selection, while tabulating the data, it was observed that 421 students out of 600 who filled questionnaires were in the age group of 16-20 years, a total of 172 students were in the age group of 21-25 years and only 7 students were in the age group of 26-30 years. The respondents were picked randomly. However, from the 600 students chosen, there was an equal number for both genders.

The findings of the collected data with the inferences made have been furnished below -

- From the study it has been observed that only 139 students out of 600, *i.e.* 23.16%, use normal bar phones, whereas 451 students, that equals to 75.16 % of total respondents ,use smartphones. A negligible percentage of respondents, *i.e.* 1.68%, have both smartphones and tabs. 78.83 % of students, that comprises of a total of 473 students, have dual SIM mobile phones.

- Out of the 600 respondents, the number of single SIM users is 109 and 5 students have mobiles phones with more than 2 SIM facilities. Only 72, *i.e.*12% of total respondents, are using Chinese, cheaper price range, mobiles phones, whereas Indian and international mobile phones were used by 56.5% and 31.41% respectively.

- 30.5% and 26.5% of the students use mobile phones with price ranges between Rs. 1000-3999 and Rs. 4000-6999 respectively, whereas 35% of the mobile phones users spent between Rs. 7000-9999 on buying their phones. The users having mobile phones costing rupees 10,000 and above is found to be 8%.

- Majority of the students (66.5%) spend between Rs. 100-399 monthly on mobile vouchers, 24.5% of the students spend a monthly voucher of between rupees 400-699. The percentage of users spending between rupees 700-999 is 7.5% and only 9 students (1.5%) were found spending rupees 1000 and above for their monthly mobile voucher.

- Most of the users (39.5%) have been using mobile phones for more than 2 years but less than 3 years, whereas 28% of the users were found using mobile phones for more than a year. The percentage of mobile phone users with duration of using for more than 3 years and less than 4 years is 14.5%. The percentage of respondents using mobile

phones for more than 4 years but less than 5 years is found to be 12.5%, whereas users of above 5 years are 5.5%.

- 73.5% carry mobile phones as a daily necessity. For 9.5% of students, carrying a mobile phone is a status symbol, equal percentage (*i.e.* 9.5%) of respondents carry mobile phones as it keeps them engaged and 7.5% have some other reasons to keep mobile phones.

- Majority of the respondents, *i.e.* 56.5%, discuss with family members while buying new mobile phones, whereas 21.5% of them discuss with peer groups. 13.5% gather online and offline information before making up their mind about buying new mobile phones. 3% of them take buying decisions after listening to shopkeepers. 4% of the respondents do not think much and 1.5% of them depend on other factors.

- For 47.5% of the students, the free accessories given along with mobile phones lure them to buy more of particular brands of mobile phones. For 36.5%, the brand matters a lot for buying a new mobile phone. Technology matters for 13.5% of them while the size of internal memory plays an important role in making purchase decisions for the remaining 2.5%.

- The majority of the respondents (43.5%) have 4 GB external memory card, while the percentage of students having 8 GB external memory card is 25.5%. 12.5% of the respondents have 16 GB external memory, 9.5% of them have 32 GB external memory and 9% with no external memory card for storing data.

- For calling, 465 students use mobile phones for voice calls only, 96 of them use for both voice and video calls and 40 students were found using SMS service with voice calls.

- 211 and 288 respondents use mobile phone for internet surfing and cross platform mobile messaging (example: Whatsapp, Hike etc.) respectively. 102 respondents use

mobiles for gaming, 82 for video recording and 92 for audio recording. 305 respondents listen to music and 87 tune in to local radio station. It should be noted that all respondents use mobiles for more than a single purpose. There were a few respondents using mobiles for all available facilities.

• 364 respondents, the highest of all options, spend 50% of their total monthly mobile phone expenditure on normal calling. 14.5% of the respondents, the highest number of respondents, spend 10% of their monthly mobile phone expenditure on video calling. A total of 170 students (28.33% of total respondent) spend 20% of their total monthly expenditure on internet surfing. 133 students (22.16% of the total students) spend 10% of their expenses on cross media messaging. More than 52% of the total respondents do not spend money on cross media messaging platforms.

• 165 students (27.5% of the total respondents) spend 50% of their monthly budget on mobile phone recharge vouchers. 141 students spend 30% of their monthly budget on internet packs and 48 students spend 20% of their monthly budget on buying SMS vouchers. These all percentages of monthly budgets with respect to the number of students are the highest in all respects.

• While netsurfing, the respondents indulge in different online and cross platform mobile messaging activities. 101 respondents (16.83%) engage in emailing, 217 of them (36.16%) in surfing for information and 282 respondents (47%) are involved in social media networking. The majority (51.83%) keep themselves busy in cross media platform mobile messaging (Whatsapp, Wechat, Hike etc.) and the least number of respondents *i.e.* 4.8% are involved in downloading heavy files. The netsurfing activities include 9.33% in online shopping, 14.83% in apps, 7.1% in e-recharge, 42.67% in e-banking and 26.1% in

online gaming. All respondents are involved in more than one activity and some of them are involved in all online activities mentioned in the questionnaire of the survey.

•   16.5% of the respondents use Wi-Fi/Bluetooth facility for message or text file sharing, 17% for video sharing, 15.5% for audio sharing and 16.5% for internet sharing. Most of them were found using the Wi-Fi/Bluetooth facility for more than one activity, such as 6.5% use Wi-Fi/Bluetooth facility for both message sharing and audio sharing, 4% of them share message, video, audio and internet, and 14.5% of the respondents for video and internet sharing. 6% of them are involved in video, audio and internet sharing with Wi-Fi/Bluetooth facility.

•   32% of the respondents feel that mobile phones keep them isolated from the real world and family bonding, whereas 35.5% of them do not feel so. 32.5% of them had the opinion that it depends on several other factors. When respondents were asked about the health hazards of mobile phones, 68% were aware of it whereas 32% of them were not aware of the health hazards of mobile phones.

An interaction session with 20 students from the sample was arranged to understand the rationale behind some of the interesting and notable findings of survey. The important inferences that the session suggested are as follows:

•   Even for the remotest corner of the country, the bar phones are becoming a thing of the past. More than ¾ of the total respondents carry smartphones with dual SIM facilities. The students suggested that a fall in the prices of smartphones in recent times and numerous facilities available in smartphones impel them to buy them, even if they cost a few hundred rupees more than normal bar phones. In fact, it came as a surprise that many SC, ST and OBC students spend their scholarship fund received from state government on buying smartphones. They were of the opinion that the cumulative amount of a year-long

scholarship amount is fair enough to buy a smartphone with fairly good configurations such as better memory, battery backup and processing speed, bigger screen size, attractive appearance and numerous other features in the price range between Rs 7000-9999.

- Although most of the students have started using mobile phones after they joined the university, they are well aware of the fact that the competitiveness of the mobile phone market reputed Indian and international mobile phone brands slash the prices of smartphones. They are of the opinion that poor durability and lack of trust have been the main reasons for the falling market of Chinese phones.

- Although the family plays a determining role in the buying decisions of a mobile phone, still the consciousness for reputed and durable brands among them is growing with the expansion of the market and the diffusion of information. Though, average monthly expenses on buying mobile phone vouchers is not significant, yet netsurfing among the students has been growing fast.

- The development of the mindset among the students that carrying a mobile phone all the time is a necessity is the key reason for the growth of mobile phone usage among students. Downloading caller tune, songs, music audio, music video, online games, apps and wall papers are sources of entertainment. With a rise in online activities, they recharge mobile vouchers, book tickets, shop, apply for jobs and courses, etc., from their mobile handsets. In fact, students spend a lot of their time and their internet data packs on searching for class assignments and day-to-day queries on Google, Wikipedia and e-books. Several available free apps have been assisting them in designing and preparing their class room and external practical presentations. A wide range of apps downloaded on their mobile phones keep them updated on weather, sports

(especially cricket), news, trains, fashion, entertainment, etc. Like the students of urban India, the internet on their mobile phones helps them share and post jokes, ideas, views, pictures, class assignments, departmental notices, etc. on social media and cross media platforms (Whatsapp, Wechat, Hike etc.).

• The interaction revealed an interesting reason for growing demand for bigger screen size and more external memory for mobile phones among students. They buy Bollywood and Chhattisgarhi songs, music videos, films, etc. from a weekly bazaar held nearby. They shared that depending on the popularity, demand and newness, the cost of such entertainment content varies from Rs. 50-100 per Gigabyte (GB) of data. In spite of staying in the remotest corner of the country, with a population of relatively low purchasing power, no cinema halls within a 100 kilometer radius and poor television density, they watch and store popular entertainment content on memory cards and prefer to watch them on bigger screen size mobile phones with friends and family. Besides getting connected to their near and dear ones, the ability of a smartphone in providing a world of entertainment is a good reason for them to believe that mobile phones do not isolate them from family and friends, but rather unite them.

Testing of Hypotheses

From a sample size of 600 students, picked randomly from the population of the students, it has been found that all respondents have mobile phones. It is found that more than three fourths of the total respondents (451 out 600 students) carry smartphones and less than one fourth of them have bar phones. Both the findings of the study prove the hypothesis that *the penetration of mobile phones on the campus is 100%, and that of smartphones is growing at a rapid pace*.

Looking at the uses of mobile phones for different purposes such as video and audio downloads, cross media platforms, uses of different apps, gaming, banking, shopping, e-recharge, e-book downloads and several other internet based activities, the assumption that the *use of internet services on mobile handsets among the students is growing fast in the university*. This also proves the pre-survey assumption that *the dependency of the students of the University on mobile phones, especially smartphones, is gradually increasing to meet their social, economic, educational, and entertainment needs.*

But the pre-survey assumption that *more than basic voice services, students are more inclined towards internet and value added services of mobile phones* is found to be partially true as the majority of them still use mobile phones for normal calling.

Conclusion

Indira Gandhi National Tribal University may be situated in one of the remotest corners of the country, but the penetration of mobile phone networks and the rise in the density of smartphones in the campus has been emerging as a noteworthy change agent in fulfilling different needs of the students.

Undoubtedly, the process of social and economic development of the area surrounding the university is slow, owing to several reasons, such as poor facilities of primary and secondary education, existence of poverty, absence of health care, low penetration of DTH television, and poor television density, difficult geographical topography, among several other factors, all leading to backwardness among the residents. In spite of the odds, the establishment of the university and the benefits of unprecedented mobile phone network facilities and availability of smartphones, at cheaper rates, have been instrumental in developing awareness, a desire for knowledge and information, encouragement of social changes and democratic participation. This facilitates the sharing of little moments of happiness online

with friends and relatives through social media and cross media platforms, fulfilling the wide range of entertainment needs and looking for employment and academic avenues among the students of the university.

Although, the students in one of the remotest parts of the country may have started reaping the benefits of the communication revolution a little later than those in more developed areas, there are nevertheless far reaching effects of mobile phone usage, which have been a big boon for meeting the educational, social, economic and entertainment needs of the students of the area and their families.

The current study successfully establishes the fact that the emergence of several Indian mobile phone manufacturing companies, availability of smartphones at cheaper rates, accessibility to a 3G network facility and competitive market tariffs can play crucial roles in the development of even the far-flung areas of the country in the near future.

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Imagining Daśapura, a *Tirtha-Nagara* : A Hermeneutical Study of an Urban Space

Ashish Kumar

Abstract

Daśapura is identified with the present day Mandasor, which is a headquarter town of the district of the same name in Madhya Pradesh. In the Nasik inscription of Nahapāna (circa 119-124 AD), the city is mentioned as *tirtha*. It appears as a *nagara* (city) as well as a capital city in the epigraphs of the mid-first millennium AD of the Aulikara dynasty of western Malwa. A perusal study of the epigraphs and literature shows that Daśapura, a *tirtha-nagara*, constituted a space, with coalesced spiritual and mundane spheres, where diverse socio-religious communities co-existed and professed their faiths. Sources help us in (de)constructing the various meanings attached to it by different communities/ authors/poets. By contextualizing these varied meanings, the present article attempts to map out the trajectory of the societal processes that shaped the religious-urban identity of this city roughly during the period of the first millennium AD. In addition, the present article studies Daśapura as a social space, which over a period became so important due to a possible presence of a school of Vedic studies here that it shaped the socio-religious identity (i.e., caste) of its brahmana inhabitants. The *tirtha-nagara* identity, different from a village and a forest, of Daśapura in this way connotes a religious-urban space that was without any distinctly

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marked boundaries of sacred and mundane worlds. Yet, it had been a space with multiple and changing meanings.

Keywords: Daśapura, *tirtha-nagara,* Mālava *gaṇa-saṇgha*, Aulikaras, Mādhyandina-Vājasanēya

> A city could have meanings which would not apply to other spaces; it could also mean different things to different people; it could even be felt differently, heard differently. The meaning of the city may be approached by trying to catch these meanings of difference.   (Chattopadhyaya, 2011).

The proponent of Indian feudalism, R. S. Sharma (1987: 167) argued that due to the urban and trade decline[1] in the early medieval period '…identity of the decaying towns was maintained by converting them into places of pilgrimage' across India. In his conceptualization, an urban space was a homogenized space that had been associated exclusively with the economic acts, and with the disappearance of such acts, it was transformed into another type of homogenized space, i.e., pilgrimage centre. Such perception, by denying the complexity, simplifies the interpretation of an urban space. A contrary picture of Sharma's argument is displayed by Daśapura as in its case a *tīrtha* (pilgrimage centre) was converted into a political centre. However,

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[1]The feudal age in India is divided into three phases: first phase (circa 300-750 AD), it witnessed the origin of feudalism. Second phase, (circa 750-1000 AD) is associated with the crystallization and consolidation of feudalism under three regional kingdoms, viz., the Rashtrakutas, the Gurjara-Pratiharas, and the Palas. The last and third phase (circa 1000-1200 AD) experienced the withering away of feudalism in India. R. S. Sharma links the origin of Indian feudalism with the changing fortunes of the Roman Empire in the west, which by the fourth-sixth century AD had declined. As a result, India's long distance trade increasingly deteriorated, causing economic and social crisis in Indian subcontinent (Sharma 1980 [1965]). See also, (Sharma 1987).

it does not mean that it lost its *tirtha* identity after becoming a capital city of the Aulikara dynasty. The Aulikaras, who were subordinates of the Gupta monarchs of Pataliputra, were present in the western Malwa of Madhya Pradesh in the fifth-sixth century AD. In the epigraphs and literature of about the mid-first millennium AD, Daśapura is often mentioned as a *pura* (forth) or *nagara* (city), indicating its urban character. Hence, in the present article a term *tirtha-nagara* is used to highlight the religious +urban character, shaped by the multiple societal processes, of this city. The trajectory of these societal processes have been varied but interrelated and the present study aims to map out these processes through an analysis of epigraphs and literature. In addition, the present article through a panoptical view also, attempts to (de)construct the varied meanings attributed to this city in the epigraphs and literature of about the first millennium AD.

In the course of the first millennium AD, Daśapura witnessed the rise and fall of several dynasties. While epigraphs of several dynasties are used to substantiate and shape the major arguments, this paper focuses more on the epigraphs belonging to the Aulikara dynasty. Due to its geo-strategic location, Malwa had provided a passage that linked northern India to the Deccan and further south on the one hand, and to the western seacoast on the other (Spate et. al., 1967: 624-25), and therefore, it is often called the gateway to the south. As a result, Malwa saw the rise of several urban centres including Daśapura, Ujjayinī, Vidiśā and so forth, along the important trade routes. Noticeably, when one entered from north-west into Malwa, one of the first major stoppages had been Daśapura.

Sacred Space: Conglomeration of Sects and Beliefs

Daśapura is identified with the present day Mandasor, which is a headquarter town of the district of the same name. It was situated in the Malwa region of the western Madhya Pradesh on the bank of Siwana River - a tributary of river Sipra (Law, 1984: 281). Situated in Malwa on a trans-regional route, this city came into existence

sometime prior to the second century AD. The Nasik inscription of Nahapāna (c. 119-24 AD), which is the earliest epigraph providing information related to Daśapura, mentions that:

> ...Ushavadata, Dinika's son, son-in-law of King Nahapana, the Kshaharata Kshatrapa... has given eight wives to Brahmanas at religious tirtha (*punyatirthe*) of Prabhasa, who at **Bharukachha, Daśapura, Govardhana** and **Sorparaga** has given the shelter of quadrangular rest-houses (*chatusalavasadhapratisryapradena*), who has made wells, tanks (*tadaga*) and gardens (*arama*), who has out of charity established free ferries by boats on the Iba, Parada, Damana, Tapi, Karabena and Dahanuka, and erected on both banks of these rivers shelters (*sabha*) for meeting... (Senart, 1905-06: 78-79; emphasis mine).

In above passage, Daśapura, clubbed with several other religious centres, is mentioned as a *tirtha,*[2] where Ushavadata had erected quadrangular rest houses (*catusala*) seemingly for the travelers or devotees visiting this place (Bhandarkar, 1883: 142). Apparently, Ushavadata had visited all the mentioned places for the performance of religious rites. It suggests that Daśapura had developed close links with places like Govardhana (Nasik), Sorparaga (Sopara) and Bharukaccha (Broach) of western India.[3] Particularly important are the Sorparaga and Bharukaccha, which were important sea ports associated with overseas trade with the

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[2] The term *tirtha* refers to: a passage, way, road, ford, stairs for landing or for descent into a river, bathing place, place of pilgrimage on the banks of sacred streams, and piece of water (Monier-Williams 1993 [1899]: 449).

[3] The point is further reinforced by another inscription from Nasik of the early centuries of the Christian era. This inscription informs us about a person named Śaka Vudhika, son of Viṇudata. He had come from Daśapura *(Daśapuravāthavasa)* to Govardhana (modern Nasik). By profession he was a writer *(lekhakasa=lēkhaka),* who donated a cave *(leṇa)* and two cisterns *(poʔhi)* to mendicants at Nasik (Senart 1905-06a: 95).

Roman Empire in the early centuries of the Christian era. The *tirtha* identity of Daśapura continued in subsequent centuries. A fifth century AD fragmentary inscription from Mandasor informs us that a 'tank, (*with water*) to be drunk by all creatures with pleasure' (*sa[rvva-satvā(ttvā)nā?] sukha-pē[yō ja]lā*), was excavated by the Manavayani king Gauri for the increase of his deceased mother's merit in the suburb of Daśapura (*nagar-ābhyāsē*) (Sircar, 1953-54: 130, 132). Noticeable here is the use of the term *nagara* (city) in relation to Daśapura. Nevertheless, it has been a practice to make religious donations at pilgrim centres, in the name of a deceased family member for his/her religious merit in early India.[4]

Even though a social space was transformed into a *tirtha-nagara*, in our case Daśapura, its meaning never remained static or singular. Rather, it through a process of politico-cultural changes assumed multiple meanings. It implies that a particular space, due to a complex process of socio-political changes, was attributed with new meanings, and this act of attribution had been caused as well as performed by the human agency. As being 'a substitute for the Vedic *yajňa*,' a *tirtha,* in Puranic literature, attains greater ritual significance (Nath, 2009: 170), its popularization as a ritual space took place at a time, when the state-society was spreading in outlying tribal areas, where Brahmanism was absent or less influential earlier. The resultant absorption of tribal population in state-society, along with the gradual imbibing of brahmanical values and shedding off the tribal habits, marked the transformation of a tribal space.[5] As Henri Lefebvre (1991: 52, 82-

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[4]According to Vijay Nath (2007: 16), certain practices such as: 'celebrating special festivals, ritual bathing, tonsuring, making *dāna,* offering *pūja,* circumambulation, performing ancestral rites and also committing religious suicide' had been more or less common to all types of *tirthas.*

[5]The term pre-state refers to various types of socio-political systems such as tribe, pastoral-nomads, oligarchies, and chiefships that lacked complex political and social structure. Contrary to it, state refers to a socio-political structure that, in context of early India, was intimately associated with Brahmanical monarchical ideology, *varṇa-jāti* social hierarchy, and agrarian production. See, Chattopadhyaya (1994: 14-34) for a discussion on the transition from pre-state to state society.

83) argues that each mode of production forms a social space conducive to it, the change from one mode to another is accompanied by the production of a new social space. He further adds that each social space 'implies, contains, and dissimulates social relationships.' It means 'that a space is not a thing but rather a set of relations between things (objects and products).' Following it, it appears that the matrix of social relations shaped the character, thereby identity, of Daśapura, which as being a sacred space, witnessed the construction and maintenance of different shrines, associated with varied sects and beliefs in the first millennium AD.

The presence of a *K??ṇa* shrine, adjoining an orchard in Daśapura, is recorded in an inscription (404-405 AD) of the reign of the Aulikara ruler Naravarman. An orchard was donated to this shrine by a person named Satya, who had been a trader (Bhandarkar et. al., 1981: 265). Similarly, the Mandasor inscription of Kūmaragupta-I and Bandhuvarman informs us about a Sun temple (*bhavana? ravēh*), which had been built by a guild of silk weavers (*śrēṇī*) in 437-38 AD. Having broad and lofty spires (*vistīrṇṇa-tu?ga-śikhara?*) like a mountain, the Sun temple was situated as a beautiful crest-jewel in the western ward (*paśchima-purasya*) of Daśapura *(Bhandarkar et. al. 1981: 326, 330).* In a same way, the Risthal inscription (515-516 AD) records that:

> 'He [ye? = Bhagavaddoṣa] had constructed in Daśapura the Prakāśeśvara temple, the symbol of Bhāratavarṣa (India), at the command of that king (Prakāśadharman);
>
> and, within that same city, a beautiful shrine of Brahman, measuring out, so it seemed, the sky with its spires that block the clouds.
>
> He (also) built a shrine to Kṛṣṇa and one to Bujjuka as a refuge for ascetics who devoted themselves to (the practice of) Sāṅkhya and Yoga.' (Salomon, 1989: 8-9).

The construction of temples and donation of wells, tanks, and rest houses in Dharmashastric and Puranic literature is projected as a meritorious act. As the Puranic religion became popular across

the Indian subcontinent, the concept of *i??a* and *Pūrta* was formulated and popularized. According to this concept, whatever was offered in the three-*śrauta* fires and the gifts made inside the *vedi* (in *śrauta* sacrifices), they were all termed *i??a*. Unlike this, donation of wells and tanks, building of temples, distribution of food and maintenance of public gardens, were called *pūrta* (Kane, 1974: 842). Such ritual development introduced by Brahmanical ideologues, unlike the Vedic religion with well-defined rituals (*i??a*) and related exclusivity to the upper castes, had a far wider appeal. The *Pūrta* concept is related to the ritual acts (such as making *dana*, observing festivals, collective bathing in sacred rivers/ tanks on auspicious days, erection of temples, idol worship, circumambulation, and listening to Pruanic tales, etc.), which required little investments, and had been accessible even to women as well as shudras (Thapar, 2002: 318-319; Nath, 2001: 21-22, 35-38). These *Pūrta* rituals, by the early medieval period, became a part of the spatial existence of *tirthas*. As a result, a sacred space, *tirtha* assumed a distinct socio-ritual meaning of its own.

The epigraphs, besides showing the popularity of Brahmanism, also highlight the popularity of Buddhism within the realm of Aulikaras, who were ruling from their capital city Daśapura. The Bihar Kotra inscription of Aulikara king Naravarman (417-18 AD), for example, 'records the digging of a reservoir in the name of the *bhikshusa?gha* of the four quarters for the quenching of thirst of all beings.' The reservoir was gifted by a person named Vīrasēna, son of Bhaṭṭimahara (Chakravarti, 1941-42: 130-132). Interestingly, two other inscriptions of the fifth century AD from Bihar-Kotra (in Raigharh district) also indicate the presence of a much older Buddhist *vihāra* in the realm of the Aulikaras (Rao, 1982-83: 121)[6]. Similarly, from Dhamnar is found a clay seal with the legend: *Chanda-nagiri Mahāvihara,* in the fifth- sixth century AD script (Ghosh, 1960-61: 60). Dhamnar is located at a distance of about 106

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[6] The editor of the two Bihar-Kotra inscriptions does not provide the original text, and some parts of his translation appear to be wrong.

km from Mandasor town within Mandasor district, and a fourth-fifth century AD complex of Buddhist monuments has been found here. Both the sites, Bihar-Kotra and Dhamnar apparently were situated within the realm of the Aulikaras. The Mandasor inscription of Prabhākra (467-68 AD) records the gift of a *stupa*, a well, and a garden to the Lōkōttara monastery (*vihāra*) by Dattabhata, an official of king Prabhakra. The Lōkōttara monastery apparently had been named after the Hīnayānist sect Lōkōttaravādin. The inscription records that:

> 'Wishing to requite, however inadequately, the obligations of his parents, and for the attainment of good luck (i.e., heavenly bliss) by them, he dug a well full of waters as deep as those of the ocean, accompanied by a *stūpa*, a *prapā*[7] and an *ārāma*[8] par excellence.
>
> People derive comfort by frequently drinking its water, cool (refreshing) as the meeting of dear friends, pure as the mind of sages and wholesome as the words of elders...
>
> This *stūpa*, accompanied by a well, had been constructed (in commemoration) of Him (the Buddha)...' (Garde, 1947-48: 12-18).

The king Prabhakra is called 'the fire to the trees in the form of the enemies of the race of the Guptas.' It means he was a subordinate of the Gupta rulers. In addition, Dattabhata, an official of Prabhakara, had been a son of Vayurakshita, a military commander of the Gupta king Govindagupta (Garde, 1947-48: 17). M. B. Garde informs us that the 'stone on which the inscription is engraved was found stuck up in the inner face of the east wall of the fort[9] at

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[7] A cistern or reservoir.

[8] A park; a grove or monastery.

Mandasor.' He further adds that this 'stone, characters and style of engraving of our inscription are strikingly similar to those of the Mandasor inscription of Kumaragupta I and Bandhuvarman, which was recorded only five years later than our inscription' (Garde, 1947-48: 12). Based on such circumstantial information related to the epigraph, it is possible to speculate the presence of the Lōkōttara monastery in or near Daśapura.

Noticeably, unlike Brahmanism and Buddhism, the presence of Jainism in Daśapura is suggested by the Jain non-canonical literature. As being different from epigraphs[10], the literature conceived the fictional space of Daśapura in a narrative form, and such fictionalization of space refers to 'the world of abstraction, what's in the head rather than in the body' of an author (Merrifield, 2006: 109). Thus, instead of reading early Indian literature in general as a repository of descriptive truth, the underlying perception of its authors needs our attention for deciphering the varying meanings attributed to an urban space. It is because an author, in his narrative, reconstructs the web of social relations in spatial and temporal context. In this way, the 'special contribution of literature is its vision, its intuitive grasp of structure, its perspective'. In fact, more crucial in relation to literature is the way 'the facts' are 'seen by the imaginative accuracy of a mind'. Therefore, without entering 'the realm of the symbolic values that the writer expresses through the 'facts' and 'objective entities,' the facts themselves would be commonplace or misunderstood' (Ramanujan, 2012 [1999]: 52-53).

The Jain authors by including Daśapura (and several other prominent cities of early India) in the grand narratives, for instance, of the *Paumacariyam,* the *Pauma-Cariu, the Vasudevahiṇ?i,*

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[9] The fort, which was built by using remains of old and ruined temples and shrines, had been founded by Ala-ud-din Khalji (1296-1316 AD) and later extended extensively by Hoshang Shah of Malwa (1405-1434 AD) (Garde, 1947-48: 12, foot note 5).

[10]See, Salomon (1998) for a discussion on the peculiar characteristics of epigraphic sources.

and the *Trişaşţiśalākāpuruşacarita* had associated this city with the Jain doctrine, legends, and religion. Such 'production of religious narratives,' constitutes the ways 'in which communities remember, retell and rearticulate crucial aspects of their historic identity' (Brace et. al., 2006: 31). These narratives, through constructed myths, can invent a religious identity, either fictive or real, of a particular urban space. Thus, Daśapura, after becoming a part of Jain mythology by the mid first millennium AD, was raised to the status of an imagined sacred landscape that was essentially Jain. A few examples from Jain literature of early India would be sufficient to highlight this point.

The *Paumacariyam* of Ācārya Vimalasūri (circa third century AD) narrates the visit of Rama, Lakshmana and Sita to several cities, located in various parts of India, during their itineraries. One of the cities that the trio had visited, after being exiled, was Daśapura (*Dasauranayara/ Daśapuranagara*). According to this Jain version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Daśapura was the capital of a king named Vajrakarna, who had been subordinated to Ujjayinī king Sinhodar. The text mentions that Vajrakarna, after embracing Jainism, vowed to bow only before Jinas and Jain monks (Nirgrantha sages). Therefore, he refused to bow before his overlord Sinhodar, who took it as an insult and in fury seized Vajrakarna's capital Daśapura. Rama and Lakshmana, who are shown in this text as being devout Jain, helped Vajrakarna against Sinhodar. Eventually, after much hardship, due to their mediation the strife between Vajrakarna and Sinhodar was resolved (Vora, 2005: 263-271). The same story appears again in the *Pauma-Cariu* of Svayambhudeva (mid eighth century AD), which highlights the presence of Jain temples in Daśapura (*Dasaurapura*) (Jain, 2002: 65-111). The *Paumacariyam* and the *Pauma-Cariu* also associate Daśapura to Ujjayinī, which was another prominent city of the Malwa in pre-modern India.

Likewise, a story in the *Vasudevahiṇdi* (mid first millennium AD) mentions an expert archer Agadadatta, who was 'deputed to Daśapura as emissary to king Amittadamana by the king' of Ujjayinī. Agadadatta went to Daśapura along with his family. He

met the king Amittadamana there, and conveyed the royal message as well as presented the gifts. In return, he was honored and provided with appropriate lodging. The same story further mentions the presence of Jain monks in Daśapura (Jain, 1977: 610-611). Daśapura is mentioned as *Daśapuranagara* in an encyclopedic Jain text, the *Niśītha Cūrṇi* of Jinadāsa Gaṇi (seventh century AD) (Sen 1975: 67, 341). The *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita* of Ācārya Śrī Hemacandra (eleventh-twelfth century AD) narrates the establishment of Daśapura by a king Udāyana of Vītabhaya. According to this text, after defeating the king Pradyota of Avanti, king Udāyana encamped at a place, where Daśapura was established subsequently, due to heavy rain. At this place ten other kings, (seemingly subordinate/allies of Udayana) built a wall of earth for their protection. Later when Udayana and other kings left the camp, it remained inhabited by the merchants. Subsequently, this encampment came to be known as Daśapura (Johnson 1962: 303-304). Similar information is provided by another non-canonical Jain text, *Pariś* i*?a Parvan* of Hemacandra (eleventh-twelfth century AD). According to this text, Daśapura was established as well as fortified by Udayana, and it was named Daśapura by the traders, who had come here for trade (Gupta, 1973: 69). Such stories, referring to Daśapura in different spatial and temporal contexts in relation to Jainism, show that this town had been a part of the sacred geography of the Jains.

Political Space: Intersecting Sacred and Mundane Worlds

As it appears from the above discussion, Daśapura was a centre of Puranic Hinduism, with substantial popularity of Buddhism and Jainism. Yet, the city space was not simply a shared sacred space. Rather, it could also be read 'as the reflections and reproductions of religious and social desires and anxieties' (Brace et. al. 2006: 30). It has been pointed out that 'the aspiring ruling chieftains build and control popular cultic shrines and pilgrimage centers' in order to 'acquire the much needed religious sanction and popular backing for their political power' (Nath, 2001a: 134; 2009: 175). It implies

that the very selection of Daśapura by the Aulikara rulers as their capital in about fourth century AD reflects their desire to seek spiritual sanction for their political authority. It makes the sacred landscape of this city an instrument, which could be employed to fulfill a political desire. As the Aulikaras, a monarchical authority, had emerged from the Mālava *gaṇa-saṇgha,*[11] which had been an oligarchy, they needed to legitimize their political claims, and for it, they transformed a pilgrimage centre into their political seat. Noticeably, the rise of the Aulikaras represents the salient example of the transition from pre-state to state society.[12]

One of the earliest references to Mālava *gaṇa-saṇgha* is found in Pāṇini's *Ashtadhyayi*, in which they are mentioned as *āyudhajīvin-saṇgha,* i.e., the Mālavas who 'lived by the profession of arms' (Agrawala, 1953: 434). Initially, they lived in the North Western frontier region, i.e., Punjab, but after their defeat at the hands of Alexander in the fourth century BC, they migrated to Rajasthan. Here they carved out an independent principality by the second century BC, with a capital named Mālavanagara (modern Nagar or Karkotanagar in Tonk District).[13] The noticeable point concerning Mālavas[14] is that they not only survived but also maintained their

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[11]The *gaṇa-sanghas* are generally called republics and oligarchies, referring to a social-political structure in which clan chiefs, belonging to different families, governed territories 'through an assembly, of which they along were members.' In this way, they lacked single monarchical authority, and as Romila Thapar (2002: 146-150) characterizes 'they might be pre-states or proto-states, and at any rate, different from kingdoms.' See also (Sharma 2009 [1959]: 119-132).

[12]See above, footnote number 5.

[13]Nandsa Yupa inscription (225 AD) refers to a king Śrī-Sōma of Sogin clan, belonging to *Mālava-va?śa*. He is mentioned to have performed an *Eka?a??rātra* sacrifice (Altekar 1947-48: 252-267). It has been suggested by D. C. Sircar (1969: 7-8) that this family of Sogins possibly ruled over the parts of the present day Udaipur as an official or vassals of the Mālava *gaṇa-saṇgha*.

[14] They were the earliest people in India who used an era, which has been identified with the Vikrama-Samvat of 57/58 BC (K?aera). It is generally associated with the ruler named Vikrama, whose identity is yet to be established. However, recent findings have conclusively established that the era of 57/58 BC was in fact established by a Śaka ruler Azes- I either as an era or as his regal reckoning (Chakravarti 2010: 174).

gaṇa-saṇgha identity intact in spite of being defeated and subordinated by the two mighty empires of early India, viz., the Mauryas and the Ku?ānas. It was the Gupta king Samudragupta, who defeated the Malāvas and reduced them to the status of a subordinate in the fourth century AD. Possibly, after their defeat, they moved to the western parts of the Madhya Pradesh and one of their branches founded the Aulikara dynasty at Daśapura (Sircar, 1969: 1-22; Chaudhuri, 1948: 172-179). The Aulikara genealogy shows that possibly the earliest ruler was Jayavarman, who was followed by his son Si?havarman and grandson Naravarman. Naravarman was followed by Viśvavarman, whose son was Bandhuvarman (Bhandarkar et. al., 1981: 86, 262-263). During the reign of two Aulikara rulers- Prakāśadharman and Yaśodharman, the Aulikaras managed to attain freedom from the Gupta allegiance. They also conclusively defeated the Hūṇas (Ramesh and Tewari, 2008: 99, 101; Fleet, 1970 [1888]: 146-148). Noticeably, after Yaśodharman, no information about the Aulikara rulers is available. From the epigraphical records, pertaining to Daśapura, of the Maitrakas, the Gurjara-Pratihāras, and the Guhilas, it appears that after the Aulikaras the city came under different political authorities at different times. However, it also appears that except Aulikaras no other political authority made Daśapura its capital city. Yet it remained an important administrative as well as sacred centre.[15]

The important ideological change that took place by the fourth century AD had been the emergence of 'monarchy' as a paramount political system (Chattopadhyaya, 2012 : 20). The Vedic polity, based on 'semi-pastoral and clan based society in the process of' sedentarization, revolved around the Vedic sacrifices, which were accompanied by the lavish feasts and animal killings. The Vedic sacrifice exhibits the nature of Vedic polity, according to which

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[15]According to an inscription from Mandasor, in 1519 AD, Daśapura (Daśapura-nagare) was governed by a subordinate ruler named Asokamala, of the king *Sa?grāmasi?ha* of *Kumbhalmera* (Sircar 1953-54a: 192).

society worked as a "great feeding chain' where the higher orders fed off the lower.' This polity based on 'agonistic concepts' gave way to 'irenic ideas' with the emergence of monarchies. By the Gupta period the concept of *mātsyanyāya* (anarchy =law of the fishes, i.e., big fish eats the smaller fish) was firmly established, and with this the king came to be seen as "consuming' the people (*viś*) but by protecting his realm' (Ali 2003: 224; 2006: 96-99). In this way, the kings who in the Vedic times were merely the heads of tribes (*janasya gopati*) became ideologically by the early medieval period 'the sole landowner or *bhūsvāmin*, commonly known as *bhūpati*' (Sharma, 2009: 194-195). In epigraphs, they came to be depicted as the enjoyer of their realm. The inscription from Mandasor, for example, depicts Aulikara king Yasodharman as:

> He who, spurning (the confinement of) the boundaries of his own house, enjoys (bhuktā) those countries, - thickly covered over with deserts and mountains and trees and thickets and rivers and strong-armed heroes, (and) having (their) kings assaulted by (his) prowess,- which were not enjoyed (even) by the lords of the Guptas... (Fleet, 1970: 146-148; emphasis mine).

The element of pleasure was associated with kingship by the mid first millennium AD, and as a result, the body of a king, in epigraphs, came to embody both physical strength as well as sensual pleasures. The Mandasor inscription of Kūmaragupta-I and Bandhuvarman reinforces this point. In this epigraph, king Bandhuvarman is described as:

> He is handsome, young, fit for battles, and possessed of modesty; a king though he is, he is not accessible to such intoxicants as self-conceit and others; he shines like the incarnation of Erotic Sentiment, even when without decoration; in point of beauty he is as it were a second God of Love;

> Even to-day, when the long eyed beautiful women of (his) enemies, afflicted by the fierce calamity of widowhood, remember him, a tremor springs up through fright causing torture to (their) compact breast.

> ...Bandhuvarman, a bull among kings, the magnanimous (and) the high-shouldered one, was protecting this (town of) Daśapura... (Bhandarkar et. al., 1981: 330-331).

The kings also claimed an association with the divinity through the performance of rituals, and construction of temples, wells, ponds, etc. for political legitimization. Apparently, a change in the notion of kingship brought the two worlds: 'profane/mundane' and 'sacred/spiritual', together. The construction of temples and the donation of lands as well as several utility works (e.g., wells, tanks, etc.) to a particular deity, raised the deity to the position of an owner, who was supposed to enjoy these donated items in return for grace and prosperity. The deity in a temple became a divine counterpart of the ruling king. The elaborate worship, comprising lavish rituals, donations, music, and dance, of the deity can also be seen as a link between the spiritual and mundane worlds (Ali, 1996: 159-160; Nath, 2001a: 135; 2009: 178). As the pleasure became a part of literary imagination, the kings on the one hand were linked to the divine qualities, and the gods on the other hand were increasingly humanized. As a result, the city space, such as that of the Daśapura, became an arena where both mundane and spiritual worlds, constituted by social relations, coalesced in the literary imagination. The city at the same time also became a material space that could be enjoyed by both a king as well as a deity.

Daśapura Brahmanas: Formation of a Communal Identity

'(social) space is a (social) product.' (Lefebvre, 1991: 26).

The interplay of diverse social communities, coming from different societal classes or groups like rulers, officials, artisans, and so forth, shaped the socio-cultural character of Daśapura. This

city on the one hand was a *tirtha,* visited by various devotees, and on the other hand, it was a *nagara* inhabited by various social groups indulged in both ritual and mundane acts. The city was thus composed of multiple intertwining social relations, which provided an organized identity to it. Yet, noticeable is the fact that this organized identity was not pre-given. Rather, it had evolved over a period. The act of identity construction 'necessitates the social construction of difference, which involves the creation of sociospatial boundaries and the cultural distinctions between insiders and outsiders, between self-image (individual) and the group image (society)' (Brace et. al., 2006: 35). Hereby, an organized identity of Daśapura as *tirtha-nagara* distinguished it from other spaces such as a village and a forest (See next section). At the same time, this organized identity is linked to a supra-regional identity 'Bhāratavarṣa' in the Risthal inscription (515 AD) of Aulikara king Prakāśadharman. The inscription mentions that the Prakāśeśvara temple was built in Daśapura, as the symbol of Bhāratavarṣa or Indian subcontinent, at the command of Prakāśadharman. Noticeably, the supra-regional identity, Bhāratavarṣa, which first appeared in the Hāthīgumphā inscription of Khāravela in the first century BC in relation to northern India[16], was subsequently attributed to the entire Indian subcontinent in the Puranic literature.

The Indian subcontinent, 'as a geographical space' has been 'a land of interlocking regions' and these 'geographically contiguous and interlocking regions' developed a 'greater cultural affinity' through 'human agency' over a period. Noticeably, the 'interactional process,' caused by human agency, 'developed over time a reference point to which heterogeneous cultural elements and geographical spaces could relate.' This reference point has been 'the idea of Bhāratavarṣa,' which comprised 'the vast range of

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[16] The term Bhāratavarsha (Bharadhavasa) in the Hāthīgumphā inscription of Khāravela refers to north India, particularly the Ganga valley (Jayaswal, 1929-30: 78).

diverse, even contradictory, traits of different localities, sub-regions, and regions' (Chattopadhyaya, 2014). Following it, it appears that the Prakāśeśvara temple, named after the patron king Prakāśadharman, not only symbolized the political might of the Aulikara king, but also the preeminent position of their capital city. In addition, the Risthal inscription, expressing a link between Daśapura and Bhāratavarṣa, also introduces a separate cultural identity of Daśapura in the sixth century context. The *tirtha-nagara* identity of this city, recorded in both epigraphic and literary sources, represents an act of identity construction by several authors and patrons.[17] Nevertheless, an urban space, after assuming a distinct socio-cultural identity, through the efforts of various social groups, in return shaped the communal identity of its inhabitants, particularly the brahmanas.[18]

The Mandasor inscription of Kūmaragupta-I and Bandhuvarman (437-38 and 473-74 AD) informs us about a guild (*srēṇi*) of silk weavers, which patronized the construction as well as

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[17] The social space comprises 'social actions' -committed by 'both individual and collective' as well as diverse kinds of 'objects, both natural and social including networks and pathways which facilitate the exchange of material things and information.' Interestingly, a social space also comprises several other social spaces as none of the space vanishes in the process of 'growth and development'. In fact, different social spaces, through 'pathways and networks' are interconnected to or interpenetrated with or sometimes superimposed on, each-others. Hence, a local space is never 'absorbed by the regional [or] national' space. Rather the national space 'embraces the regions' as well as locals. In this way, 'each fragment of space' comprises not a single but multiple spaces, thereby, multiple 'social relationship(s)' (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 33, 77, 86- 88).

[18] In the first millennium AD, the brahmanas expert in rituals, Vedic-Shastric literature, and priestly activities, almost across India, received land grants in the form of agricultural fields, villages, forest tracts, and so forth, from the rulers of different dynasties. In most of the cases, due to land grants brahmana donees had to migrate into new areas away from their original homeland. These brahmana donees often carried their regional identities with them into new areas, where the donated land was located, and over a period, their regional identities were transformed into distinct caste identities. See, (Sharma, 2007: 204-206).

repair of a sun temple in Daśapura. This inscription also points out the presence of brahmanas in Daśapura, who according to this inscription:

> … are endowed with truthfulness, forgiveness, self-control, quiescence, religious vows, purity, fortitude, study of Vēda, proper conduct, modesty and understanding, and who are store of knowledge and penance (and yet) free from conceit, shines like the sky with the glowing planets… (Bhandarkar et. al., 1981: 328).

The same inscription interestingly was composed by a brahmana named *Vatsabhaṭṭi* - a resident of Daśapura.[19] It is noticeable that *Vatsabhaṭṭi* was not only the composer of this inscription but had also been an architect of the Sun temple (Bhandarkar et. al. 1981: 332). The Risthal inscription also informs us about the presence of the ascetics associated with Sāńkhya and Yoga in Daśapura (Salomon 1989: 9). In addition, the presence of several brahmanas, particularly those associated with the Mādhyandina-Vājasanēya school, in Daśapura is highlighted by the epigraphs of the subsequent centuries.

Two Sankheda inscriptions of Dadda II (dated 20 April 642 AD), for example, mention a *bharadvāja gōtra* brahmana Surya, who had been a student of the Mādhyandina-Vājasanēyas school. Before emigrating to the village Kṣīrasara, Surya is mentioned to have been living in Daśapura (Mirashi 1955: 75-81). The Nogawa copper plates grant of Dhruvasēna II (640-41 AD) records a donation of land to two *pārāśara gōtra* brahmana brothers, viz., Dattasvāmin and Kumārasvāmin, belonging to Mādhyandina-Vājasanēyas school. Interestingly, whereas Dattasvāmin belonged to the *trivēdins* of Daśapura, his brother Kumarasvāmin belonged to the *chaturvēdins* of Daśapura (Hultzsch 1905-06: 194-

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[19]According to A. L. Basham (1993: 93), *Vatsabhaṭṭi* was a brahmana.

195). The presence of both *trivēdins* and *chaturvēdins,* indicates a prevalent social hierarchy, based on Vedic knowledge and expertise, among brahmanas at Daśapura. In addition, the very reference to the place (i.e., Daśapura) of origin of these brahmanas in the Nogawa epigraphs suggests the increasing importance of a spatial identity in the social life of a brahmana community. However, the most interesting point is that the brahmanas named Surya, Dattasvāmin and Kumarasvāmin, all belonged to Mādhyandina-Vājasanēya school. Their association with the same school of Vedic studies increases the possibility of Daśapura's being a centre of Vedic learning. The expression 'Mādhyandina-Vājasanēya' refers to the school of *White-Yajurveda* or study of *White-Yajurveda*, which has been ascribed to the sage Yajnavalkya. According to the legend, the original *Yajurveda* was taught by the sage Vaisampsyana to his student Yajnavalkya, who due to his teacher's anger was made to forget all of it. Yajnavalkya then prayed to the Sun and in return received the knowledge of *Yajurveda* (Monier-Williams, 1960: 809, 938).

It means that the brahmanas associated with the Mādhyandina-Vājasanēya school have been experts in the *White-Yajurveda* and possibly a school associated with it was located in Daśapura. As the *White-Yajurveda* was associated with the Sun, the presence of Mādhyandina-Vājasanēya school in Daśapura seemingly also popularised the Sun worship here. The Mandasor inscription of Kūmaragupta-I and Bandhuvarman, for example, records the construction as well as repair of a sun temple in Daśapura by a silk weaver's guild. A later date inscription of the time of Pratihāra (946 AD) informs us about a *maṭha* of Hari Ṛṣīśvara, who was a resident of Daśapura. This monastery (*maṭha*), comprising the shrines of Indrāditya-dēva (Sun), Vaṭa-yakṣiṇī, and Trailōkya-mōhana-dēva, had been situated in a place named Ghōṇṭa-Varśika Ghōṇṭa-Varśika, near Daśapura (Ojha, 1917-18: 173). This inscription hence illustrates continuity in the worship of the sun in Daśapura or in the region in which this city was located.

Furthermore, the brahmanas of Daśapura gained so much importance during the medieval period that in the Chitorgadh stone inscription (AD 1428-1429) they collectively came to be grouped as *daśpura-jñānti,* meaning a close community or clan or *jāti=* caste(?) (Sircar, 1966: 137). This inscription was composed by a brahmana named Ekanātha, a son of *Bah?ā*[20] Vishṇu of Daśapura (*k?hrimaddaśpurajñāntirbha?āvishṇu*) in praise of Guhila prince Mokala of Mewad, who had built a Śiva temple at Chitrakū?a (i.e., Chitorgadh) (Kielhorn, 1894: 408-421). Being an important development, it marked the crystallization of a socio-ritual communal identity, which had been derived from an urban centre. This caste identity still exists in modern times and the presence of Dasora or Dasor brahmanas in the Malwa region reinforces this point.[21]

Intertwined Spaces

In the early Indian literary tradition, space and time are neither uniform nor neutral, 'but have properties, varying specific densities that affect those who dwell in them' (Ramanujan, 2012: 45). It implies that different spaces, viz., cities, villages, and forests have distinct characteristics as well as impacts on its dwellers. In a similar way, distinct units of time, viz., days, months, and seasons were either auspicious or inauspicious; different seasons were considered fit for different human acts. The Mandasor inscription (404-05 AD), for example, records that an orchard was donated to the shrine of *K?ṇa,* in Daśapura by a person named Satya after:

> ...the auspicious **rainy season**… [when the] corn-wreathed earth, with replenished rice and fodder [had been] adorned with *kāśa* flowers. (Bhandarkar et. al. 1981: 265; emphasis mine).

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[20] It is noticeable that the term *Bah?ā* was 'a title of respect attached to the names of the learned Brāhmaṇas' (Sircar, 1966: 51).

[21] The Dasora or Dasor brahmanas derive their name from the city Daśapura, identified with present day Mandasor in Madhya Pradesh. At present, they are considered a part of Nagar brahmana community (Shrivastav, 1971: 141).

Likewise, the Risthal inscription (515-516 AD) records that the Prakāśeśvara temple, in Daśapura, was built by Bhagavaddoṣa:

> ...in **the summer** when Puṣpaketu (Kāma) was blooming within the fountain rooms that were peopled by young women who were overcome by the heat of the sun. (Salomon, 1989: 8-9; emphasis mine).

In the above cited epigraphs the human acts, such as religious donations or gifts, are seen in relation to distinct spaces and times. The nature of such relations is expressed, in early Indian literature as well as epigraphs, in the form of varying ethics, values, and emotions affiliated to the social world. This point is further supported by the Mandasor inscription of Kūmaragupta-I and Bandhuvarman, which highlights two important aspects of Daśapura: one, its natural landscape, and second, its monumental beauty. The inscription records that the city was adorned with several mountains, trees, flowers, lakes with shining waters, lotuses, water lilies, ducks, swans, and so forth. While illustrating the monumental beauty, the inscription describes the palatial houses with flags, long terraces, rail moldings, and plantain trees that were located within Daśapura. The city was enclosed by the:

> …two charming rivers of tremendous waves, shines like the body of the God of Love, clasped in private by (his wives) Prīti and Rati, possessed of (prominent) breasts… (Bhandarkar et. al., 1981: 328).

The spheres of the nature and the monuments, mediated through human presence, are perceived as being complimentary to each other in the inscription. The point is further reinforced by another passage from the same inscription:

> Where the woods are adorned with lordly trees, bowed down with the burden of their flowers; -with the humming of the

swarms of bees become bold through intoxication,

-    and with the women-folk (*purānganā*) of the town strolling unceasingly;

Where the buildings, with moving flags, full women (*abalā-sanāthānya*), intensely white (and) extremely lofty, bear resemblance to the peaks of white clouds variegated with forked lightning... (Bhandarkar et. al., 1981: 328; emphasis mine).

In the above passage, the author appears to convey that the nature and the monuments had become meaningful in an urban landscape due to the presence of human beings (i.e., women), who enjoyed the comfort and beauty of the both.[22] In addition, the inscription of Kūmaragupta-I and Bandhuvarman associates the winter season with the sensual as well as spiritual acts:

.... (The temple) which has broad and lofty spires, which (thus) resembles a mountain, is pale-red like the mass of the rays of the moon just risen, and, being charming to the eye, shines like the tucked-in lovely crest-jewel of the western ward (of the town);

(In the season) which is pleasant in consequence of the interiors of the houses being crowded with young women (and) in consequence of the rays of the sun, (and) the warmth of fire, during which the fish lie deep in water and which is destitute of the enjoyments (caused by) the rays of the moon, flat roofs of houses, sandal paste, palm-leaf fans, and garlands; and when the water-lilies are bitten by the frost;

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[22]According to Kālidāsa, the eyes of the fair women of Daśapura (daśapuravadhūnetra) 'are familiar with the movements of the creeper-like eye brows, which have dark and variegated tints flashing up by reason of the up-lifting of the eye-lashes, and which assume the beauty of the bees following the movements of the jasmine' (Pathak, 1997: 44).

In the season which is charming on account of the swarms of bees exhilarating with the juice of the full-blown flowers of the *rōdhra*[23] (and) the *priyańgu*[24] trees and the jasmine creeper, when the solitary branches of myriads of *lavalī*[25] creepers dance with the winds violently cold with particles of frost;

When the falling of frost and snow is derived by the fast clasping of the massive, lovely and plump thighs, breasts and hips of the beloved women by young men, fallen into the power of sexual love;

…in the season when the massive breasts of (women) are worthy of enjoyment… this edifice (sun temple) was consecrated with the performance of auspicious ceremonies… (Bhandarkar 1981: 330-331).

In the Mandasor inscription of Prabhākra (467-68 AD), the spring (?) season is associated with the sensual as well as donative acts:

When the season, in which the young lotus is fatigued with the load of the bodies of bees, and the *sāl* tree looks charming, had come, when wives were being tormented by the fire of love, their dear husbands having been away from home;

When groves were assuming fresh splendor (with their trees) being waved by the breezes, neither very hot nor very cold, with intoxicated cuckoos just commenting their sweet notes, and with the young leaves looking reddish like the lips of charming women;

This *stūpa*, accompanied by a well, had been constructed (in commemoration) of Him (the Buddha)…

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[23] The tree Symplocos Racemosa.

[24] A medical plant and perfume; Panicum Italicum; Sinapis Ramosa; Saffron.

[25] The Averrhoa Acida.

> May this store of water (i.e., the well), that constantly enjoys
> the festivity of union with the bodies of many women (who go
> to bathe there) always be full like the ocean that (also) enjoys
> the constant festivity of union with many rivers (who are, as it
> were,) his wives! (Garde 1947-48: 12-18).

The human emotions of love and intimacy besides spirituality in
this way are employed to define the peculiar characteristics of
different seasons. By doing so, the composers have bestowed a
new meaning upon *nature*. Such characterization in fact humanizes
the natural phenomenon.[26] However, in early Indian literature
nature in its various forms is represented differently. For instance,
where in the context of a village (*grāma*) nature is seen as a source of
livelihood, in the context of a forest (*araṇya*) it becomes the final
resort for the ascetics, who have renounced the human-society.
The village is depicted in Sanskrit literature as an orderly,
disciplined, and civilized human settlement where *dharma* (i.e.,
varna-jati norms, customs, traditions, and so forth) was practiced.
Contrary to it, the forest was a disordered, undisciplined, and
uncivilized space devoid of *dharma*. Unlike a householder
(*gṛhastha*), who was expected to perform social duties of the *grāma*
and *dharma,* an ascetic residing in a forest was free from such
obligations (Thapar, 2007: 33-41; 2012: 105-126). It implies that the
social norms, customs and traditions, which were expected to be
observed by people in villages, had no binding force on those
residing in forest areas. Nevertheless, the forest provided wood,
medicines, fuel, fodder, roots, fruits, and game to the villagers. In
addition, the *Arthaśāstra* considers the forest a source of revenue as
well as forest people a threat to the state. Therefore, it recommends
on the one hand the subjugation of the forest dwellers and on the

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[26]According to the *Kāvya Mimānsā,* the winter season is suitable for sensuous
pleasures due to long nights. It further adds that in spring season women are more
interested in sensuous pleasures, singing, and worship of Kāmadeva, etc. (Rai,
2007: 218-220).

other hand preservation of different forests, such as the elephant forest, due to their economic and military value (Parasher, 2012: 127-151; Trautmann, 2009: 229-254). Contrary to both Villages and forests, Daśapura has been imagined by *Vatsabha?ī* as an urban space where nature in the form of gardens, and different seasons was a source of sensuous pleasure. It shows that nature in different spaces assumes varying meanings in relation to human activities.

Conclusion

A (de)construction of the identity of an urban space is a complex process, involving an analysis of the diverse social relations in a spatial and temporal context. Inhabited by various socio-religious and political groups, Daśapura had been a space with fuzzy boundaries of spiritual and mundane spheres. It was a sacred-urban space (*tirtha-nagara*), shared by different religious/sectarian groups, living in a close proximity. Their religious acts seemingly created, consolidated, and maintained the *tirtha-nagara* identity of Daśapura. For rulers such as the Aulikaras, this sacred space fulfilled twin desires: one, it became their political seat and second, it became a source of political legitimization. They too through their donative acts contributed to the popularization of Daśapura's *tirtha-nagara* identity. The case of Daśapura or Dasor brahmanas is significant. It shows how a communal identity over a period becomes intermeshed with the spatial identity. This city apparently had different meanings for different social groups. Yet, these groups, in spite of having different perspectives, organized a distinct identity for this urban space. The (de)construction of Daśapura's identity, thus, needs an analysis of these varied meanings, encoded in the epigraphic and literary compositions. An analysis of *these compositions,* in which Daśapura is seen, experienced, and expressed in spatial and temporal contexts in narrative or poetic forms by the authors (belonging to different social groups), helps in ascertaining its identity. The study of epigraphs and literature shows that both, the spiritual and the mundane spheres, constituted the urban space of Daśapura and

the human agency through various acts of mediation interlinked as well as interposed these spheres. In addition, different seasons, perceived as being suitable for different human acts performed in distinctly assigned spaces, were also attached to the religious-urban space of Daśapura in epigraphs. As a result different seasons (representing nature and time) on the one hand and spaces (representing scared and mundane spheres) on the other hand are humanized by assigning ethical and moral values to them in relation to varied human activities. The *tirtha-nagara* identity, different from a village and a forest, of Daśapura in this way represents a religious-urban space without any distinctly marked boundaries of sacred and mundane worlds. Yet, it had been a space with multiple and changing meanings.

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The ANC and the South African Freedom Struggle: Analyzing the Relevance of International Relations in the ANC's Liberation Movement

Shaantanu Shankar

Abstract

The success of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa was perceived across the international environment as a significant landmark in the evolution of the politico-economic environment of Sub-Saharan Africa. The ANC pioneered South Africa's liberation movement through the Cold War and into the post-Cold War era, forcing the Nationalist government to negotiations on the issue of Apartheid and minority rule through persistent opposition from within South Africa, as well as from outside South Africa. At the same time, significant international affairs also played a notable role in the victory of the ANC, a central theme of this research paper. This paper focuses on the global political implications of the Apartheid regime, attempting to highlight the significance of international relations and global developments in the ultimate victory of the ANC in South Africa.

Keywords: South Africa, ANC, Apartheid, Liberation, British Empire, Cold War, USA, USSR

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Introduction

Origins of Apartheid and the Formation of the ANC

The ANC was created in South Africa as a political movement and a multiracial nationalist organization. On January 8th 1912, chiefs, representatives of peoples and church organizations and other prominent individuals gathered in Bloemfontein and formed the ANC. The ANC declared its aim to bring all Africans together as one people to defend their rights and freedoms (African National Congress). The ANC was formed against the backdrop of the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The Union was a formation of two British colonies, Natal and Cape Province, and two Boer Republics, Transvaal and Orange Free State, as a result of the British victory over the Afrikaner population, known as the Boers who were the local Dutch migrants, in the Second Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 (South African History Online [a]).

The Boer Wars were contested as a result of British attempts to form a South African federal state within the British Empire through its annexation of Transvaal in 1877 and the decision to appoint Cecil Rhodes for the annexation and administration of territories north of the Limpopo. During the same period, the South African economy received an injection of capital from Europe, mainly British into the mining boom spurred by diamond and gold discoveries. By 1899, South Africa accounted for approximately 27.55 % of the global gold output. The control of the increasing mineral wealth of Southern Africa was a matter of national importance for both nationalist elements and the British Empire. At the same time there was a growing sense of discontent within the colonies against imperial control. This was reflected in the preparation of a new draft constitution in 1909 and the South Africa Act of 1909 condemning outside interference and control. However, the new South African Prime Minister Louis Botha came to the conclusion that a coalition between the two ethnic sections of white South Africans, the Afrikaners and the Boers, would be critical for the economic development of the Union especially

considering the considerable stakes of the British in the mining industry. Through corporate enterprise, the British continued to exert significant influence over the region (Thompson and Berat, 2014: 97-190).

With the formation of a new state came new forms of political oppression for the non-white populations. A number of legislations were passed to provide official sanction to racial discrimination. For example, the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 made it a criminal offense for Africans to break a labour contract (Native Labour Regulation Act 1911), and the Mines and Works Act of 1911 legitimized the long term mining practice by which whites monopolized skilled jobs, effectively restricting Africans to semi-skilled and unskilled labour in the mines (Mines and Works Act 1911). Most importantly, the Natives Land Act of 1913 separated South Africa into areas in which either blacks or whites could own freehold land: blacks, constituting two-thirds of the population were restricted to 7.5 per cent of the land; whites, making up one-fifth of the population were given 92.5 percent of the land (Natives Land Act 1913). It also restricted the common practice of Africans working as sharecroppers on farms in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. These new forms of oppression also restricted the right of non-whites to franchise and their movements. Such pro-white policies led to the measured build up of African resistance and the growth of new political bodies. In 1902, the coloured population in Cape Town had formed the African Political Organisation. Mahatma Gandhi was deeply involved in the struggle against racial discrimination and he began a passive resistance campaign against the pass laws in 1906 (South African History Online [b]). In this climate the ANC was formally launched as the first political organization that transcended tribal identities under the alias of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC).

The 1940s was a period of transition for the ANC where the organization was boosted with new life and energy, which allowed the conversion from a conservative organization to a mass

movement in the 1950s. The growing popularity of Afrikaner nationalism was reflected through the growing popularity of the ultra-right nationalists under the leadership of D.F. Malan. Malan built a strong political appeal by stressing the particular sufferings of the Afrikaner people. Under these circumstances, the ANC Youth League was formed in 1944 primarily as a recruiting agency (South African History Online [c]). Anton Lembede was elected president, Oliver Tambo secretary and Walter Sisulu treasurer. Nelson Mandela, A.P. Mda, Jordan Ngubane, Lionel Majombozi, Congress Mbata and David Bopape were elected to the executive committee. The basic policies of the league were in conformity with those of the ANC. Their ideas were based on ideas of African nationalism. Their manifesto utterly rejected the notion of 'trusteeship', the idea that the white government somehow had African interests at heart.

The decade ended with the elections of 1948, with the Nationalists led by Daniel Malan rising to power on the platform of Apartheid. Apartheid was a new term concocted for an old idea. It literally means apartness and it represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position since colonial arrival. The function of Apartheid was to entrench white supremacy forever. The premise of Apartheid was that whites were superior to Africans, Coloureds and Indians and the policy was supported by the Dutch Reformed Church, which furnished Apartheid with its religious underpinnings by suggesting that Afrikaners were God's chosen people and that blacks were a subservient species. In 1949, the ANC Youth League drafted a Programme of Action, which called for strikes, boycotts and defiance. This was a landmark effort in ANC's efforts to turn itself into a truly mass organization. In spite of objections from the President Dr. Xuma, the will of the majority of ANC members prevailed and Dr. Moroka replaced him and the Programme of Action was approved. A number of stalwarts of the Youth League were also promoted to senior ANC cadres and Nelson Mandela himself was elected to the National Executive Committee of the ANC (Mandela, 1994: 90-109).

The Cold War and the Evolution of the South African Freedom Struggle

Due to the significant growth of the mining industry, South Africa became a major economic centre in the Western alliance against the axis powers in World War II. The closing of the Mediterranean Sea to Allied shipping further increased the strategic significance of South Africa due to the alternate shipping route to North Africa, East Africa and Asia. South African troops were also engaged across the continent. The war-induced economic boom had a positive impact on the socio-economic status of the Afrikaner community as well (Thompson and Berat, 2014: 163-169). At a political level, this manifested in the strengthening of the Nationalist party that rose on an anti-British sentiment post World War II. Further, in the polarizing global environment, the Nationalists rose on a platform opposing communism, a critical factor in the placement of South Africa firmly within the Western bloc through the Cold War.

In Africa, the end of World War II witnessed the weakening of the relative strengths of the colonial powers spread across Africa. This resulted in the rapid strengthening of political movements across the African continent with the common objective of liberation from colonial rule. Against the backdrop of the emergence of the Cold War, these popular anti-colonial movements were branded as 'communist movements', placing them against the global interest of the US and its allies.

The USSR's policy towards the South African government consisted of elements of geopolitical and economic rivalry. At the political level, South Africa's geographic position and advanced military capacity within Africa created a security concern for the Soviets. As a major supplier of similar strategic minerals in the global economy, the intention to deny resources to the West through fomenting revolution and civil strife in Southern Africa aligned the interests of different elements of South Africa's as well as Southern Africa's liberation movement with that of the USSR, including the ANC, Communist Party of South Africa (SACP),

African Peoples Organisation (APO) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) (Cambell, 1986: 41-48).

In 1950, the South African government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, which would have a major impact on the ANC. The act outlawed the Communist Party of South Africa and made it a crime to be a member of the party or 'further' the aims of communism. Nevertheless, the act was aimed not only at the SACP but also at all opposition advocating political, economic and social change (Suppression of Communism Act 1950). The bill was drafted in such a broad way that it outlawed all but the mildest of protests against the state and additionally restricted individual and organizational opposition to its policies.

The ANC and a number of other organizations were targeted through the bill. The ANC, supported by the SAIC and the APO, organized its first political strike on a national scale on 26 June 1950, which was labeled the Day of Protest. The Day of Protest would prove inspirational in the formulation of ANCs defiance campaign, a national civil disobedience campaign. Two stages of defiance were proposed. In the first phase, a handful of individuals would engage in small-scale civil disobedience all across the country. The second stage was envisioned as mass defiance, accompanied by strikes and industrial actions nationwide (Mandela, 1994: 112-150). The defiance campaign brought closer cooperation between the ANC, the SAIC, the APO, the South African Coloured People's Organization (SACPO) and the Congress of Democrats (COD) and was critical to the liberation struggle in spite of the limited success of its campaign in penetrating outside urban areas. These organizations were united by the threat of an immensely powerful enemy and embraced the idea of cooperative action.

During this phase, the freedom struggle acquired a new intensity and the organization began to open up to increasingly militant ideology to support the liberation movement. The leadership also took a more activist route with Albert Luthuli becoming the new ANC president in 1952 (South African History

Online [d]). Non-violent passive resistance were not reaping results at a desired pace. With State violence making any legal expression of dissent or protest impossible, South Africa was fast turning into a police state.

In 1955, approximately 3000 delegates met on June 25th and 26th near Soweto in a Congress of the People representing the ANC, the SAIC, the APO, SACPO, the COD and the multiracial South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The primary topic for discussion was the Freedom Charter, drafted weeks before the congress met. The Freedom Charter became the common programme enshrining the hopes and aspirations of all the people (South African History Online [e]). The Charter was a revolutionary document that envisioned radically altering the political and economic structure of South Africa. It emphasized that South Africa should be a non-racial society with no particular group assuming special rights or privileges. It further stated that all people should be treated equally before the law, that the land should be "shared among those who work it," and that the people should "share in the country's wealth." The congress delegates ratified almost all sections of the charter when the police surrounded the meeting, announcing that they suspected treason was being committed, and recorded all the names and addresses of those in attendance (African National Congress).

In 1956, the police arrested 156 leaders, including Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu on charges of treason. Mass resistance continued in a number of forms but efforts had little effect on the reversal of Apartheid policies. The failure to achieve any real success and ideological differences regarding tactics employed and the plural identity of the ANC caused a split in black resistance in 1959. The 'Africanist' elements within the ANC were purged and under Robert Sobukwe formed the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) (Thompson and Lynn, 2014: 170-195).

The split within the ANC also coincided with a split within the Communist bloc. The schism between the USSR and China, also

known as the Sino-Soviet split, was a phase from 1960 characterized by mounting ideological friction between the two power centres within the larger Communist alliance resulting in the polarization of Communist, Socialist and Left-leaning factions within Southern Africa and South Africa as well. The USSR with its long-standing links with the ANC and the SACP began to nurture this relationship through support for the increasing militarization of the liberation movement, leaving China to cultivate relations with the alternative force in South African revolutionary politics, the PAC. The Sino-Soviet schism caused sharp divisions within the South African liberation movement, playing a significant role in determining the ANC's regional alliances as well. At the same time, the USSR represented a significant source of financial and logistical support for the growth of the liberation movement in spite of the increasing government restriction and regulation on the activity of the same. It is also worth mentioning that Chinese support for the African liberation movements had been inconsistent and sparse, subject to domestic economic instability within China (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 43-49).

The ANC and anti-Apartheid Diplomacy: Africa and the South African Freedom Struggle

In 1960, the ANC and the PAC launched parallel national anti-pass campaigns to oppose pass laws through non-violent protests. At one such PAC demonstration at Sharpeville, a township to the south of Johannesburg, the police opened fire on unarmed, peaceful demonstrators killing more than sixty-seven and wounding one hundred and eighty two (South African History Online [f]). The massacre signaled a new era in state barbarism marked by extreme brutality, and days after the massacre the government banned both the ANC and the PAC and declared a state of emergency.

The police arrested thousands of activists subsequently. Severe state action also weakened the ANCs firm stance on its position of non-violence. The period also brought to prominence

the ANC's so-called External Mission due to the inability to operate effectively within South Africa. The financial and logistical support of independent African states would prove crucial to the very survival of the ANC and the South African liberation movement.

The initial mandate was waging acts of violence against the state (Mandela, 1994: 328). Intentions were to begin with what was least violent to individuals but most damaging to the state. Four types of violence were considered: sabotage, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and open revolution. Open revolution was inconceivable considering the resources available and the severe constraints on the operational abilities of the ANC and the MK. Terrorism as a strategy could have a reciprocal effect on the people, which was inconceivable for the ANC. Sabotage and Guerrilla Warfare were the only two possibilities to consider. Considering the ANC's reluctance to embrace any sort of violence and the influential Indian lobby within the ANC, it was logical to start with the form of violence that inflicted the least harm upon civilians: sabotage. Sabotage also represented a strategy, which was within the resource constraints of the ANC, and it had the added virtue of requiring the least manpower. The initial strategy was to carry out selective attacks against institutions representing both military and economic state power. Institutions targeted included military and police installations, power plants, telephone lines and transportation links. The aim was to hamper military effectiveness of the state, frighten the National Party supporters, discourage foreign investment and weaken the economy to force the government to the negotiation table (Pfister, 2003). MK officially began its campaign on December 16th 1961, carrying out simultaneous acts of sabotage in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban.

For the ANC, non-violence and passive resistance was more of a strategy than an ideology and when facing a state strategy of barbarism, the ANC was forced to turn to militancy. The ANC found itself hugely constrained as a liberation movement. MK

became the militant manifestation of the ANC and Nelson Mandela was the man that was chosen to lead the MK in the freedom struggle. The winning of freedom by armed struggle was the only method left open. However, both the ANC and PAC were not able to effectively weaken the state, with the power asymmetry seemingly too large to overcome.

After the arrest of Nelson Mandela and other critical leaders of the ANC in 1962-64, ANC's leader Oliver Tambo would flee the country and continue to run the organization underground from abroad. In 1967, the MK began a joint campaign with the Zapu, a people's army fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The same year the ANC was given permission to establish four MK military bases in Tanzania, though relations with Tanzania would turn sour. The PAC had also established its networks in Africa and was a major impeding factor for the ANC in the 70s. Within South Africa, their presence was minimal in the 70s (Thompson and Berat, 2014). During this phase, the financial, logistical and military support provided by the African states was critical to the survival as well as propagation of the ANC's vision of a liberated South Africa.

In 1975, Portugal withdrew from Angola and Mozambique and Marxist governments emerged that were strictly opposed to apartheid. And in 1980, Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union-patriotic Front party won a landslide election victory and formed a government that was also anti-apartheid. The South African Defence Forces made a number of unauthorized military excursions into these states, which led to increasing international condemnation of the apartheid regime (South African History Online [g]). In spite of the international condemnation of these excursions, the South African military continued to undermine both the ANC and the PAC's ability to operate both from within and externally.

By 1978, the US had surpassed Britain as South Africa's number one trading partner with increasing trade from Japan and other European powers. A considerable investment that came

from these countries was primarily directed into the mining sector as South Africa produced significant quantities of essential military oriented strategic minerals, including platinum, chromium, manganese and vanadium in addition to gold, diamonds and other economic oriented strategic minerals. The economic strength of the Union state further compelled other African regimes to work with South Africa despite drastic ideological differences (Thompson and Berat, 2014: 190).

The state, in order to support its strategy of barbarism, was forced to invest large sums in the development of its own armaments industry, especially due to the growing momentum of the liberation movement. In 1978, the then Prime Minister John Vorster retired and P.W. Botha, minister of defence since 1966, became the Prime Minister. Economic conditions would sooner or later force the state to pursue some sort of reformative strategy, taking into consideration the massive spending of the defence sector. Additionally, the UN also began to take considerable notice of the evolving situation in South Africa.

Since 1952, the General Assembly backed by the NAM and other developing nations began to pass annual resolutions condemning apartheid, resolutions that were increasingly supported by the growing number of independent Asian and African states. By 1967, these efforts led to the creation of a Special Committee on Apartheid and a Unit on Apartheid, which issued a stream of publications exposing and denouncing the effect of South Africa's racial policies, establishing a UN Council for Namibia as well. Finally in 1977, efforts produced certain tangible results, with the UNSC unanimously voting for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa (Thompson and Berat, 2014: 192).

Though both the PAC and the ANC were limited in their operations within South Africa, the anti-apartheid movement now had spread across different sections of society, with the emergence of an umbrella movement known as 'Black Consciousness Movement'. This was representative of a number of different movements and organisations and a majority of the African

population, and presented rising costs to the nationalist government in its effort to suppress the liberation movements (O'Malley Archives, Heart of Hope). The anti-apartheid movement was now widespread and truly representative in nature.

During the same period, the African-American Civil Rights Movement resulted in the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited state discrimination on the basis of race, religion, colour, and national origin in the USA. This had a significant impact on the perceptions towards the liberation movements not only in South Africa, but also across sub-Saharan Africa. Initially branded as communist movements, which threatened the larger security of the USA, these movements now were perceived as legitimate within civil society in the USA and subsequently across the West. With the strengthening of civil society and grassroots organisations in the formulation and implementation of policy and the weakening of the USSR through the same period, the West started to realign its policy with respect to the South African nationalist government.

Internationalization of the Anti-Apartheid Movement: Towards Liberation

In 1972 the National Party government sought an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan of 1.24 billion Rands. This IMF loan imposed 'structural adjustment' in the form of deflationary policies, tight monetary policies and increased interest rates to encourage savings. Consumer subsidies were frozen, and the poor were hurt as a result of increased taxation. All these factors fuelled the popular uprisings of those years. The 1973 oil shock, which sent the prices of oil spiraling upwards, dealt a further blow to the state of the economy. The business environment in South Africa was no longer conducive to foreign investment. Further, the UN, describing Apartheid as 'a crime against humanity', declared in 1977 the existing embargo on arms sales to South Africa as mandatory.

Subsequently, community organizations began to spring up all over South Africa. In August 1983, representatives from over 475 'grassroots' organisations from across the country came together in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town, to form a single umbrella organization: the United Democratic Front (UDF). Within months over 600 organizations joined in. The UDF aimed to mobilise and organize resistance at the national level against apartheid injustice. The UDF was fully supported by the ANC and the UDF organizations became a way to link the ANC's underground structures and to establish networks with the ANC in exile (O'Malley Archives). The ANC also formed an alliance with another principal grassroots organization, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which had become the largest African trade union by 1985. Their alliance with the ANC peaked in 1987 when both the UDF and the COSATU formally adopted the ANCs Freedom Charter (Mandela, 2014: 57). Critically, the UDF's and COSATU's links with the ANC were significant in tilting the tide towards the ANC in creating a continental consensus regarding the ANC-PAC rivalry.

The government was dealt another blow as nations around the world began to impose economic sanctions on the Apartheid regime. A combination of the immense rejuvenation of the liberation movement in the 70s and the 80s, stagnating state economy and successful diplomatic initiatives forced the state to consider the option of negotiations. The withdrawal of foreign investment further weakened the state apparatus with as many as 40 American companies pulling out in 1985 and another 50 in 1986 (Thompson and Berat, 2014: 201).

The domestic unrest reached new levels. The youth, faced with harsh conditions, lack of employment and poor school conditions became very radical and militant against symbols of Apartheid. The people now responded to state barbarism and brutality in large masses, and took up increasingly militant means to fight state repression. The situation was slowly disintegrating into a full-scale civil war. To deal with the escalation of the crisis,

the South African government also intensified its efforts and imposed the first of a series of emergencies in 1985 across South Africa. Emergency regulations gave the police powers to arrest without warrants and to detain people indefinitely without a proper charge sheet without any sort of legal or personal notifications (South African History Online [h]).

The ANC's true potential as a liberation movement was exposed through its links with the UDF. Meanwhile, the MK stepped up its sabotage campaigns across the country. In December 1982, MK set off explosions at the unfinished Koeberg nuclear plant outside Cape Town. In May 1983, MK carried out its first car bombing aimed at an air force and military intelligence office in the heart of Pretoria. Due to alliances with Angola and Mozambique, the ANC was able to establish MK training camps in these countries. These countries also played a key role in mobilizing opinion on the ANC's leading role in South Africa's liberation struggle.

The 80s saw a resurgence of the ANC both in South Africa and outside as they stepped up their military and political campaign against the state from within and stepped up external engagement, enlarging its international network, both in the East and West. In the US, the Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 due to the vigorous lobbying by anti-apartheid organizations working against the presidential veto. This pressurized the U.S into officially recognising the ANC and the ANC established an office in Washington in 1989. The ANC's links with the allied South African Communist Party supported ANC efforts to gain a foothold in the 'Eastern Bloc'. In 1987, the ANC opened an Exile Mission in Moscow. In the West, the ANC found support from the international anti-apartheid movement. During this phase, diplomacy was directed towards the West with Oliver Tambo stating that it boiled down to the question of how to compel the support of the United States, Great Britain and Germany for the cause of victims of apartheid. In pursuit of this objective, Tambo undertook extensive international visits meeting several

prominent officials and commissioning a number of new external missions (Berber, 2000: 54). During 1981-1988, ANC offices were opened in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Spain. This was important considering that by 1989, ANC had 40 diplomatic representations across the globe while Pretoria had fewer than 30 diplomatic missions, and the relentless policy to maintain apartheid further contributed to a sense of alienation at the international level (Berber, 2000: 59).

In 1989, F. W de Klerk replaced Botha as the president and expressed willingness to negotiate with any other group committed to peace in his inaugural address itself. The liberation movement had taken its toll on the apartheid regime. Oliver Tambo drafted the ANC's Harare Declaration in August 1989, which outlined the framework for creating a conducive climate for the commencement of a negotiated settlement and the guidelines to the process of negotiation. It was drafted after consultations with some of the leaders within South Africa, with Mandela in prison and leaders of other African states. The declaration developed into a process of consolidating and expanding the support base of the South African liberation struggle throughout the world. Simultaneously, it helped the ANC make inroads into the international support base of the apartheid regime. This remarkable achievement was accomplished at a very difficult time for the ANC, during the fall of its firm ally the Soviet Union (Maharaj, 2008).

The Harare Declaration clearly stated that once an appropriate climate for negotiations had been created, negotiations would then include "the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding cease-fire"; establishing the basis for a new constitution by agreeing, among others, on the nine principles highlighted in the beginning of the Declaration; the formation of an interim government to supervise the making of a new constitution and to effect the transition to democracy, including holding new elections. The Declaration envisaged the formal termination of all armed hostilities after the adoption of the new constitution (Harare

Declaration). The ANC made it very clear that renunciation of violence would have to be a result of negotiations and not a precursor to it. The nationalist government had already formed a secret negotiating committee that met a number of times with Nelson Mandela. The government required the old cadre of the ANC to quell the protesting masses who emerged as a result of extreme state brutality and the lack of political representation.

On October 10th 1989, the government released Walter Sisulu, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias, Motsoaledi, Jeff Masemola, Wilton Mkwayi and Oscar Mpetha, political prisoners and ANC leaders in the 50s and 60s. This move effectively lifted the ban on the ANC and its leaders. On February 2nd 1990, De Klerk announced the lifting of bans off the ANC, the PAC and thirty-one other organizations (Mandela, 1994: 664). On February 10th, Nelson Mandela was released at Victor Vester, Cape Town. This set in motion the series of events which led to the negotiated settlement and the establishment of a transitional government from 1990-1994, which was critical in the dismantling of the apparatus of Apartheid. In April 1994, the ANC won the first free and representative South African elections, legitimizing the ANC as the political party to lead South Africa in this new phase of growth and development.

Conclusion

One of the most significant milestones in the contemporary history of the African continent was marked by the liberation of South Africa from the rule of Apartheid. With the victory of the ANC in the 1994 elections, Africa had now entered a new phase in its political evolution as a collective of free nations. The success of the ANC has been credited to a number of factors including the release of Nelson Mandela from prison, the spread of the Black Consciousness across the grassroots of African society empowering every section of society against Apartheid, and the growing pressure of international sanctions on the South African government.

This paper has argued that the global political implications of the Apartheid regime were a critical factor in not only the fall of the Nationalist government, but also the overall evolution of the freedom struggle. This goes back to the 'Suppression of Communism Act' in 1950, which aligned the interests of the Apartheid government with the USA and the larger Western axis of power during the initial phases of the Cold War. It was with the economic and military support of this axis of power that the South African government continued to grow while suppressing any sense of opposition. The ANC, in spite of expanding its support base from a small and conservative organisation to a mass movement representing a significant proportion of population residing within South Africa, seemed powerless against the apparatus of Apartheid. This period culminated in the arrest and detention of a majority of the ANC's leadership, forcing the ANC leadership to operate from outside South Africa.

In 1968, the USA signed its historic Civil Rights Act of 1968, which set in motion the shifting public opinion on not only the South African liberation movement, but also liberation movements across the African continent and the larger developing world. This was followed by a period during which grassroot and community based organisations, NGOs and other such institutions began to command greater authority in the public arena, increasing their influence and impact in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. Additionally, the threat posed by Communist movements to the West was also diluted through two major factors; the Sino-Soviet split weakening the unity of the Communist bloc and the fall of the Soviet Union. With the spread of decolonisation across Africa, the regional and global environment forced a realignment of Western interest towards the ANC and more importantly against the mechanisms of the Apartheid government.

Through the 1980s, the Nationalist government found itself more and more isolated in an increasingly hostile political climate, both regionally and globally. The signing of the Comprehensive

Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 in the USA was the defining blow for the Nationalist government, isolating its critical international partners completely. Now the ANC finally began to assert itself against the nationalist government, assuming the driving seat in the transition process initiated in 1990. On June 3rd 1993, the announcement of the country's first non-racial one-man, one-vote elections took place on April 27th 1994. The announcement was an incredible landmark of the ANC's liberation movement (Mandela, 1994: 730-733). The ANC had finally achieved what it had been fighting for. Now, the ANC was at crossroads, it had successfully completed one stage of its life and was ready to embrace its new role in the governance of South Africa. On May 10th 1994, Nelson Mandela took over as the President of South Africa, becoming the first African to lead a united South Africa.

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Normative Ideal of Government Communication and Indian Reality

Dhiraj Singh

Abstract

Government Communication is the content, rules and machinery that the Government use for communication with the citizens. This article tries to map the field of Government Communication and cull out the opinions and prescriptions for the efficiency and ethicality of Government Communication from the available scholarship. The specificity of the Government Context imbues the field with unique constraints and responsibilities. Few influential models in the field have been taken and applied to Indian situation. The article defines the concept and delineates the main themes of the field. A case study of the United Kingdom highlights the ethical conundrum of aggressive Government Communication. Indian Government Communication acquits itself well on accuracy and trustworthiness but the Indian system is far behind on the goal of establishing a two-way symmetrical system of communication where shared meanings are co-created with building relationships between publics and the government based on mutual understanding. Similarly on the parameters of resources, and the commitment of higher management and capabilities there is a lot

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to be desired. Being a perspective article based on the personal experience of the author, the article hopes to encourage further evidence-based studies in this ignored area.

Keywords: Government Communication, Transparency, Ethical communication in public institutions, Indian Information Service.

Introduction

This article is a practitioner's musings about his profession- in this case, Government Communication. Government Communication has come up in the academic sphere after a long period of neglect in the last two decades. This may be due to many factors. There is a realization among politicians, bureaucrats and academicians that Government Communication is a relevant tool both from the public administration/service delivery point of view and from the angle of electoral gains. Furthermore, a rather prolonged period of very visible and controversial excesses in government communication in the United Kingdom led to concerns among the students of communication about developing a value system in a field which was deemed to be too insignificant for any such attention. Right to Information Acts in various countries were enacted and attained maturity during this time in many countries including India. This forced the Government Communicators to raise their game as this brought forth new factors, such as expressed ideological commitment to transparency and the possibility of getting verified/caught. All this was happening against the backdrop of breath-taking technological changes. The internet, social media, easy publication/photography/ videography/ news collaboration tools along with the vastly reduced cost of doing research changed the media and information landscape. Given all this, it will not be an exaggeration to say that Government Communication is at a crossroads.

The purpose of the paper is to situate Indian Government Communication within the available scholarship on Government Communication. Attempt will be made to cull out factors of efficiency and ethicality in Government Communication literature and they will be applied to the Indian situation. It needs to be clearly stated that the discussion part of this article is based on the personal experience of the author and will merit more systematic evidence-based research to verify the observations. Section 2 of the article will attempt a definition of Government Communication and will bring forth the specificities of the field. The section will also try to map the available literature on the broad area of Government Communication. Section 3 will underline the importance of Government Communication in democracy and will deal with the duty of the democratic imperative of the Government to communicate with the publics. Section 4 will present the case study of the United Kingdom Government Communication to illustrate what ethical issues can emerge from the practice of aggressive Government Communication. Here, we will also try to emphasize the centrality of professional government communicators in the whole enterprise. The next section will discuss the existing models in the field and aim to bring out the prescribed value system of the field. By this time we hope to identify the normative parameters of the field. Section 6 will apply the models to the Indian situation before concluding.

(II)

Canel and Sanders (2012) defined Government Communication as "the aims, role and practice of communication implemented by executive politicians and officials of public institutions in the service of a political rationale, and that are themselves constituted on the basis of the people's indirect or direct consent and are charged to enact their will". They claim that this definition has a few advantages as it includes as it includes senior federal/central level functionaries like the Prime Ministers, Ministers and President along with other levels of government such as mayoral

or local and regional government communication. More importantly for them, it is specific to executive arm of the government and keeps out the judiciary and legislature.

Scholars like Graber (2003) and Garnett (1992) have distinguished Government Communication from its private counterpart along three key dimensions. Firstly, the public sector communication, relatively speaking, is not governed by market logic and more deeply subjected to legal and formal constraints. These soft constraints affect managers' choices more than more than they do in the private sector. Second, being financed by public money, Government Communication is subject to public and legislative scrutiny to a far greater extent than private sector. The recent overhaul of the British Government Communication system was under the supervision of the legislature and, to a great extent, due to legislative pressure. Closer to home, Government advertisement policy of the Central Government in India stipulates giving advertisements more on the basis of principles of equity for newspapers than the need of the campaign (DAVP website), something unthinkable in private organization. In short, government communication has to go beyond its purely communication related goals to also maintain a different level of probity and regulatory consideration. Beckett (2000) has advised caution in imitating private business blindly citing open self-interest of private sector and also, as mentioned above, its self-supporting status. Also, it has been noted that while for the private sector communication is an obligatory practicality, for the Government it forms the very basis of democracy (Viteritti, 1997).

As a series of nomenclature is floating, there is potential for a considerable taxonomic confusion among researchers. Political communication, an umbrella term in political science, is often used in almost the same context as Government Communication. In his overview of political communication research, Swanson (2000) noted the breadth of its portfolio, but concluded that its central focus is on "the role of communication in political processes and institutions associated with electoral campaigning and

governing". Contrasting this with Canel and Sanders' (2012) definition makes it clear that Government Communication is one area of political communication that concerns itself with communication efforts of the executive arm of the government. To further clarify the issue we can look at the review of the Political Communication by Lin (2004), who elaborated on five key sites and methodological perspectives namely:

- rhetorical analysis of political discourse;

- propaganda studies;

- voting studies;

- mass media effects;

- interplay of influence between government, press and public opinion.

It can be discerned that despite a clear overlap in these themes, communication efforts of the government can be carved out as a distinct branch of study. This discussion makes it pertinent that a brief outline of the field of government communication should be attempted. This will not only situate the field in the cross-section of communication research but will also bring out the normative aspects that have been troubling researchers.

Mapping Government Communication Research

After a long spell of scholarly neglect, Government Communication has received some attention in the last ten years. Government Communication and related concepts, such as political public relations, government public relations and government political marketing, are part of some solid research (Lee, 2008; Strömbäck, Mitrook & Kiousis, 2010; Liu, Horsley & Levenshus, 2010; Jackson, 2010; Fairbanks et al 2007, Seltzer and Zhang, 2011; Hong, Park, Lee & Park, 2012).

In the United States, a group of scholars found it worthwhile to pursue Presidential communication and related issues. M. J.

Kumar has been diligent about researching the organizational issues of Presidential communication (Kumar, 2001a, 2001b, 2003a, 2003b, and 2010; Kumar and Sullivan, 2003). A President has been called 'master of spin' by Farnsworth (2007). Other studies touch upon, Presidential public relations (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2011, Kiousis and Strömbäck, 2010), Presidential relations with the media (Hess, 2000; Walcott & Hult, 2008), chief executive communication strategies in relation to political scandals and terrorism (Canel & Sanders, 2006 , 2010), and the study of presidential communication in between elections as a "permanent campaign". Democratic role of media relations of the government and the Government's shortcomings in performing that role has been the focus of some studies (Garnett, 1992; Garnett & Kouzmin, 199; Graber, 2003; Pandey and Garnett, 2006). In Europe, particularly the UK, the aftermath of Alastair Campbell gave a boost to good scholarship on strong handed Government Communication. Franklin (2004) has examined the UK's political communication and the allegations of manipulative government communication together with a number of other scholars and journalists (Andrews, 2006; Gaber, 2004; McNair, 2011). The UK Parliament produced some excellent studies on Government Communication. The Netherlands has also been a fertile ground for Government Communication studies. Sally Young (2007) conducted a rare study of country-wide Government Communication structure in Australia. Canel & Sanders (2013) have distilled four broad themes in Government Communication studies, which owe which owe their lineage to Political Communication. These are: Chief Executive Communication, the development of the permanent campaign, logistical and operational issues and news media/government.

However, there has been a slow, but definite movement, from the vote-centric focus of political communication in these studies to other attributes of Government Communication. Government Communication, at least in the academic field, has made strong strides away from its tactical role for electoral gain to a higher purpose of democratic imperative, performing a function of

creating and strengthening democracy. Some related areas that are being studied with, and sometimes in lieu of, Government Communication are public diplomacy (Signitzer and Wamser, 2006; Molleda, 2011) issue management (Heath & Waymer, 2011), crisis communication (Coombs & Holladay, 2010 ; Coombs, 2011 ; Kim and Liu, 2012) , public affairs (Harris & Fleisher, 2005; McGrath) and its relation with government communication (Harris, 2007).

Canel and Sanders (2013) fourth theme of news media/ government nexus has attracted strong scholarship in the areas of information subsidies, agenda setting, agenda building, primary definition, indexing, government news framing, etc. (Zoch and Molleda, 2006, Kiousis, Popescu and Mitrook, 2007, Lieber and Golan, 2011; Tedesco, 2011; Hallahan, 2011; Canel, 2012). These instrumentalities have opened up tangible possibilities for the concept of strategic communication, which not only works for the electoral or reputation related gains of the political executive, but also for the government capacity to provide communication support to the policy activities. As the frequency of these studies suggests, the Government Communication techniques attained new sophistication that raised issues of not only of its performance, and conditions of good performance, but also of the ethics of the enterprise. One of the main concerns of some such studies has been to raise the Government Communication professionals from technicians to a managerial level; a prominent fallout of the emergent strategic approach (Canel and Sanders, 2013).

The emergence of this ethical aspect of Government Communication is most clearly visible in the trend of scholarship that perceives the government as a communicator for the empowerment of the citizens. It was thought that the public officials and the government have a responsibility to help citizens to fulfil their democratic duties. The citizen should have the information to avail government services and to judge government performance. This can also entail the inclusion of citizen voice in policy making. This type of literature often talks

about the duty of the government communicators (Lee, 2008, Garnett, 1997) and the issues of trust, transparency and responsiveness (Fairbanks et. al, 2007, Gaber, 2007 and Kim, 2010).

With this we come to the question 'Why do governments communicate?' This will enable us to move further towards the need for ethics of Government Communication and also metrics of evaluating their performance.

(III)

Why Do Governments Communicate?

The integration of multiple interests by widespread consultation is a well-accepted requirement of a functioning democracy. Informing and legitimizing government policies apart, maintaining political support also remains an important goal of political executive (OECD, 1997). It is a democratic imperative if seen from the point of view of the principal-agent perspective. The Principal, i.e. the citizen, needs all the information about the agent, i.e. government, to make informed choices. The communication helps the principal in democratic tasks of sorting, disciplining and political salience. Sorting is the selection or election of policy makers; disciplining is instilling accountability and making undesirable behaviour costly. Communication also plays a role in the mainstreaming of issues (Coyene and Leeson, 2007).

An informed citizenry is important for effective service delivery. Whatever the government intends to accomplish requires the information, support and will of the people. Programmes and services about which knowledge is available to citizens have better chances of being embraced. In many cases, this information helps the citizen to use and evaluate the programme or the services against the stated objective of the government.

Importance of the government in providing information is well captured by Stiglitz (2006):

As in the case of other public goods, government has an important role in the provision of information. In a modern, complex economy, contrary to the standard theories of conventional (pre-information theory) economics, prices do not convey all the relevant information. Firms and households may care a great deal about information on the growth of the economy, the unemployment rate, or the inflation rate. Each month they eagerly await the release of the new data, which governments typically collect.

Communication channels like media are very important feedback mechanisms. Feedback provided by media reports enable the policy makers to do the course correction. Media also plays a role in informing the various branches of the government about the functioning of the other departments. Apart from the conduit, watchdog and feedback role, media has become an arena where policy and political issues are threshed out. In the light of this, the media is treated as an actor in its own right. Free press and speech have intrinsic value as policy objectives (Sen, 1984). However, they have great instrumental value in achieving other fundamental goals. Electoral penalties and other reputation-related sanctions make public officials careful not to abuse their powers, but this fear is applicable only when there is a chance of exposure. Media plays a major role in that. Furthermore, free press not only reduces the chances of abuse of power, it also ensures that people's basic needs are met adequately.

This informational role of garnering support, informing, legitimizing and participating has been accepted in the official pronouncements of the United Kingdom. Independent Review of Government Communication under the Chief Executive of the Guardian Media Group, Bob Phillis, started with the notion of communication as "part of public policy and formulation… not an afterthought" (Cabinet Office, 2004). The erstwhile GICS explained:

"The Government has a duty:

- to explain its policies, decisions and actions;

- to inform the public about their rights and liabilities; and

- to provide the public with advice and warnings." (GICS Handbook)

However, the role of communication has changed a great deal, and growing sophistication and depth in media research on effects, message design and decision making has made the implementation of this knowledge in the political sphere a core strategic option for government. Media is no longer a conduit of information; it has become an arena of political and policy contestations. Hence, the role of communication has gone far beyond the traditional role of persuasion and information. In the new scenario, media has acquired a decisive say in shaping the contours of the political and policy game. Media logic has started seriously encroaching on the patterns of operation in the political and policy fields. Obtaining control of media discourse has become a key objective in recent political stratagems.

The communication objective has been increasingly shifting from public enlightenment to dominating the news agenda. Retaining initiative in the news agenda war means controlling the public discourse and defining the political debate on one's own terms (Gaber, 2000). With the increasing sophistication and power of communication, it is playing a bigger role in managing the "media image and diverse audience (constituency) sentiment" (Cozier, 2004). The role of communication in projecting the leader in larger-than-life terms has made media a "leadership resource" (Heffernan, 2006). Gaber has equated this development with the internal contradictions of democracy put forward by Francis Fukuyama. These contradictions have the potential of undermining democracy. He has placed image management among the 'below line' functions of political communications. These functions make presentation the central philosophy rather than a practice. Firstly, communication or presentation start to gain priority over delivery, and secondly it leads to a decline in

trust for the government because communication is almost always perceived to be following a hidden agenda of image management (Gaber, 2007). In fact, a three-way breakdown of trust between the government, media and public was cited as a major cause of undertaking the revamp of the government communications system in the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2004). The irony of communication — a central ingredient of healthy democracy, playing havoc with the institution it is supposed to buttress — is hard to miss.

Gaber used following quote from Onora O'Neill to sum up the problem:

> ...complete openness and transparency has done little to build or restore public trust. On the contrary, trust seemingly has receded as transparency has advanced. Perhaps on reflection we should not be wholly surprised. It is quite clear that the very technologies that spread information so easily and efficiently are every bit as good at spreading misinformation and disinformation. Some sorts of openness and transparency may be bad for trust. (Gaber, 2006)

There is unanimity about the role of communication in democracy as an informed citizenry has been universally accepted as the *sine qua non* of making good choices. At the same time, there is consensus on the anti-PR perspective. There are concerns about the "manufactured nature" of so-called "informed consent" (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), and lack of trust about the information offered. Thus the democratizing role of communication remains unquestioned. However, its aggressive application has raised questions.

Now, we will study an illustrative case study in brief. The United Kingdom in the Tony Blair era and later, illustrates how overzealous Government Communication can create an ethical quandary in public administration.

<div align="center">(IV)</div>

The United Kingdom Experience

By the time the Labour Government came to power in 1997, the communication landscape had changed a great deal. The news cycle became a 24-hour thing, media needed more information to fulfil their requirement, speed became the main concern, and a culture of sound bytes gave way to a reasoned and deliberative approach to news. This expansion and deepening of media put new pressures on the government communication machinery. In another submission to the Phillis group, Civil Service Commissioners opined, "Our impression is that, currently, the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS) is neither limber enough nor sufficient in number to meet the new demand, though we recognise the efforts to bring it up to date. The public demand for greater openness and accountability in the way that government works needs to be matched by a GICS that is adequately staffed to provide the service demanded of it." The final report of the group echoed this submission when it noted: "We received much evidence on the insatiable appetite of the media for facts, interpretation, speculation, observation and political comment, driven both by the rapid growth in the number of media outlets and by the resulting competitive pressure. At the same time, there has been an explosion in the many different ways in which the government might communicate. This has put extraordinary strain on a communications system designed in a less frenzied media age"(Cabinet Office, 2004). Lord Donoughue, in his submission to the Wicks Committee said that the incoming government in 1997 wanted "something sharper" than the "traditional Government Information Service – which never contained the great high flyers of life … they were not able to cope" (Committee on Standards in Public Life, House of Commons. 2003).

This demand for "something sharper" was rooted in the enormous sophistication that the Labour Party developed in its media relations during its long year in opposition. The new labour

was fairly open about it. Alastair Campbell told the Select committee on Public Administration, "In opposition we made clear that communications was not something that you tagged on the end. It is part of what you do. It is something we have tied to the government." This, according to experts, may have triggered the breakdown of trust between government, media and public.

The main features of this new aggressive media management included the following:

Message Control

The centralization of message control in Government attained new heights under Alastair Campbell. His aim was to establish complete control over all the messages of the government. He issued orders that all the ministerial interviews be approved by 10 Downing. He made sure that all government communications followed his three 'Rs' – Rhetoric, Repetition and Rebuttal (Wheelar, 2003). The number of politically appointed experts to deal with media increased.

The centralization of message was to a considerable degree directed by "presidentialisation of the post of the Prime Minister"; Campbell saw his role as "selling Tony" (Heffernan, 2006). Controlling of news agenda was central to the tools of achieving the centrality of the Prime Minister. Media was used to give relentless visibility to the Prime Minister, rebuking Ministers for stepping out of line, indicating policy intentions and finally, as discussed above, in the name of unity of message, Government communication was used as an effective instrument to impose 10 Downing's wishes on the entire government. Another reason for this centralization is the "dramatic increase in media pressure" (Committee on Standards in Public Life, House of Commons. 2003). Due to expansion and deepening of media, "insatiable appetite of the media for facts, interpretation, speculation, observation and political comment" (Cabinet Office, 2004), there was a decreasing deference in media for government authority and

an increased power of media, which could be tapped for electoral purpose. The Labour opposition hangover resulted in a mind set of 'permanent campaign'. The point throws up many issues, such as ambiguity on the concept of spin, difficulty of separating advocacy from valid communication duties, the Special Advisor's grip over Civil Service and the pressure to be more partisan, and presentation as the central philosophy (Yeung, 2006).

Curtailing Media Autonomy

The Labour government desire to control the news agenda often resulted in tactics that had the effect of limiting media autonomy. Gaber has prepared a list of "above the line tactics", such as government announcements, re or prebuttals, publicizing interviews and speech as opposed to "below the line" activities, of spinning, attempting to set and drive the day's news agenda, public relations tricks like kite flying, fire breaking and milking the stories. He is also critical of creating a coterie of favoured journalists and intimidation as a tool of media relations management (Gaber, 2000). Many of the "below the line" tactics will be considered above-board by many practitioners and experts. However, some of the tactics deserve larger treatment.

"Spinning" or "sexing-up" the facts was manifested with tragic results in the case of Iraq Dossiers. Both the Hutton and Butler reports found evidence of pressure from Campbell to make as strong a case as possible for Iraq invasion (Yeung, 2006). This tendency breaks the trust of media in government information. There was a cry that the government was "spinning out of control"[1].

Intimidation and cajoling entered the tool box of government media relations. The communication machinery aggressively questioned the tone, slant and, in cases, even the grammar of the

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[1]The phrase became headline for a number of news stories including in BBC and Guardian apart from the title of Wheeler (2003) article.

news stories. Deviousness and aggression were detected in government communication by principal clients like BBC.[2] These practices of making an adversarial stance difficult for mediapersons (though hardly successful) can be seen as an attempt to undermine media autonomy. Another discriminatory practice has been the tradition of giving selected briefings and of leaking information. This creates a system of reward that can be withheld. This works as a bargaining chip to ensure favourable coverage. Columnist Tom Brown is quoted as saying, "Campbell's handling of the London lobby is bullying, and intimidation. He uses favourites and withdraws favours when he is displeased".[2]

Institutional Strains

From the institutional-legal point of view, the above developments indicate failure of a number of internal executive controls and Parliamentary oversight. As said earlier, Government Information Communication Service Handbook defined the proper parameters of government communication. 'The Guidance on the Work of the Government Information Service' said, "the basic conventions, which successive Governments have applied to Government Information Services, require that these activities:

- should be relevant to Government responsibilities;

- should be objective and explanatory, not tendentious or polemical;

- should not be, or be liable to misrepresentation as being, party political; and

- should be conducted in an economic and appropriate way, having regard to the need to be able to justify the costs as expenditure of public funds." [3]

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[2]BBC "Campbell attacks 'dishonest' media" at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland /676821.stm
3 Still available on http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/propriety_and_ethics/civil_service/government_information_service/

The overall umbrella of 'integrity, impartiality and honesty' of Civil Service Code (Cabinet Office, 2004) also applied to the profession of government communication. Both the Mountfield and Phillis Reviews acknowledged that the codes were needed to be followed in letter and spirit. However it had been very difficult to follow the impartiality requirement of these codes in the field of government communications which by definition required taking sides. As Gaber told Phillis review:

> It is hard, if not impossible, to distinguish between being positive and upbeat in one's presentation of government information and 'spinning'. Basically, both are the same process of presenting the government of the day in the best possible light. This extends not just to accentuating the positive but also to minimising the negative (Ivon Gaber's Submission to Phillis Commission, Cabinet Office, 2004)

Apart from these conceptual landmines the enforcement mechanism of these conventions rested with the department that were headed by the Ministers. In such a situation, enforcement appears to rest on shaky ground. In cases where ethical or proprietary issues were referred to the Propriety and Ethics group of Central Secretariat of the Cabinet Office or the Cabinet Secretary, they also had only cosmetic powers that did not extend to cancelling the campaign. This flimsy tradition was pushed aside under the pressure of the expansion of media and the media savvy regime.

These developments led to a massive backlash from media, legislature and public, and led to a comprehensive overhaul of the Government Communication system in the United Kingdom. Here, the case has been used to illustrate the ethical conundrum that the field can present.

Government Communicators

Though the Government Co mmunication goes much beyond the professional communicators specially assigned to manage this

aspect of public administration, for this study and generally, they form a valid core of the study of the field. As seen above, recent developments have created a degree of distrust for these professionals but their requirement remains well recognized. Functionally speaking, practitioners have listed monitoring media coverage, briefing and advising political and policy officials, media relations, devising and execution communication campaigns, carrying communications across administration, researching and assessing public opinion as their key tasks (Édes, 2000).

From a more structural point of view, Avery et al., (1995) have elaborated on the functions of Government Communication professionals. According to them, key functions of public communications practitioners would include "increasing public awareness, changing inimical personal behaviour, keeping legislators informed, providing a 'window out' function for agency managers (and) facilitating the two-way communication between agencies and citizens that often results in modification of agency action as well as citizen behaviour".

Lee (1999) and Garnett (1992) have added that these practitioners are instrumental in fulfilling agency goals. Additionally, they say that public relations tools can be used to increase compliance and public support for new policies and laws, as well as for providing policy bureaucracy with insight relating to how publics will respond to the Government decisions enabling course correction. Communicators also keep citizens informed by updating them about "policies, procedures, requirements and conditions".

With this kind of centrality the public communicators have emerged as the key focus of Government communication models. These models constitute normative ideals of Government Communication.

<center>(V)</center>

Models of Government Communications

When we look at the model created to study Government Communication we tend to find that they are about efficiency and ethics of Government Communication. Three Models most widely used are Heise's Public communications model, the government communication decision wheel, and the three-dimensional model in Government Communications. However, Grunig and Hunt's (1984) four models of communications and public relations has been providing an overarching framework with which to analyse and classify the type of communication, though it was created for private sector.

The Government Communication Decision Wheel

The government communication decision wheel model (Liu & Horsley, 2007) lists the environmental characteristics of the public sector, which contains four coexisting, complementary micro-environments: multilevel, intragovernmental, intergovernmental, and external. The multi-level microenvironment involves more than one level of government coming together on an issue and maintaining relative autonomy. The intergovernmental environment is where two or more units at the same governmental level coordinate. An intragovernmental environment consists of single agency from any level of government. And finally, an external microenvironment where any level of government coordinates with external players like NGOs and private sector.

After establishing the levels, the model outlines eight key characteristics of government public relations — politics, public good, legal frameworks, media scrutiny, poor public perception, federalism, limited professional development opportunities, and lack of management support for communication. These characteristics are studied in all the four micro-environments. Over the years, the model has been applied by scholars (Liu et al.,

2010; Lee, 2008), and was found useful for public communicators to help them select the best communication tools for a given environment and characteristic.

Public Communication Model

Heise (1985) tried to address the problem of plummeting public trust in the Government by proposing an alternative model of proactive and ethical Government Communication. Heise proposed five ground rules to ensure that the public feels that they have the information to make informed decisions. First, government officials needed to make publicly available all releasable information, irrespective of that material being positive or negative for the organization, in a timely and completely accurate manner. The second is that communicators use a variety of communication channels in their efforts to communicate to the public, and not just the media in order to avoid dark areas. The third is that officials "seek to facilitate accurate, systematic, and timely feedback on policy issues from the entire community which they serve, rather than continue to rely on partial feedback from well-organized and politically active individuals and groups." Fourth, senior public officials should be scrupulous about not mixing public with political. Fifth, the top management of the organization should spearhead the culture of ethical communication.

Three-dimensional Model for Transparency in Government Communications

Fairbanks, Plowman, & Rawlins (2007) built upon the ideas of the Heise's (1985) model and Grunig and Hunt's (1984) four models of positive communication. The model stresses four parts: communication practices, organizational support, provision of resources, and finally the need to value transparency. In the last point, they are acknowledging the value system of the communicators as a key factor. Value for transparency is defined

as "to seek to communicate in transparent ways and to adopt practices that promote open information sharing." Resources are important, as without the proper resources, transparency cannot be attained. The third part, communication practices, emphasize the importance of the two-way symmetrical model of communication. The model aims to create an organizational culture that supports transparency. This necessitates a place for communicators at the management table. The element of organizational support envisages that the communicator should have an institutional mechanism to access information. Whereas, Heise (1985) was focussed on completeness and accuracy of the communication, the three-dimensional model stresses transparency. In this model specifically designated communicators are tasked with the duty of spreading transparency and transparent ideals throughout their agency.

Four models of Communication and Public Relations

Grunig and Hunt (1984) presented four models of communication or public relations: the press agentry/publicity model, the public information model, the two-way symmetrical, and the two-way asymmetrical models. The press agentry model is a one-way asymmetrical approach that is basically propaganda without much regard for accuracy and research. The public information model uses one-way communication to disseminate and distribute accurate, but very rarely negative information about an organization. The public information model is the model most often used by government communicators (Fairbanks et al, 2007, Martinelli, 2006). The model is least concerned with effectiveness and feedback. In two-way asymmetrical communication, where dialogue is present but the purpose is only the organization's benefit, and feedback is not used to change the stance of the organization. The two-way asymmetrical model uses research to know its publics and to know which messages would resonate most with them, and to create the most desirous outcome for the organization (Grunig, 1992).

This discussion has brought to the fore, the ethical dimension of Government Communications. These models have clearly favoured accurate, timely, complete communication, which is not only two-way but also attempts to create a shared realm of understanding about the key aspects of public life. Communication should assist in upholding the trust and should support transparency as a value. In case of the Government Communication, equal access is also an important ingredient of ethical behaviour. One of the grouses against the Blair's government media relations was that it was selective in giving news to media.

With this background we now come to Government Communication in India. An attempt will be made here to place the Indian system within the theoretical frameworks given above. Emphasis will be on ethical aspect of Government Communication in India but other environmental factors will also be examined with reference to the Indian reality.

(VI)

Indian Government System and the Normative Ideal

A normative ideal not only touches upon the desired ethical framework but also the prescribed norms of efficiency and strength of a system. As seen above, the literature on the Government Communication has also followed this. In this section, an effort will be made to situate the Indian Government Communication system in a type of communication with reference to the four models of Grunig and Hunt (1984). Here, the degree of application of Heise's (1985) five tenaets of Government Communication to ensure that public trust in Government remains intact will be checked. The environment of the Indian Government Communication system will be analysed within the framework of the government communication decision wheel model (Liu & Horsley, 2007) and the Three-dimensional model for transparency in government communications by Fairbanks, Plowman, & Rawlins (2007).

At this stage it must be clarified that the author is proceeding to give his personal views on the basis of two decades of experience in federal/central Government Communication. To the best of his knowledge, these models have not been used in the Indian situation. These views are not only personal but more in the nature of a curiosity about the reality of Indian Government Communication and hope to raise some academic interest so as to encourage more authentic and research-based study of this severely under-researched area.

Furthermore, as this is an analysis, based on personal experience of the author, it will focus exclusively on the domain of federal/central Government Communication in India. Designated communicators of the Indian Government work under the overall umbrella of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Indian Information Service, a central service populated by generalist and specialist civil servants qualify as designated communicators at the federal level within the parameters of existing studies (more prominently, Fairbanks, Plowman, & Rawlins, 2007). The press Information Bureau is the organization that provides Communication Officers of varying seniority to various Ministries and Departments; it will be the focus of this analysis. It must be noted that while the Press Information Bureau provides media relations and media feedback services (along with other tasks mentioned by Édes (2000), there are other Important department like the Directorate of Advertising & Visual Publicity for government advertising, Song & Drama Division and Directorate of Field Publicity for interpersonal Communication, Publication Division for book publishing and more recently New Media Wing that takes care of digital communication, though, digital communication through New Media has taken root in almost all Ministries and is functioning fairly independent of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Still, a significant number of digital initiatives are helmed by Information Service Officers posted as Media and Communication Officer or Departmental Publicity officers. The Press Information Bureau and its Officers have a mandate to interact with media under Allocation of Business Rules

that does the Work Allocation in the Government of India. From this core, they have been roped in for other communication activities and can be called designated communicators with valid justification.

Heise and Indian Reality

Heise proposed five ground rules to ensure that public feels that they have the information to make informed decisions. It has been noted that there has not been much research on how Heise Model is applied and to what extent this is actually applicable (Fairbanks, 2005). The first tenet that government officials needed to make publicly available all releasable information, irrespective of that information being positive or negative for the organization in a timely and completely accurate manner presents a mixed picture. Departmental Publicity Officers do not consider it part of their job profile to issue negative stories and it is left to journalistic enterprise to report on the negative aspects. Though under RTI anyone, including journalists, can get any information, both negative and positive, but under planned Government Communication negative publicity is avoided. However, for maintaining relationships and sometimes with the idea of 'making the best of a bad situation', the Officer may intervene to help the journalist obtain information or a quote for the story. However, of late, with citizen charters and RTI requirements, online posting of information is in fairly robust health from this point of view. Almost all data of the ongoing schemes and budget of the department is available on departmental website. Quality and updating schedule need to improve, but excellent websites are not very rare. There have been enough instances of negative media reports culled out from released government data on websites. Also certain types of data, for example, financial figures trade data, industrial output is released irrespective of the fact of their being flattering or otherwise for the Government of the day.

The second tenet is that communicators use a variety of communication channels in their efforts to communicate to the public, not just the media in order to avoid dark areas. Here Indian

Government Communication scores high as apart from media-related tools like press releases and press conferences, the government is also using social media and interpersonal communication along with advertising. While mass media might be hogging the limelight in the basket of Government Communication efforts, a mix of varied media is deployed with an eye for democratic access. The Public Broadcaster, as a mission, attempts to cover dark areas without giving undue importance to monetary aspects. Government advertising policy specifically supports small papers to promote grassroots level journalism.

The third point that officials "seek to facilitate accurate, systematic, and timely feedback on policy issues from the entire community which they serve, rather than continue to rely on partial feedback from well-organized and politically active individuals and groups" finds that the government is only in a nascent stage of taking feedback from public. While with the advent of social media and the internet in general, feedback has become easier but institutional preparedness for inclusion of varied voices in the policy making is still a little distant. Efforts like addressing grievances on social media, government taking suggestions on MyGov, putting up consultation papers on websites of the Ministries are a step in the direction but they need to be more pronounced and there is a need for trust among the public that their word counts. The process has begun but the distance is yet to be covered.

Fourth, senior public officials should be scrupulous about not mixing public with political. It is easier said than done as genuine coverage and communication of Government work may bring electoral gains. The avoidance of politics was the element of Heise's proposed model that seemed to be the most problematic (Fairbanks, 2005). Even a public service message is crafted to make the government look good. There is no overt dishonesty involved, but implications are generally beneficial for the ruling party. Indian communicators are normally clear about party-related publicity and the ruling party usually does not risk media criticism

for overtly using government resources for party purposes. However, politics plays a role in deciding the emphasis and direction of the communication. DPOs will not indulge in political advocacy or political criticism of the opposition, but government does deploy these resources for politically strategic places, and projection of political leaders is not rare. In fact, the Supreme Court had to intervene to stop the use of leaders' photographs for government advertisement. In short, Government Communication may sound like *His Masters' Voice*, but usually it does not venture into overt political propaganda. The number of politically appointed communicators is still low. Heise (1985) also recognized that there is a fine line between communicating about policies and promoting a political agenda. Indian Government Communication fares quite well on maintaining its institutional propriety. Mostly, the Government system has not been considered sharp enough. Moreover, the reputation penalty for using public resources for party purpose in the form of negative publicity has also discouraged it.Fifth, the top management of the organization should spearhead the culture of ethical communication. Indian bureaucracy, like any bureaucracy, is steeped in the value of secrecy. Communication remains an afterthought for policy bureaucracy unlike political leadership who see virtue in getting positive mileage. There are restrictions on talking to media and even the departmental communicator lacks the required access to information in many cases. 'Leaks" are not considered good. The commitment of the management to transparency varies and is dependent on self-interest rather than being guided by a value for transparency. Most of the time the Government does want better media coverage and for people to know the initiatives taken by the Government. However, this commitment for getting credit for its activities may be different from what Heise had in mind.

Indian Government Communication performs reasonably well as government data and releases, in general, are treated as authentic and the communicators, by and large do not indulge, in black propaganda. The code of conduct of bureaucratic propriety

remains mostly intact, sometimes to the disappointment of political leadership. Heise's model, while laying down the parameters of trust enhancing communication fails to talk about the environmental factors which are needed to study the dynamics of Government Communication in deeper and operational terms. For that we come to the government communication decision wheel given by Liu & Horsley (2007).

The Government Communication Decision Wheel Model

Multilevel Environment of the model can be seen in instances where various levels of government –central, state and local collaborate and maintain relative autonomy. An example can be seen in recent Swachchta (Cleanliness) drive where apart from centre States and Panchayat have come out with their own plans to promote one goal. The need for Inter-Governmental can be seen in almost every major campaign. For example the campaign on the 125 Years of Baba Saheb Ambedkar will go well beyond the Social Justice and Empowerment Ministry and will involve many other agencies including Information and Broadcasting, Culture, etc. And finally, an external microenvironment, where any level of government coordinates with external players like NGOs and private sector. The intra governmental example can be seen in day to day events, where self-contained campaigns are carried out. External environment is exemplified in campaigns like Start-Up India, where Government is coordinating with private associations and entrepreneurs. As can be seen from these boundaries collide and coalesce regularly. Swachchata Campaign is being carried out at almost all four levels simultaneously.

When we look at the eight key characteristics of government public relations -- politics, public good, legal frameworks, media scrutiny, poor public perception, federalism, limited professional development opportunities, and lack of management support for communication, the picture becomes clearer. It also provides some insights on why Indian Government Communication system performed alright on Heise Model.

We have already discussed how difficult it is to separate politics from Government Communication. Therefore, its impact can be seen in the communication efforts of the Government. A simple act of comparison of current better performance in a sector with previous performance has political connotations. As described in the United Kingdom case study, new governments look for "something sharper", and Government Communication machinery often comes under stress with this new surge of expectation. Deviations from prescribed norms may and do result.

The fact that the communication and information held by government is a public good is accepted, at least theoretically, and in the age of RTI it has also acquired an operational dimension. This puts public communicators in a more accountable situation. Where private communicators feel relatively insulated, the demand on government for information is rather strident and has a moral *locus standi*. This has resulted in a legal framework, specially RTI which define the communication scenario.

Media scrutiny is higher for public administration as they cannot claim the insulation that is often available to the private sector. Allison (2004) has argued that the media cover government decision-making more often than the actions of private companies and the media can influence the timing of government decisions. Governments also use media to inform their publics about their schemes (Lee 2001). Both these observations are true in the Indian context. Their expenses, motives and performance are not only audited internally but the public and media are always vigilant in order to find holes in the process. For example, Government advertisements were the subject of a recent Supreme Court judgement and the Judiciary found it fit to frame guidelines for a purely executive issue.

Public, with some justification, has often found the private sector to be more efficient. Government often suffers from negative perceptions about its responsiveness and levels of probity. Similarly the perception of the communication officer also matters. In certain cases, like Ministry of External Affairs (where

Information Service Officers are not deployed), spokespersons, due to both individual and structural reasons, have gained an aura of authority that gives them credibility. We discussed federalism in the case of multilevel environment above.

The last two points can be analysed together as they are more intimately related to the performance of the communicators and also indicate the devaluation of communication in a certain sense. Limited professional development opportunities and a lack of management support for communication are clearly applicable to the Indian context. The Government system works on the concept of reasonable career progression involving increasing responsibilities and commensurate resources and remuneration. From the promotion point of view, communicators are often up to 10 years behind their policy counterpart. More importantly, in many cases, promotion does not entail enriched responsibilities. For example, it is not uncommon that within a span of two to three years officers of three levels are made incharge of a particular Ministry. The job profile of a communicator remains the same despite promotion. Resource deployment is also an issue. To have one officer handling the media and communications responsibilities of more than one ministry is normal. Staff, equipment and management support leaves much to be desired. Integration of the communicators with the client ministries also impacts their performance. Usually, the communicator lacks the institutional mechanism of information flow to her. Also, often, there is suspicion among policy bureaucrats about the 'Half Journalist', the communicators. This makes life a bit difficult. A place for the communicator on management table is rare and her understanding of the material she is supposed to communicate is second hand and she is not in a position to intervene at the right time to embed communication strategies in the policy formation.

It is quite possible that Indian Government Communication passed the muster of relatively ethical communication in Heise model simply because it lacked the wherewithal to be 'something sharper'.

After studying this if we see Grunig and Hunt (1984) four models of communication or public relations i.e. the press agentry/publicity model, the public information model, the two-way symmetrical, and the two-way asymmetrical models, we will find that what was found by Fairbanks et al. (2007), Martinelli (2006) with regard to general scenario, is applicable to Indian situation also. The public information model that uses one-way communication to disseminate and distribute accurate, but very rarely negative information about an organization best describes the Indian Government Communication system. False propaganda and inaccurate information are not applicable. There are positive developments towards two way asymmetric communication especially with the use of the Internet and social media. MyGov, Twitter feedback on services, consultation papers, social media 'hangouts' indicate a desire for getting feedback and establishing a research based communication system. But the two way symmetric system that aims to develop relationships with publics against a backdrop of co-created shared meanings remains a far cry.

Conclusion

Fairbanks' (2005, 2007) study is based on interviews with Federal Government Communicators of the United States and much of it is applicable to the Central Government Communicators of India. Fairbanks has tried to give practical solutions for enabling ethics and transparency in the Communications. Where Heise has tried to present a vision of trust building Government Communication, Fairbanks gives the way to achieve this. Her first advice is to establish healthy communication policies like open Information sharing, accuracy of information, and knowledge about restrictions that are legally applicable. Communicators also need to be fairly trained not to fear the consequences of released information, and to use multiple sources to disseminate the information. These practices are not place specific. In India, any Government communicator grapples with these challenges

everyday. Headline coverage is both a matter of pride and fear. Access to accurate information is a prerequisite of a Communication Officers successful delivery. Here the model also stresses the need for building a relationship with the publics and making them part of the decision making process. There is a recognition of this in recent times in Indian Government Communication but the relationship and shared meaning project can at best be described as being in a nascent stage.

The second arm of the three dimensional model is organizational support. Here, there are valuable points for the Indian system. It envisages a catalyst's role for the manager who is the head of the organization. In reality, it is very clear that the organization takes its transparency and communication cues from the top. A media-savvy political or bureaucratic head often creates more enriching work environment for the communicator. Similarly, if the policy bureaucracy gives the communicator a place at the management table then the Government can communicate with more authority, accuracy and speed. This is exemplified by the Ministry of External Affairs, where the spokesperson, a senior career Diplomat, is part of all major decisions and kept in loop in all major issues. This has resulted in a more focused communication by the Ministry. The model also supports formal affirmation of communication ideals in the agency mission, which is bound to be useful in the Indian situation. The model also recognizes the need for resource allocation for communication as transparency and communication is a costly business.

The above discussion was devoted to looking at Indian Government Communication from the prism of available models, where Heise's model tested the trustworthiness of the Government Communication, and Grunig and Hunt's model situated the system in a public information model moving towards two-way asymmetric. The communication wheel analysed the environment of the Government Communication and finally, the three-dimensional model elaborated on the required practices. We will close the discussion by talking about Habermas's concept of Public Sphere (Habermas, 1962, 1989).

'Public Sphere' is a sphere between society and state where the public is solidified, according to Habermas, (1962). Hence, the public sphere is composed of private individuals whose societal interconnectedness transcends the boundaries of their personal lives. Here private individuals meet to create ideas that have a bearing on state authority. While being criticised for its inability to explain modern societal forces (Susen, 2011) or for creating a false feeling of unanimity, which may be a mask for suppression of dissent (Motion, 2005), 'public sphere' has emerged as a construct against which real world concepts can be measured. In its ideal form, it will be a space of consolidation of political will through the unrestricted flow of ideas informed by authentic information.

The ideal public sphere will be marked by a scenario where "all citizens have equal access to communication that is both independent of government constraint, and through its deliberative, consensus-building capacity, constrains the agendas and decisions of government in turn" (Bennett and Entman, 2001). Richards (2004) made it clearer when he wrote, In "Habermas' formulation, the public in the liberal democracies should be a participatory public, the collective of citizens engaged, ideally, in informed and rational discussion, and in dialogue with their leaders. This is the universal public, which occupies the public sphere in the strongly positive sense of shared space, independent of the state, in which public opinion can be formed through exchange and debate."

Seen from this angle, Government Communication finds a lofty calling -- a duty to develop and nurture the Public sphere as it requires a Government that is committed to be participatory and transparent. While Governments have the right to be persuasive in their presentation of policies to their voters they should keep public interest above gaining electoral mileage in executing communication with public money. This entails an obligation on the part of governments to be more accessible, responsive, transparent and free of spin than other institutions. Herein lies the importance and obligation of Government Communication. After

all, they are the key builders of that sacred space called the 'public sphere'.

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Labour's Spectral Presence in Supply Chains

Ranabir Samaddar

David Harvey in *Limits to Capital* notes the unrelenting circuits that capital-as-commodity must run through with the circuits having their own respective turnover time and often conflicting with each other. For its own realisation and expansion value must travel relentlessly through different forms predicated by their starting points (such as, money, fixed capital, or commodity such as consumer goods or raw material) with their own particular motions, and importantly with capital at times shrinking as part of it in money form is withdrawn from circulation so that it can be hoarded in order to be deployed again back into circulation to ensure more machineries, etc. These simultaneous motions are essential for capital to circulate and thus accumulate – actually from the first moment of its appearance when it has to confront labour and buy its power to produce value. As money becomes the most useful form in which capital can circulate, even when industrial commodities are also circulating to produce value, labour recedes from the scene. At times without any further addition to the total surplus value produced, capital in a particular form may increase. Time and space both play significant roles in this marginalisation of labour. This is now witnessed in a tidal wave of bankruptcies and closures of monetary institutions, which threaten to submerge global economy in a backlash against neo-

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liberal market economics. In a sense, then, free market neo-liberal economics means complete freedom for the various circuits to run even when competing and conflicting with each other to utter ruin.

The important point however is still the old classical one, namely that commodities are exchanged in the market not as equivalent use values; rather they are bought and sold for money. In other words, the use value of commodities must fulfil the material condition for restarting production through a particular circuit. While potentially money can be hoarded or put into circulation, capitalists through competition are driven to constantly throw their capital back into the circuit, however damaging the results are for the system as a whole. The specific labour embodied in every commodity, called concrete labour, is marginalized by what can be called total labour which each commodity represents as a portion of that total labour performed in society. This is what Marx had famously called abstract labour. In the process of exchange only that amount of labour socially necessary to produce the commodity under average conditions (that is with average levels of skill, etc.) will be considered valuable. The quantity of socially necessary labour embodied in different commodities, rather than all the diverse types of concrete labour involved become the source of all commodities' exchange values. Socially necessary labour time creates a benchmark which capitalists now must equal and beat. With socially necessary labour becoming crucial in the circulation of commodity, the law of value asserts itself like a law of nature under capitalism.

One may add that in this continuous metamorphosis not everything is transformed; the passage creates also waste. Thus waste of money, conduct, material, organic elements, biological remains, etc. becomes a permanent feature of capitalist circuits, and the capitalist circuit in one form or another must now begin to process waste also, because without that the logic of circuit cannot proceed. Waste appears as the other of value. Waste must now produce value, that is to say waste represents materiality's transmogrifications amidst the turmoil caused by global

capitalism marked by uncertainties of the regulatory modes of circulation. Waste represents capital's attempt to salvage, recuperate, and recycle the remains of production, the disposable that must not carry the guarantee that it will become irretrievably waste. Postcolonial labour is the guarantee that nothing will be an irretrievable waste for global commodity chain.

Given the dynamics of postcolonial capitalism, what is waste? Will there be ever in capitalist system of value production anything that will not have value? Is the point of departure always going to be the assumption that waste is a by-product, residual, epiphenomenal, and inconsequential for the understanding of value production and realization? Are we to consider it in the mirror of order/disorder binary? Or, is waste as the product of a contradictory process of value production and realisation, which now require fresh categorizations and value regimes? Also, given the fact that without labour (non-standardised, hence "creative"), waste renewal is not possible, how do we situate labour in the value chain of a commodity which puts capital at the centre and pushes labour at the margins?

Not without reason, contemporary global capitalism marked by increasing production of waste and recycling of waste is characterized at the same time by extreme wealth concentration, a rapidly expanding and largely impoverished global labour force, and an ever expanding waste reprocessing economy.[1] This is the

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[1] One report from Bangladesh states, 'Sixty per cent of iron used in the construction business in Bangladesh comes from the ship-breaking industry, earning the state-capitalist apparatus annual revenue of US$900 million. It employs 30,000 people directly and 250,000 people indirectly. Yet the labour laws in the sector are not applied to protect the workers from grievous injury. In the last decade 250 workers have died and more than 800 have been handicapped for life. Hulking steel remains of ships that took part in maritime trade across the earth's ocean spaces in the last century undergo radical transformation, reverting from ship back to steel. The process of breaking down the massive ocean liners uses a mixture of acetylene and muscular power. Within the rusting structural frames lie the secrets of steel reclaiming its form. Here is the inverse of the shipyards of northern maritime powers, where steel, through the power of capital infrastructure, was reshaped into

logic of global value chains to which everything useful must attach in order to be useful as exchangeable product. Global value chains must produce global poverty chains.

In context of all that have been referred to alluded to in this brief note, we can advance some provisional answers to the question, namely, why is living labour, which is to say the presence of labour, always spectral in the apparent world of commodity flows and capital flows? Why is its presence mostly ethereal, shadowy, and phantom like? Two reasons can be immediately forwarded.

One, knowledge of economy is always ruled by the economists, who as Marx pointed out "have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are artificial institutions; those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this they resemble the theologians, who likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion which is not theirs is an invention of men, while their own is an emanation from God. When the economists say that present-day relations – the relations of bourgeois production – are natural, they imply that these are the relations, in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but there is no longer any."[2] Therefore in the domain of economy, ruled by the economists who are

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objects that would produce the conditions for capital to reorganize itself. The long stretching beach and the bay provide the scenography as the labourers struggle to dismember rusting leviathans in the oily mud. The bosses of the ship-breaking yards of Chittagong have an appalling human rights record despite global media coverage and impose a notorious no-photography rule…' Ahmed, N. (2013). 'Entangled Earth', *Third Text*, 27 (1): 44-53): 50.

2 Marx, K. (1847). *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in Marx Engels Collected Works, Volume 6 (Mosocow: Progress Publishers, 1976) : 176

characterized by their lack of historical sense, the history of crises, interruptions, and labour's angry presence is always absent, at best marginally present. This is truer in postcolonial economies where organized and formalised wage labour is accompanied by various other discrete forms of labour. And second, as indicated, the history of economy never includes the history of strikes, for strikes and other similar actions are the only occasions when labour makes its presence felt.

But we can refer as well as to other factors related to the specific ways of capital accumulation in the postcolonial world, such as the primitive mode of accumulation, its significantly extractive nature, the importance of waste reprocessing in capital circulation, and the presence of a host of revenue sharing intermediaries in the process of realization of profit, which cannot be realized without sharing of revenues and at the same time which must be kept apart to the extent (historically) possible from the revenue sharing processes and functions, and thus the dominant but problematic presence of rent and interest in the circuits of capital. Labour is not solely a process between man and nature (common to all social forms of development), but a trait of a particular social development process, where labour becomes the abstraction of several productive activities. Labour is abstraction. Labour as abstraction is the way in which capitalism appropriates living labour. Labour in general is not only a category but it corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with relative ease transfer from one work to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. It loses the craft character of the past and becomes labour in general. It is not only a category, but labour in reality, which is labour: pure, simple, abstract labour; as Marx said, "absolutely indifferent to its particular specificity but capable of all specificities".

Is this not the situation in the postcolonial condition where labour migrates from work to work, and the peasant becomes a semi-worker to become a full worker only to return to till his/her small parcel of land or work in others' fields when industrial or

semi-industrial or semi-manufacturing, or even extractive jobs (like small scale and artisanal mining or sand mining, or stone crushing) become scarce? Some researchers think that because of a waning of our interrogations of agrarian society that we could not realise the implications of the changes in the agrarian order, and the metamorphosis of the peasant into a petty commodity producer, and the flexibilisation of labour form. While much of what they say about agrarian transformation is correct, they seem to be ignoring the fact that only with the rise of a city-centric economy and massive influx of migrant labour into for instance the cities and towns of India (with consequent studies on urban transformation and migrant labour) that we could get a sense of the said agrarian transformation and our understanding re-focused on what was happening to rural labour. The un-remunerative rural small scale economy, the impact of neo-liberal governance, massive migration, and consequent multiplication of labour forms – all these were much in evidence when the *Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganised Sector* came out in August 2007. Migration brought back the focus on studying labour forms. In this context it is important to note that the footloose postcolonial labour is also a consequence of international investment chains in countries like India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Colombia, Panama, Cambodia, Mexico, etc., in garment production, iron ore mining, manufacturing of ancillary parts and instruments in industries such as automobile, electronic production such as mobile telephony, leather products, toy industry, etc. These are overwhelmingly export oriented with the production sites being often special zones. Wages are often low, the work force is markedly female, and the labour supervision rules strict and marked with violence.

Another aspect of the same scenario is the supreme logistical sites (like building financial corridors, special economic zones, upgrading ports for greater container handling capacity, creating seamless multimodal transport hubs, building new towns, reprocessing e-waste, constructing highways, airports, and logistical cities, etc.), which require and create footloose labour –

the latter forever remaining in the shadows of the logistical sites, but moving on from construction work to plumbing to driving transportation vehicles, to perhaps quarrying or reprocessing urban e-waste. Profit is never derived from these logistical activities directly. For instance, in a new town where land prices will soar up, built in environment will rake in money, financial hubs will be established, BPOs will populate the town, and new steel and glass buildings will come up, the immediate revenue will be in form of rent and interest, whereas without labour the soil could not have been ready, bridges could not have been built, airports could not have been constructed, additional iron ore supply would have been impossible, and steel and glass buildings could not have come up, etc., etc. Yet, in this circuit of commodity circulation, capital will continuously change form, and value-producing labour will be more and more distant from the final stage when the profit will be realized from the capital invested, and revenue will be shared. Or, think of the capital (which deployed labour) that went into clearing the forest to open up an iron ore mine to produce steel to produce a crane to build a giant steel and glass house or a data centre in a new town so that a local version of the Silicon Valley would come up to produce programmes and facilitate information expansion and transmission. One will see capital is constantly moving between what Marx called Department I and Department II – between variable and fixed capital, or between fixed and fluid capital, consumer goods and capital goods, and money capital and industrial capital – pushing labour all the way through the process to obscurity. The entire process requires money which too circulates alongside the circulation of commodities (as consumer goods and capital goods), determining the quantum of profit and revenue and its sharing. Consideration of inflation is therefore important in an analysis of the circuits. Inflation and disturbances in the money circuit result in discontinuous renewal of capital, particularly fixed capital, and create disturbances in trade cycle, while concentrating wealth in fewer hands and reducing income of many – a story of infinite accumulation and perpetual divergence. The postcolonial state as

in India is therefore eternally wavering between increasing money supply and restraining it, and as a side show of this monetary exercise between increasing interest rate and decreasing it. Inflation may eat into wages, salaries, savings (idle capital), and interests, while a decrease in interest rate while reducing production cost (which includes payment of interest) and encouraging more circulation of capital may discourage savings and thus capital formation. It is a classic Foucauldian description of governmental dilemma: how much or how little, how to manage money supply so that capital and commodity flows in their interrelated trajectories may continue in an ideal way? Or, neoliberal management of economy would suggest, how much shock to administer so that the engine of capital can restart? How can the crisis of flows be turned into an advantage for capital? Or, how with the same quantity of money the economy can ensure more rapid monetary circulation, meaning that a greater volume of transactions is completed with the same quantity of money? Or, how can production of virtual additional capital be made possible within the production process itself that is by making money the most precious commodity, and thus short circuiting the process of production of other commodities? Labour's creation of value is an eternal victim to these vagaries.

'Accelerated Economic Growth' and 'Global Warming'

Shankar Sharma

In an article in *The Hindu* of 14.5.2016, C. Rangarajan, former Governor, Reserve Bank of India has said: "The "potential" to grow at 8 to 9 per cent at least for a decade exists. We have to make it happen." The successive governments in the country have been focusing on such a high GDP growth rate, as the road map to eliminate poverty in the country. After decades of such focus on high GDP growth rate, it has become essential to take stock of the experience for society as a whole. Instead, the question should be whether such a high growth year after year is desirable or whether it is in the true interest of our communities.

The country has been recording high GDP growth rate for many years. Since 1996 onwards the country has logged a high

Time taken for the size of economy to get multiplied at constant CAGR

CAGR Growth Percentage	Increase by 100%	Increase by 200%	Increase by 300%	Increase by 400%
@ 4%	19 Years	29 Years	36 Years	40 Years
@ 6%	13 Years	20 Years	25 Years	29 Years
@ 8%	10 Years	15 Years	19 Years	22 Years
@ 10%	8 Years	13 Years	16 Years	18 Years

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average GDP growth of more than 6% till 2005, and more than 7% since 2006 onwards (World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). Such high growth year after year can lead to the multiplication of the size of our economy as shown in the table. Whereas a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4% of GDP will take about 40 years to increase the size of our economy by 4 times, 10% CAGR of GDP will take only 18 years.

If the "potential to grow at 8 to 9 per cent at least for a decade" can be made to happen, as C. Rangarajan has suggested, the country's economy can become double in 9 to 10 years. The doubling of economy will lead to many other issues for society, besides doubling the 'wealth' of the country. The primary question should be whether this doubling of 'wealth' comes at a huge cost to some sections of our society, and how much.

A sustained high GDP growth rate will mean the manufacture of products and provision of services at an unprecedented pace leading to: setting up of more factories/ manufacturing facilities; increasing an unsustainable demand for natural resources such as land, water, minerals, timber etc.; acute pressure on the Government to divert agricultural /forest lands; huge demand for various forms of energy (petroleum products, coal, electricity etc.); accelerated urban migration; clamour for more of airports, air lines, hotels, shopping malls, private vehicles, express highways etc. A sharp increase in each of these activities, while increasing the total GHG emissions, will also add up to reduce the overall ability of natural carbon sinks such as forests to absorb GHG emissions. There will also be increased pollution of land, air and water along with huge issues of managing the solid, liquid and gaseous wastes.

At a time when our natural resources are getting depleted at an alarming rate, and when the pollution of air, water and land have become major health concerns, the above scenario cannot be ignored any longer, and hence needs due diligence.

The consequential social and environmental impacts of high GDP growth rate in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bolivia etc. for many years continuously should establish that the concerns are

similar everywhere, while the poverty has not been eliminated fully.

The net effect associated with high GDP growth target will be that the total GHG emissions will increase by a considerable margin, even if we adopt most energy efficient processes, and the reduced emission intensity of the state's GDP is feasible. The desirability of such high GDP growth rate scenario to our society needs to be questioned in the context that the increase in total GHG emissions will be closely associated with the increased pollution of air, land and water; and the increased denial of access to natural resources to the vulnerable sections of the society. Reduced area and density of forests, dammed rivers, forced displacements which will all be the consequences of a frenetic 8 - 9% GDP growth are bound to impact the vulnerable sections of our society adversely. Since the vulnerable sections of the society are also the most impacted lot due to climate change, the true relevance of such high GDP growth to our communities needs to be questioned and approached rationally.

A quick look at the possible impact of sustained high GDP growth on the critical sectors of the Indian economy can reveal a disturbing trend. The transport sector will demand much higher consumption of energy such as diesel, petroleum and LNG. These products which already have about 80% import content can only increase with disastrous consequences for energy security. The pollution loading of vastly increased consumption of petroleum products, which has given rise to concerns in urban areas already, is likely to reach extremely unhealthy levels. Along with increased GHG emissions and much higher levels of suspended particulate matter, the pressure on the transportation infrastructure can become unmanageable. Increased use of private passenger vehicles, which is already a huge concern in urban areas, will escalate to choke our roads and lungs. Vastly increased industrial activities, as a consequence of high GDP growth rate, will place an unbearable demand on land, fresh water, energy and other raw materials. Such a demand on land (such as in SEZs, coastal

industrial corridors, large size coal power plants, nuclear power parks, IT&BT parks etc.) has already given rise to a lot of concerns to social and health scientists, and already has witnessed social upheavals as in the cases of the Narmada valley, Singur in West Bengal, Niyamgiri Hills in Orissa etc.. Under such a scenario the industrial sector, which is already responsible for about 21% of GHG emissions in the country, will contribute hugely to the increase in total GHG emissions. Similarly, high GDP growth rate will lead to a steep increase in demand for building activities in the form of factories, transportation infrastructure, offices, hotels, airports etc. which in turn will place huge demand on construction materials and energy. In this scenario can the increase in GHG emissions be contained adequately?

The most telling impact of frenetic economic growth over the next 20 years will be on forests, rivers and other natural resources, which in turn will lead to reduced capacity of nature's carbon sinks. As against National Forest Policy target of 33% of forests & tree cover, the country has less than 20% of the same, whereas the forests in tropical countries are considered to be very important sinks of CO_2. The demand for additional lands and minerals for the increased activities in all the above mentioned sectors will further reduce the forest & tree cover, which in turn will severely impact the availability of fresh water as well as nature's ability to absorb GHGs. The impact of vastly reduced forest & tree cover on human health and on all aspects of our society is well known, and hence requires no detailed elaboration. Whereas the increased economic activities associated with high GDP growth rate will certainly result in vastly increased GHG emissions, the same will also reduce the ability of forest & tree cover to absorb GHG emissions from the atmosphere. In this scenario it is anybody's guess as to how the net GHG emissions can be reduced to an acceptable level.

The base line assumption (in Integrated Energy Policy of the erstwhile Planning Commission) that the country needs to sustain economic growth of 8 - 9 % over next 20 years to eradicate poverty and to meet its human development goals will lead to numerous

intractable social and environmental problems. Such a high growth rate has never been found necessary in developed economies, where even at the highest growth period they are reported to have registered only 3-4 % growth. The so called "trickle down" benefits to vulnerable sections of our society through 8-9 % growth will be negligible as compared to the all round benefits associated with inclusive growth of a much reduced rate, say 3-4%, if we harness our natural resources responsibly and equitably. Hence the obsession with high GDP growth rate target should be considered against a paradigm shift in our developmental objective, which will give priority for inclusive growth aimed at sustainable and responsible use of natural resources.

There is the critical need to appreciate the fact that there is a limit to nature's ability to support human activities / desire. Such a demand on nature must be carefully managed, which is not possible if we set a target a high GDP growth rate year after year for a huge population, which is also growing every year. The consequences of high GDP growth rate will result in depriving the weaker sections of the society of access to natural resources (such as to the forests, rivers and ocean), while driving the fragile environment to the point of no return. Does our society need such an eventuality? Is this desirable given our understanding of climate change?

The continued economic policy of high GDP growth rate by successive governments should be reviewed keeping in view the following issues:

a. Air pollution in India is so high that it kills half a million people every year.

b. Despite a high GDP growth rate since 1996, about 30% of the population in the country are reported to be below poverty line.

In a business as usual scenario

c. It is projected that about 60% of all the buildings we are likely to see in the country by 2050 are yet to be built;

d. Beyond 2050 at the global level the cities are projected to account for more than 60% of natural resources, energy and pollutants;

e. India's electricity consumption is projected to increase by 4 times by 2050.

A World Bank report of June 5, 2013 has highlighted how the environment has suffered in India as a consequence of past decade of rapid economic growth. The report titled "Diagnostic Assessment of Select Environmental Challenges, Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability: What Are the Trade offs?" has many revelations of critical importance to the future of our communities, provided our leaders take cognizance of it. Salient features of this report are as follows:

● Although the past decade of rapid economic growth has brought many benefits to India, the environment has suffered, exposing the population to serious air and water pollution.

● The report finds that environmental degradation costs India $80 billion per year or 5.7% of its economy.

● Green growth strategies are needed to promote sustainable growth and to break the pattern of environmental degradation and natural resource depletion. Emission reductions can be achieved with minimal cost to GDP.

● In this context it can be added that in the medium to long term such emission reductions can even add to GDP through positive feedback impacts.

● Simultaneously, poverty remains both a cause and consequence of resource degradation: agricultural yields are lower on degraded lands, and forests and grasslands

are depleted as livelihood resources decline. To subsist, the poor are compelled to mine and overuse the limited resources available to them, creating a downward spiral of impoverishment and environmental degradation.

- Environmental sustainability could become the next major challenge as India surges along its projected growth trajectory.

- A low-emission, resource-efficient greening of the economy should be possible at a very low cost in terms of GDP growth. While a more aggressive low-emission strategy comes at a slightly higher price tag for the economy it promises to deliver greater benefits.

- For an environmentally sustainable future, India needs to correctly value its natural resources, and ecosystem services to better inform policy and decision-making The report says Green growth is eminently feasible: Green growth is necessary; Green growth is affordable; Green growth is desirable; Green growth is measurable. It can be argued that without green growth, India's future development however measured will be at great risk.

- A low-emission, resource-efficient greening of the economy should be possible at a very low cost in terms of GDP growth. A more aggressive low-emission strategy comes at a slightly higher price tag for the economy while delivering greater benefits.

- Emissions reduction would have a minimal impact on GDP which would be offset by savings through improving health while substantially reducing carbon emissions. A 10% particulate emission reduction will lower GDP only modestly. GDP will be about $46 billion lower in 2030 due to interventions, representing a loss of 0.3 % compared to business as usual. A 30% particulate emission on the other hand reduction will lower GDP by about $97 billion, or 0.7 %.

- GDP growth rate will be negligibly reduced by about 0.02 to 0.04% in both scenarios. There will be significant health benefits under both scenarios which will more than compensate for the projected GDP loss.

- The savings from reduced health damages will range from $105 billion in the 30% case and by $24 billion with a 10% reduction.

- Under both the scenarios, another important benefit would be a substantial reduction in CO_2 as a co-benefit which has potential for being monetized.

- Taken together the CO_2 reduction and the health benefits will be greater than the loss of GDP in both cases.

It should become clear from these discussions that, whereas it is evident that an economic policy focusing on a high GDP growth rate year after year has not resulted in the elimination of poverty, it is certainly leading to the accelerated depletion of our natural resources and to unacceptable levels of pollution of land, water and air, while contributing to the global warming. Keeping in view the need to contain global warming and the vastly increasing pollution loading, the relevance of a high GDP growth rate paradigm for the country needs to be effectively discussed at the societal level from the perspective of overall welfare of every section of our society.

Should we not turn our attention to those economic activities which will not lead to further diversion of forest/agricultural lands, which will not demand much of water and energy, which will not lead to pollution of land, air and water, and which will lead to sustainable harnessing of our natural resources? Such activities may include, sustainable agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry, forestry, health and educational services, IT&BT, eco & health tourism etc.

In this context it is pertinent to know what Tamil Nadu State Action Plan on Climate Change (TNSAPCC) has said. It says: "Global development experience reveals that one percent growth

in agriculture (*and associated activities ?*) is at least two or three times more effective in reducing poverty than the type of same growth emanating from non-agricultural sector."

Are we rational enough to take a diligent view of all these and other associated issues in our development pathway as a truly welfare society?

Book Reviews

Parag Khanna (2016). Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization, Random House, 496 pages, ISBN-10: 0812988558, ISBN-13: 978-0812988550 ` 1712, $ 18

In the shadow of Brexit it might seem out of place to talk of a world moving inexorably towards a more connected future. If anything, it seems the world is becoming more inward looking, more closed. However, we would be too hasty if we were to interpret 'events' as signposts of historical change. Brexit, even if paradoxically, is a consequence of an increasingly connected world. And Brexiteers- a substantial majority of them- are people who feel increasingly 'left behind' by this rapid change.

Parag Khanna's Connectography, part travelogue, part contemporary history, is an account of this new, integrating world. The 'hardware' of this historical change is physical infrastructure - from ports to pipelines, from shipping lanes to railway lines, from airlines to internet cables, all on hyperdrive, creating cascading connections across space and time, integrating distant geographies, and recreating the world from one of political states into a world of supply chains. This is Parag Khanna's vision of today's world - where it's not just trade that follows the flag, but one in which the flag marches onward to new frontiers, steamrolling obstacles, be they physical or political, creating seamless spaces of flows for supply chains that follow. This brave new world is the apogee of the geopolitics-geoeconomics nexus- the ultimate convergence between statecraft and economic policy.

Khanna unravels this convergence through the chronicle of his travels across continents, following the path of the infrastructure of flows he describes in sometimes overwhelming detail. The book is rich, perhaps over-ripe, in information. Khanna has traveled to almost every site, every place of significance, in this newly networked world, examining every node in his exploration of the shape of what we can call the architecture of new 'connectographies' that seeks to if not replace then at least render irrelevant, the geographies of place with a new logic- a logic of seamless spaces of flow.

What is the underlying structure of this new logic of flow? Khanna puts forward what we can call the three propositions of the world defined by its connectographies. 'First, connectivity has replaced division as the new paradigm of global organization' (Khanna, Kindle DX location 308). To understand the nature of this 'connectivity' one must look at 'functional infrastructure'- super-highways, transoceanic internet cables, transport corridors- rather than the 'outdated' political infrastructure of political borders and boundaries. 'Borders tell us who is divided from whom by political geography. Infrastructure tells us who is connected to whom by functional geography' (Khanna, Kindle DX location 641).

Second, devolution is the most powerful political force of the age (Khanna, Kindle DX location 308). Political devolution is represented by a distinct movement of power and decision-making authority from central governments to mega-cities. Simultaneous to this devolution of power, is an unfolding aggregation of smaller political units into what Khanna calls 'commonwealths of shared resources', typified by 'dynamic regional federations', such as those in East Africa and South East Asia.

Third, and perhaps, most important, 'the nature of geopolitical competition is evolving from war over territory to war over connectivity' (Khanna, Kindle DX location 308). This emerging arena of competition means nations, or economic units, are engaged in a constant 'tug-of-war' to realign the directional flows

of supply chains towards 'nodes', cities or Special Economic Zones (SEZs) located in their territories, or in other territories subject to their control- such as overseas ports, offshore sites, etc.

This is the logic that operates in creating the brave new world defined by its 'connectographies', which in our era of almost limitless technological imagination can radically change even the most persistent 'textures' or 'traps' of geography.

At first thought, parts of Parag Khanna's book might remind one of arguments appearing in Thomas Barnett's argument of integrated spaces vs. nonintegrated gaps, which proposes that lesser connected regions of the world are more volatile- this receives mention in the book (Khanna, Kindle DX location 1082); or Thomas Friedman's Flat World thesis, which argues, for example, that Bangalore is more connected to California than perhaps other cities within India, (Khanna, Kindle DX location 1111). Although, to be fair, 'connectographies' are not so much about 'flattening' of diversities of place as they are about the a compression of time and space, a la David Harvey.

The compression of global time-space, through physical modification of what Henri Lefebvre refers to as the 'texture of space', though, involves, clearly, acts of force, but also, violence. This is starkest when the functional geography of the spaces of flows, such as the making of transport corridors, as in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), comes into conflict with the unique 'challenges' of the spaces of places, in all their uniqueness, of both diversity and adversity. In the case of the CPEC, the logic of connectography meets its starkest challenge. The logic of flows is countered with all challenges it seeks, even claims, to supersede political boundaries, geopolitics and geostrategy, not to mention the greatest challenge of all- the question of equity, fairness and justice.

Whom do the spaces of flows serve, whom are they for? What do corridors connect? Do they connect enclaves where access is limited to those who fulfill the criteria of value, defined in terms of economic or knowledge potential for the neo-liberal global

economy? Or do they act as entreports for the unprivileged and the disenfranchised to access higher echelons of prosperity and well-being? For the most part, Khanna is vague, perhaps value neutral, in his assessments, though he does mention the wealth-creating potential of the new connectographies. Khanna does call for a 'new moral compass' for our emerging world of tomorrow, perhaps only because unless justice and equity are delivered, the 'global underclass revolt' could result in the unravelling of all there is and all that has become. Apart from this somewhat ominous warning, Khanna does not delve into the problem of rising inequality and the problem of distribution. His vision, and solution, is rather functional- the 'greatest good for the greatest number' so that the pyramid of inequality becomes a diamond, with a 'large middle class'. Khanna ignores the fact that a cut diamond is composed of many small pyramids of its own. His future is no utopia of 'each according to his ability, to each according to his need'. Perhaps, intentionally so, but it is a better world than the one of today, divided perpetually between the 'movers' and the 'move-nots'. Mobility, Khanna, says 'ought to be one of the paramount rights of the twenty-first century' (Khanna, Kindle DX location 5960).

Connectography has some shortcomings, which can easily be corrected in future editions, which the book definitely deserves. The book has a lot of information, collected by the author during his travels, across the world, on all continents, barring one. At times it seems that the structure of the book is determined more by the author's itinerary than an underlying unifying question. The information overload can sometimes get overwhelming, and at other times read like an aggregation of news reports, rather than a structured argument. It would really help if the author gave a little more time in developing his theoretical propositions regarding the logic of connectography, and carrying them through the text, consciously. Perhaps keener editing could make the arguments sharper and more focused on explaining the architecture of connectivity as a global system, rather than individual projects at different sites in the world.

Connectography is an informative, and even enjoyable book. The author brings in his personality into his writing and that makes the text more readable and alive. The most important contribution of the book is its maps. Connectography is not, fundamentally, about an integrated flattening world, it is about how a world in flux can be grasped, mapped and seen, through texts such as the book itself, and through the mapping tools the author uses to depict this connecting world. Khanna generously lists out, throughout the book, mapping tools and software, which in itself make the book worth its value. In fact, it is a gift to students and researchers, and a comprehensive travel guide for exploring the world of tomorrow.

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Edited Book

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Chapter in Edited Book

Mastanduno M. (2014) 'Realism and Asia' in Pekannen, S. M., Ravenhill, J. and Foot, R. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia,* Oxford: Oxford University Press: 25-44.

Internet Source

Thayer, B. A. (2006). 'In Defense of Primacy', *The National Interest*, available at http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/in-defense-of-primacy-1300 (accessed 19 August 2016).

Newspaper

Pradhan, B. (2006). 'India's Foreign Policy', *Hindu*, 26 June.

New York Times (2005). 'US-NATO Alliance', 5 April (for news items).

Report*s*

Ghuman, R.S., Singh, S. and Brar, J.S. (2005). *Unit Cost of Higher Education in Rural Punjab: A Case Study of Universities and their Affiliated Colleges*, New Delhi. A Report submitted to the Association of Indian Universities (AIU).

Thesis

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